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Monitoring others’ actions, and our control over those actions, is essential to human 
social reciprocity. One such everyday social interaction is joint attention when one 
person follows another’s direction of gaze to a referent object. When initiating joint 
attention (also known as “gaze leading”), reciprocal gaze responses must be 
processed rapidly. Therefore, we need to detect and sense agency over these social 
outcomes. If we cause an outcome, a compression of perception of time occurs 
between our action and its outcome. This phenomenon is termed temporal binding 
(also called intentional binding), believed to evidence an implicit sense of agency. 
Using a temporal binding paradigm, Experiments 1-5 evidence an implicit sense of 
agency for gaze shift responses to gaze leading. Using an old/new recognition 
paradigm, Experiments 6-7 evidence equal, high performance for recognition of 
unfamiliar faces for both previously encountered congruent and incongruent gaze 
responses to gaze leading. Experiment 8 employed electroencephalography to 
explore whether the neural system differentiates congruency of gaze shift elicited by 
gaze leading, finding, for the first time, N170-like evidence of this. Combining 
previous literature and the new findings in this thesis, a new neuro-cognitive model 
of joint and shared attention is proposed. This encapsulates the processes at work for 
both the gaze leader and gaze follower, the associated neural mechanisms and the 
subsequent social cognition processes which can ensue. 
  





Abstract ............................................................................................................ 1 
Contents ........................................................................................................... 2 
List of Tables.................................................................................................... 8 
List of Figures .................................................................................................. 9 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ 11 
Author’s declaration ....................................................................................... 12 
SECTION 1 : Introduction and Aims............................................................. 13 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................. 13 
Aims and Objectives ............................................................................... 14 
Thesis Summary ..................................................................................... 14 
The Importance of Eye Gaze Processing ................................................ 15 
Literature Review ....................................................................................... 16 
Glossary .................................................................................................. 16 
Joint and Shared Attention ...................................................................... 16 
Developmental Trajectory of Joint Attention ......................................... 17 
Autism and Joint Attention ..................................................................... 19 
Other Animals’ Gaze Behaviour ............................................................. 22 
Sense of Agency and Joint Attention ...................................................... 23 
Electrophysiological Correlates of Joint Attention ................................. 24 
Current Theories and Models of Shared Attention ................................. 26 
Neural Mechanisms of Joint Attention ................................................... 28 
Concluding Remarks............................................................................... 31 
Outline of Thesis ..................................................................................... 31 
SECTION 2: Experimental Chapters ............................................................. 32 
Chapter 2: Sense of Agency Over Responses to Gaze Leading .................... 33 
Explicit and Implicit Agency...................................................................... 35 
Temporal Binding ....................................................................................... 36 
Theoretical Models of Sense of Agency and Implicit-Explicit Agency 
Dissociation ................................................................................................ 40 
Neural Mechanisms of Sense of Agency ................................................... 42 
Eye Gaze and Social Attention ................................................................... 44 




Joint Attention ............................................................................................ 44 
Distortions of Perceived Time Associated with Eye Movements .............. 47 
ASC and Sense of Agency ......................................................................... 47 
ASC and Joint Attention ............................................................................. 48 
Experiment 1 .................................................................................................. 49 
Experiment 1 Method ................................................................................. 49 
Participants.............................................................................................. 49 
Design.. ................................................................................................... 50 
Stimuli ..................................................................................................... 50 
Apparatus and materials.......................................................................... 51 
Procedure. ............................................................................................... 51 
Experiment 1 Results .................................................................................. 52 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction. .................................. 52 
Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset 
analyses ................................................................................................... 56 
Correlation analysis of explicit and implicit agency findings ................ 58 
Correlation Analysis of AQ .................................................................... 59 
Experiment 1 Discussion ............................................................................ 59 
Experiment 2 .................................................................................................. 60 
Experiment 2 Method ................................................................................. 60 
Experiment 2 Results .................................................................................. 61 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction ................................... 61 
Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset 
analyses. .................................................................................................. 63 
Correlation analysis of explicit and implicit agency findings ................ 64 
Correlation analysis of AQ ..................................................................... 64 
Experiment 2 Discussion ............................................................................ 64 
Experiment 3 .................................................................................................. 65 
Experiment 3 Method ................................................................................. 65 
Experiment 3 Results .................................................................................. 66 




Reproduction error and percentage reproduction ................................... 66 
Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset 
analyses………………………………………………………………...67 
Correlation analysis of explicit and implicit agency findings ................ 68 
Correlation analysis of AQ ..................................................................... 69 
Experiment 3 Discussion ............................................................................ 69 
Chapter Discussion ..................................................................................... 70 
Temporal binding findings...................................................................... 71 
Explicit and implicit agency ................................................................... 73 
Autism-like traits and binding and agency effects……………………..73 
Limitations and Future Directions .............................................................. 74 
Conclusions ................................................................................................ 77 
Chapter 3: Further Investigation of Sense of Agency Over Responses to Gaze 
Leading ........................................................................................................... 78 
Experiment 4 .................................................................................................. 80 
Experiment 4 Method ................................................................................. 80 
Participants.............................................................................................. 80 
Stimuli. .................................................................................................... 80 
Apparatus and materials.......................................................................... 81 
Design ..................................................................................................... 81 
Procedure. ............................................................................................... 81 
Experiment 4 Results .................................................................................. 82 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction ................................... 82 
Secondary measures and manipulation checks ....................................... 84 
Experiment 4 Discussion ............................................................................ 85 
Experiment 5 .................................................................................................. 85 
Experiment 5 Method ................................................................................. 86 
Experiment 5 Results .................................................................................. 87 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction ................................... 87 
Secondary measures and manipulation checks ....................................... 88 




Experiment 5 Discussion ............................................................................ 88 
Chapter Discussion ..................................................................................... 89 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 90 
Chapter 4: Examining Effects of Gaze Responses on Face Recognition ...... 91 
Face Recognition ........................................................................................ 92 
Face Recognition in Autism ....................................................................... 93 
Joint Attention and Gaze Behaviour Effects on Memory .......................... 93 
Experiment 6 .................................................................................................. 95 
Experiment 6 Method ................................................................................. 95 
Participants.............................................................................................. 95 
Stimuli. .................................................................................................... 95 
Apparatus and materials.......................................................................... 96 
Design ..................................................................................................... 96 
Procedure ................................................................................................ 97 
Experiment 6 Results .................................................................................. 98 
Data processing ....................................................................................... 98 
Recognition ............................................................................................. 98 
Reaction time for gaze leading task ........................................................ 98 
Reaction time for face recognition task .................................................. 98 
AQ correlational analyses ....................................................................... 99 
CFMT correlational analyses .................................................................. 99 
Experiment 6 Discussion .......................................................................... 100 
Experiment 7 ................................................................................................ 100 
Experiment 7 Results ................................................................................ 101 
Data processing ..................................................................................... 101 
Recognition ........................................................................................... 101 
Reaction time for gaze leading task ...................................................... 101 
Reaction time for face recognition task ................................................ 101 
AQ Correlational analyses. ................................................................... 103 
CFMT correlational analyses ................................................................ 103 




Experiment 7 Discussion .......................................................................... 104 
Chapter Discussion ................................................................................... 104 
Limitations and Future Directions ............................................................ 105 
Conclusions .............................................................................................. 106 
Chapter 5: Follow my Lead: Event-related Potentials Elicited by Responses 
to Joint Attention Initiation .......................................................................... 107 
N170… ..................................................................................................... 109 
P3….. ........................................................................................................ 110 
N300.. ....................................................................................................... 110 
N2pc……………………………………………..………………………111 
Autism-like Traits ..................................................................................... 111 
Experiment 8 ................................................................................................ 112 
Current Study Aims .................................................................................. 112 
Experiment 8 Method ............................................................................... 112 
Participants............................................................................................ 112 
Stimuli. .................................................................................................. 113 
Apparatus and materials........................................................................ 113 
Procedure .............................................................................................. 113 
Data acquisition .................................................................................... 114 
Experiment 8 Results ................................................................................ 116 
Gender categorisation data.................................................................... 116 
AQ data ................................................................................................. 117 
ERP Analysis ........................................................................................ 117 
Experiment 8 Discussion .......................................................................... 121 
Limitations and Future Directions ............................................................ 124 
Conclusions .............................................................................................. 125 
SECTION 3: General Discussion ................................................................ 126 
Chapter 6: General Discussion and Conclusion ........................................... 127 
Results Overview ..................................................................................... 128 
Agency. ................................................................................................. 128 
Face recognition memory ..................................................................... 129 




Neural mechanisms ............................................................................... 129 
Autism-like traits……………………………………………………...130 
Further Discussion of Results ................................................................... 130 
Agency Findings ................................................................................... 130 
Face Recognition Findings. .................................................................. 132 
Neural Findings..................................................................................... 133 
Integrated Discussion of Results. ......................................................... 133 
Limitations and Future Directions ............................................................ 134 
Model of Shared Attention and Associated Neural Mechanisms……….135 
How experiments 1-8 contribute to the model...................................... 138 
Application of the model to theory. ...................................................... 139 
The neural network in the model. ......................................................... 140 
Cognitive outcomes in the model. ........................................................ 141 
Thesis Summary ....................................................................................... 142 
References .................................................................................................... 144 
Appendices ................................................................................................... 160 
Appendix A: Stephenson et al. (2018) ......................................................... 160 
Appendix B: Autism Spectrum Questionnaire…………………………….200 
Appendix C: AQ Sub-scales analyses……………………………………..204 
  




List of Tables 
Table 1 fMRI Evidence for Distinct and Common Brain Regions Activated 
During Initiating and Responding to Joint Attention Reported by Redcay et 
al. (2012)………………………………………………………………………… ...29 
Table 2 Mean and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) for Reproduction 
Errors (ms) and Explicit Agency Ratings (from 1 to 8) in all conditions and 
the Agency Rating Difference. …………………..............................................54 
Table 3 Reproduction errors for each condition for Experiments 3 and 4. 
Confidence intervals are based on 1000 bootstrap samples………………..83 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics RT (in milliseconds) for old/new task and 
correlation coefficients with AQ sub-scale scores, with 95% BCa confidence 
intervals reported in parenthesis………………………………………….205 
 
  




List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 The three empirical strands of this thesis, 
investigating the gaze leader in a joint attention 
interaction 
15 
Figure 2 Graphical abstract summarising the expected 
temporal binding effect for causing gaze shifts in 
others in response to gaze leading 
34 
Figure 3 The Libet-clock method used by Haggard et al. 
(2002), figure taken from Moore and Obhi (2012) 
37 
Figure 4 Illustration of the compression or extension of 
perceived time intervals 
38 
Figure 5 Account of optimal cue integration underlying the 
experience of agency 
41 
Figure 6 Increased activation of angular gyrus when 
reported sense of control decreased 
43 
Figure 7 Graphs taken from Pfeiffer et al. (2012) showing 
self-reported relatedness of gaze reaction 
46 
Figure 8 Trial sequence for the Active Gaze Leading task 50 
Figure 9 Mean percentage reproductions for Experiment 1 55 
Figure 10 Mean percentage reproductions for Experiment 2 62 
Figure 11 Mean percentage reproductions for Experiment 3 66 
Figure 12 Trial sequence for the Saccade task 81 
Figure 13 Mean percentage reproductions by condition for 
Experiment 4 
84 
Figure 14 Trial sequence for the Passive Object task 86 
Figure 15 Mean percentage reproductions by condition for 
Experiment 5 
87 
Figure 16 Trial sequences and examples of stimuli for the 
Gaze Leading task 
96 
Figure 17 Mean Reaction Times to report old/new for foils, 
joint attention (JA) and non-joint attention (non 
JA) faces Experiment 6 
99 
   




   
Figure 18 Mean Reaction Times to report old/new for foils, 
joint attention (JA) and non-joint attention (non 
JA) faces Experiment 7 
102 
Figure 19 Mean Reaction Times to report old/new for foils, 
joint attention (JA) and non-joint attention (non 
JA) faces Experiments 6 and 7 
103 
Figure 20 Trial sequences and examples of stimuli 
Experiment 8 
113 
Figure 21 Regions of interest for the ERP analysis 116 
Figure 22 Mean amplitudes for the time window 170-230 ms 
for each electrode in the regions of interest 
117 
Figure 23 Grand Averaged ERPs 118 
Figure 24 A scalp map showing the gaze response difference 
effects 
119 
Figure 25 Grand averaged ERPs (n = 35) in response to gaze 
onset for electrodes P8 and Cz 
120 
Figure 26 Neurocognitive Model of Joint and Shared 
Attention 
137 
   
Figure A1 Scatterplot showing the positive correlation 
between scores on the AQ sub-scale for attention 
to detail 
204 
Figure A2 Scatterplot showing the positive correlation 
between AQ scores and the RT to report the 
gender of non joint attention faces. 
 
205 
Figure A3 Scatterplot showing the negative correlation 
between scores on the AQ sub-scale for 
imagination 
206 
Figure A4 Scatterplot showing the positive correlation 












First and foremost, I would like to express huge gratitude to my supervisor, 
Andrew Bayliss, whose support, wisdom, patience and kindness have known no 
bounds throughout my work with him. He invested in me when I was an 
undergraduate and has inspired and encouraged me every step of the way since.  
There is simply no better supervisor than him, anywhere. Secondly, I thank Gareth 
Edwards who has provided brilliant academic and moral support in equal measure, 
and has been, and continues to be, an ideal mentor.  
 I thank also my other supervisors, Louis Renoult and Martin Doherty, who 
have both given me much valued support and advice. I thank Bayliss Lab members, 
past and present, who all influenced my research in some way and provided excellent 
examples to follow, particularly Emma Howard.  
 I owe an enormous debt to all my fellow PhD students, past and present, at 
UEA School of Psychology in whose warm embrace I have shared good and bad 
times and always found great support, comfort and friendship and, above all, much 
laughter. Special mention here goes to Marianna Stella and Laura Forder. I am 
indebted to all the Psychology lecturers at UEA who have taught me so much in the 
past seven years since I started my undergraduate degree as a middle-aged student, 
full of trepidation, during what turned out to be the best mid-life crisis ever. I also 
thank all the support staff, past and present, in the School of Psychology who work 
so hard to keep everything running smoothly. Particular thanks to the brilliant Jackie 
Orford and Scott Steward. I thank, too, all the people who have participated in the 
research in this thesis. 
 Last but never least, thanks to my family, to my mother, Lyn, and step-father, 
Jez, and sister, Claire, who always inspire me and support me way beyond what I 
deserve. Thanks to my perfect son, Ben, who has grown into a wonderful young man 
as I have ventured through this PhD and who makes me happy every day. Finally, 
the greatest debt I owe is to my partner, Andrew Spencer, with whom I have been so 
lucky to share 25 years of unwedded bliss. He is, and always will be, my hero. 
  






I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other 
award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully 
acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others. 
 
Some of the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3 has been communicated to the 
scientific community by publication in Cognition (experiments 1, 2 & 4). This paper 
can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. 
Approval has been sought and granted by the School of Psychology Ethics 





















SECTION 1 : Introduction and Aims 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
  




“The countenance is the portrait of the soul, and the eyes mark its 
intentions.” 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, 106-43 B.C. 
Aims and Objectives 
 The aim of this thesis is to increase existing knowledge about the neural and 
cognitive processes at work when we lead someone’s gaze towards an object to 
engage in joint attention. Specifically, the effects on the joint attention initiator when 
a gaze bid is reciprocated or rejected will be explored. This chapter will begin by 
outlining in more detail the purpose and aims of the thesis in a thesis summary. 
Then, why these processes are an important part of our everyday social encounters 
will be explained, followed by a review of the relevant literature. 
Thesis Summary 
 The primary aim of this thesis is to add to what is known about the gaze 
leader during a joint attention interaction, to seek to offer greater balance in the 
literature which has begun to investigate the gaze leader, yet still more is known 
about the gaze follower. I seek to do this by investigating the gaze leader’s 
behavioural and neural mechanisms which are deployed during joint attention. One 
consequence of this additional data about the gaze leader will be to help inform 
another primary aim of the thesis which is to put forward a novel, comprehensive 
neuro-cognitive model of joint and shared attention. A secondary aim of the thesis is 
to examine any individual differences for any effects revealed in the studies, 
specifically, related to autism-like traits, because the reviewed literature suggests 
some sub-optimal joint attention behaviours. There are two strands to the 
behavioural consequences of gaze leading. The first strand examines an action 
understanding question of whether we feel a sense of agency over the responses we 
elicit in others’ gaze behaviours. The second strand examines any effects upon facial 
recognition. The third strand is neural, seeking to find electrophysiological evidence 
that a distinction is made between eliciting congruent and incongruent responses to 
our joint attention bids. Figure 1 depicts these three strands (two behavioural, one 
neural).  
 






Figure 1. The three empirical strands of this thesis, investigating the gaze leader in a 
joint attention interaction. 
 
The Importance of Eye Gaze Processing 
The morphology of the human eye with distinctive white sclera ideally 
facilitates detection of gaze signals (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001) and so gaze can 
be prioritised in the visual system by an extensive neural network, identified as 
involved in gaze processing (see Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009; for a review). The 
cooperative eye hypothesis is that human eyes have evolved to serve the need for 
social interactions, and are, therefore, highly visible (Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann, & 
Call, 2007). This is important because gaze information processing can help us 
access other’s theory of mind (see Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 2007; 
Emery, 2000; Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000, for reviews). Furthermore, gaze 
following is one of the key cognitive processes which enables us to learn through 
observation (Frith & Frith, 2007).  
Direct gaze, which is often a precursor to initiating joint attention, is a crucial 
stimulus which we prioritise during our social cognition processing and modulates 
our behaviour, depending upon context (see Hamilton, 2016, for a review). There is 
even a clear preference for the amount of time we feel comfortable with gaze being 




directed towards us (Binetti, Harrison, Coutrot, Mareschal, & Johnston, 2015). 
Therefore, converging evidence shows that gaze processing is a key component of 
many aspects of social cognition. 
Literature Review 
This review will summarise findings about joint and ‘shared attention,’ the 
latter being a state where at least two individuals are attending the same object, and 
are aware of one another’s states. A great deal is known about joint attention, but the 
specific contribution of this review will be to synthesise new insights from 
neuroscience and behavioural work on initiating joint attention (also known as “gaze 
leading”). This is critical for the higher-level state of shared attention.  
Because the role of the initiator has been wholly neglected in the literature 
until the past eight years, a complete picture of both agents during shared attention 
has been missing but is now starting to emerge. Furthermore, those diagnosed with 
autism have been found to have more deficits in initiating than responding to joint 
attention (Mundy & Newell, 2017; Nation & Penny, 2008) and so this review will 
include the most recent findings about joint attention in autism. Some key terms 
involved in joint attention and used throughout the thesis are defined in the glossary. 
 
Joint and Shared Attention 
Joint attention occurs when an individual (the initiator) gazes at an object, 
causing another individual (the responder) to orient their gaze to the same object. 
Shared attention can be definitionally distinct from joint attention in that both agents 
are aware of their shared attentional state (Emery, 2000). However, this distinction is 
not always made clear. The two terms are often used interchangeably and some 
Glossary 
Gaze cueing: when a gaze shift towards a location causes another person to reorient their  
gaze towards the same location. 
Gaze following: the act of following the direction of another’s gaze in response to  
gaze cueing. 
Gaze leading: the act of the joint attention initiator in attempting to cause the  
responder to follow their gaze. 
Joint attention: a triadic interaction during which one person orients their gaze in  
the direction of another’s gaze towards a referent object. 
Shared attention: the same as joint attention except that both parties are aware of  
their joint attentional state. 




researchers use the term joint attention to include shared knowledge of attentional 
focus, whilst others do not (see Carpenter & Call, 2013, for more detailed discussion 
of this). I argue that it is preferable to use two different terms to make the distinction 
clear. Whilst they are tightly related processes, acknowledging the distinction 
between them allows a more nuanced examination of their underpinning cognitive 
mechanisms. Therefore, the definitions of joint attention and shared attention offered 
by Emery (2000) are adopted here; shared attention requires both parties to know 
they are mutually attending to the same referent object, whilst joint attention does 
not.  
Initiating shared attention seems to set us apart as a species. Whilst some 
non-humans show the ability to follow gaze (e.g. macaques; Rosati, Arre, Platt, & 
Santos, 2016), only humans appear to initiate a share attention interaction for the 
sole purpose of sharing attention (Carpenter & Call, 2013). Despite this, the research 
has only recently begun to focus on the initiator of the interaction. Over the past 15-
20 years, greater understanding of social cognition has resulted from extensive 
research into gaze following (from the responder’s perspective) and the 
accompanying affective, behavioural and neural mechanisms. Much of what we 
already know about the role of joint attention has come from developmental work on 
the trajectory of infant-mother social gaze behaviours, and so it is to this work that I 
turn first.  
Developmental Trajectory of Joint Attention 
From birth, human infants show orientation towards eye contact (Farroni, 
Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). There is some evidence for neonates having an 
ability to follow eye gaze, at least if they have seen the preceding eye movement 
(Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson, 2004), and there is evidence for gaze 
following ability in three month-olds (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998). However, 
despite these studies, it remains debated precisely when infants do meaningfully 
follow gaze cues partly because what constitutes gaze following can vary between 
studies. One longitudinal study found gaze following developed between two and 
eight months and stabilises by between six and eight months (Gredebäck, Fikke, & 
Melinder, 2010). Index-finger pointing then emerges at eight to twelve months and 
has been thought to be the first indication that the desire to share attention is 
developing, although there is evidence that holding out an object and giving it to an 




adult is a precursor to this behaviour (Cameron-Faulkner, Theakston, Lieven, & 
Tomasello, 2015). 
Once gaze following has developed, joint attention, a pivotal part of 
developing social cognition can emerge. “Inter-subjectivity” is the sharing of 
experiences between people (Bard, 2009; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). In an infant’s 
first year the child and the primary caregiver share attention in their dyad and this is 
known as the “primary intersubjective” stage (Bruner & Sherwood, 1976; Terrace, 
2013). At around 12 months infants ‘check back’ towards the person whose gaze was 
followed after following their gaze towards the object (Scaife & Bruner, 1975). This 
coincides with the primary intersubjective phase moving on to the “secondary 
intersubjective” phase in the infant’s second year. This is when child and the 
caregiver can start to share attention not only between themselves but including a 
referent object and so is when joint attention develops (Terrace, 2013). 
Mother-child joint attention is positively correlated with efficiency in word 
learning (Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) and a longitudinal study found infants who gaze 
followed more at 10.5 months could produce more words associated with mental 
state at 2.5 years, which, in turn, also correlated with theory of mind ability at 4.5 
years (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015). Recently, jointly attending to a film alongside an 
experimenter was found to increase the chances of three to four year olds passing a 
verbal false-belief task presented in the film (Psouni et al., 2018). In addition, the 
frequency of engaging in joint attention predicts language acquisition (Morales et al., 
2000; Mundy & Newell, 2007).  
The critical age for joint attention development appears to be during the latter 
part of the first year of life and during the second year, with initiating joint attention 
developing later than responding to joint attention (Mundy et al., 2007). In sum, 
understanding that gaze is referential to objects and people develops by the end of 
the first year of life (Hoehl, Wiese, & Striano, 2008), whilst joint attention initiation 
develops later, by 18 months for a typically developing child (see review of joint 
attention development by Happé & Frith, 2014). The early emergence of joint 
attention typically within the first two of years of life exemplifies its key role not 
only in the development of language, but in social cognition processes generally.  




Autism and Joint Attention 
One key, diagnostic element of Autistic Spectrum Conditions (ASC) is a 
deficit in nonverbal communication, including eye contact abnormalities (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, who use the term "Autistic Spectrum Disorder"). 
Although those with autism have relatively spared gaze following behaviour, they 
are considered unlikely to initiate joint attention or, at least, to have atypical gaze 
leading behaviour (Billeci et al., 2016; Mundy & Newell, 2007; Nation & Penny, 
2008), although see Gillespie-Lynch (2013), for an alternative view. Billeci et al. 
(2016) found that toddlers with an ASC diagnosis displayed the same eye 
movements as controls when responding to joint attention, but their patterns of 
fixations were different when initiating joint attention, for example, fixating for 
longer on the face than the typical controls and making more transitions from the 
object to the face.  
Another recent study found that recognition memory for pictures was better 
when children had gaze led to the pictures than when they had been gaze cued to 
them. Critically, this was found for typically developing children but not for those 
with an autism diagnosis (Mundy, Kim, Mcintyre, & Lerro, 2016). Most recently, a 
large study of 338 toddlers made the revealing finding that, when free viewing video 
scenes, monozygotic twins showed remarkably similar patterns of gaze fixations on 
the eye regions of faces, r = 0.91, compared with r = 0.35 for dizygotic twins and no 
correlation for non-siblings (Constantino et al., 2017). Eye-looking at the mouth 
region followed a similar pattern of results to the eye region. Moreover, these 
apparently more highly heritable characteristics of gaze behaviour were reduced for 
children with autism. Children with autism looked less at eyes and mouth regions of 
faces than typically developing children. If children with autism look less at eye 
regions than typical developing children, this fits with the other reviewed findings of 
reduced eye contact and gaze leading in this population. A recent, revealing study 
showed that typically developing adults and children preferred a set of stuffed animal 
toys with visible white sclera over those without, whilst those with a diagnosis of 
autism did not (Segal, Goetz, & Maldonado, 2016). This is suggestive of the 
importance of eye gaze to the typical development of social cognition, and supports 
the cooperative eye hypothesis too. 




This is important because those with autism may appear to lack motivation 
for social interaction (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012) and it is 
joint attention initiation which can signal social motivation to interact with others 
(Mundy & Newell, 2007). Chevallier et al. (2012) argue that sub-optimal social 
cognition in autism arises from motivational deficits rather than vice-a-versa. 
However, the social motivation theory of autism has increasingly been challenged. 
For example, a recent systematic review of empirical studies into the social 
motivation hypothesis identified that only 57% of reviewed studies supported the 
idea (Bottini, 2018). Another paper challenges the theory strongly, including 
pointing out that those with autism do not report lack of motivation for social 
interaction (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018). It is also remarkable, for example, that implicit 
social biases may be relatively intact in those with an autism diagnosis (Birmingham, 
Stanley, Nair, & Adolphs, 2015). I do not accept that it is a lack of social motivation 
which drives the eye contact and gaze leading differences found in autistic 
individuals, but, nevertheless, these differences in gaze behaviours will inevitably 
impact social interaction. 
There may be individual differences in the broader phenotype too. Edwards, 
Stephenson, Dalmaso, and Bayliss (2015), across three experiments, found a 
negative correlation between a “gaze leading” effect (attentional orienting towards 
faces which had just followed gaze) and level of autism-like traits. The greater the 
autism-like traits, the less attentional capture from faces who followed gaze. This 
indicates there may be individual differences in joint attention initiation behaviours 
across the typically developing population, specifically linked to the levels of typical 
personality traits found in those with an ASC. 
There are associations between social skills and joint attention skills. For 
example, better joint attention skills in three year old children with an ASC have 
been associated with better friendships at age eight (Freeman, Gulsrud, & Kasari, 
2015). Lawton & Kasari's (2012) intervention to improve joint attention initiation in 
preschool children with an Aby increased social interaction duration. Other 
interventions to improve joint attention interaction in children diagnosed with an 
ASC have resulted in improved language development, play skills and social 
development (see Goods, Ishijima, Chang, & Kasari, 2013; Murza, Schwartz, Hahs-
Vaughn, & Nye, 2016; Reichow & Volkmar, 2010, for reviews). However, 




improvements from joint attention interventions have often proved short-lived (e.g. 
Whalen & Schreibman, 2003) or have not been assessed to ascertain whether the 
improvements are maintained (see Stavropoulos & Carver, 2013, for a review).  
Stavropoulos and Carver (2013), in their systematic review, offer a potential 
explanation for any intervention benefits proving short-lived. The proposed 
explanation is the lack of social motivation in those with an ASC and so it is 
suggested that oxytocin may play a key role in the lack of social motivation. 
Stavropoulos and Carver (2013) suggest administering oxytocin, together with a 
joint attention intervention, may be more successful. Oxytocin certainly does seem to 
be involved in social motivation together with other critical neurochemicals such as 
dopamine (see review, Guastella & Hickie, 2016) and so this proposal is attractive. 
However, as Guastella & Hickie's (2016) review points out, there are many 
complexities involved in administering oxytocin to those with such a heterogeneous 
conditions as autism, and much further research and clinical trialling is needed 
before more conclusions can be drawn. A recent small clinical trial using intranasal 
oxytocin treatment took further steps towards this and found that those children with 
autism who had the lowest pre-existing oxytocin levels showed the most 
improvement in social abilities (Parker et al., 2017). 
All the evidence for deficits in joint attention for those with autism have not 
only led to a wealth of studies on the efficacy of joint attention skills interventions 
(see Murza et al., 2016, for a meta-analysis), but also have fuelled debates about 
what we can learn about autism more generally (see Chevallier et al., 2012). In the 
field of autism interventions there has been a growing interest in how technology-
based interventions, including virtual reality, can be utilised (Grynszpan, Weiss, 
Perez-Diaz, & Gal, 2014, for a meta-analysis) and the use of assistive robotics 
specifically is another emerging area (see Boucenna et al., 2014, for a review). 
Therefore, further research into autism and shared attention can serve the dual 
purpose of driving forward interventions to improve social skills for those with a 
diagnosis of autism, but also help explain the elusive question of understanding 
autism itself. It is encouraging to see the recent steps towards focussing upon joint 
attention initiation as a key deficit which can be targeted for improvement, in 
addition to gaze processing more generally since this was first highlighted by Mundy 
and Newell (2007), (see also a review by Stavropolous & Carver, 2013). 




Other Animals’ Gaze Behaviour 
 Some non-human species demonstrate the ability to follow gaze to obtain 
information, often about potential food or predators. For example, rhesus macaques 
and chimpanzees follow gaze direction of conspecifics (Tomasello, Hare, & 
Fogleman, 2001) and chimpanzees can shift attention between tasks. Chimpanzees 
use gaze and head direction cues (Tomasello et al., 2007) and also exhibit checking-
back behaviours (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; for a detailed review see also 
Carpenter & Call, 2013). In rhesus macaques we know from single-cell recordings 
that there is a neural network which supports gaze direction encoding (Perrett et al., 
1985; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, Benson, & Rolls, 1992). There is evidence that 
domestic dogs show sensitivity to human visual perspectives (Kaminski, Bräuer, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2009) and that domestic goats can follow human gaze 
(Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2005).  
In order to accept the argument that humans have a unique ability to share 
attention it must be accepted that gaze following in non-humans is simply to 
ascertain the object of another’s attention, rather than evidences intent to share 
attention for some social goal in itself. Leavens and Racine (2009) argue that apes do 
engage in joint attention but do not define joint attention as including shared 
knowledge of attentional state. Leavens and Racine (2009) cite evidence of wild apes 
using manual gestures and captive apes using finger pointing to communicate what 
they want to support their view. Carpenter and Call (2013) argue this evidence is 
unconvincing, particularly because the cited instances of apes using declarative 
pointing are usually trained responses in captivity and not for sharing attention for its 
own sake, as human infants do. Evidence seems to favour Carpenter and Call’s 
(2013) viewpoint (see also Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005, for other papers offering the same opinion). Further 
support for this comes from Warneken, Chen, and Tomasello (2006) who compared 
humans and chimpanzees during cooperative tasks. Children aged 12 to 24 months 
showed motivation to cooperative with a human adult partner, whilst young 
chimpanzees only cooperated if obtaining food was a goal, rather than being 
motivated to cooperate and share attention for its own sake.  
More recently, Goot, Tomasello, and Liszkowski (2014) have shown that 
apes will only point towards an object they want when they are constrained in cages 




and need their keeper to retrieve it for them and will always move towards the object 
first. Conversely, human infants will point from a distance towards objects they 
themselves could retrieve (Goot et al., 2014). This suggests again that sharing 
attention simply as a cooperative, social human act is likely to be uniquely human.  
Finally, there are some very intriguing findings by Rosati et al. (2016) which 
reveal that a free-ranging population of rhesus macaques show similar age and sex-
related differences in gaze following as humans. Observing gaze following in 481 
macaques, Rosati et al.’s data (2016) indicate a decreasing propensity to follow gaze 
in old age (Kuhn, Pagano, Maani, & Bunce, 2015) and more gaze following in 
females than males (Bayliss, Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005), apparently mirroring those 
same findings in humans. Rosati et al. (2016) do not, however, suggest there is a 
shared pattern with humans of social cognitive skills development in monkeys, 
noting the lack of language and theory of mind development which, in contrast, 
human gaze following often facilitates. 
I, therefore, conclude that sharing attention is an exclusively human activity 
as an end in itself and, therefore, has great importance in shaping our culture and 
success as a species, particularly when considered as an integral part of our ability to 
engage in social cognition including empathy and the critical ability to possess 
theory of mind. This accords with the view originally offered by Tomasello et al. 
(2005), and the recent studies just described offered further support for this assertion. 
Sense of Agency and Joint Attention 
Another cognitive process which is likely involved in joint and shared 
attention, is sense of agency, a process involved in perhaps all our motor actions. 
Sense of agency is experienced when we cause or generate actions, and through 
them, feel that we control events around us (Gallagher, 2000). One study has 
suggested that having a successful response to a joint attention bid creates a sense of 
agency in the initiator. Pfeiffer et al. (2012) measured self-reports of feeling of 
relatedness between the participant’s gaze towards an object and the response of 
either gaze aversion or gaze following. The results showed that greater sense of 
agency (relatedness) was reported when gaze was followed than when it was not 
followed. In one experiment, gaze was always followed with varying latencies and 
participants reported feelings of relatedness with 400 ms being the interval that 
produced the highest ratings of relatedness and a linear decrease thereafter up to 




4000 ms. However, in another experiment where gaze was either followed or averted 
gaze resulted, even 4000 ms latencies resulted in feelings of relatedness, there being 
little effect on relatedness of latency. Therefore, the optimal temporal range within 
which a response to shared attention initiation feels naturalistic remains a subject for 
future further research to build upon these findings. Such information could help 
inform the interventions which seek to improve social skills for those with autism 
which were discussed earlier. This thesis will explore whether there is an implicit 
sense of agency over gaze leading, a previously unexplored area, given Pfeiffer et al. 
(2012) only explored explicit self-reported sense of relatedness. This is measured 
using the phenomenon termed temporal (or intentional) binding, whereby there is a 
subjective compression of time between a self-generated action and its outcome (see 
Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). 
Electrophysiological Correlates of Joint Attention 
EEG studies which looked at gaze processing will be reviewed first, 
involving the N330, the N2 posterior contralateral (N2pc), the early direction of 
attention negativity (EDAN), and the N170 components. Then, two studies which 
investigated gaze leading specifically, examining the N170 and P3, will be 
described. 
N330. Greater occipito-temporal negativity (event-related potential, ERP, 
component, N330) has been demonstrated in response to incongruent gaze shifts 
away from an object, compared to congruent (Senju, Johnson, & Csibra, 2006). The 
suggested explanation was that the N330 reflected the greater effort required to 
process the violation of the expectancy that gaze would be shifted to an object. In 
addition, the N330 was believed to reflect activity in the posterior superior temporal 
sulcus (pSTS) because corresponding fMRI data showed increased activity in 
response to incongruent gaze shifts. Tipples, Johnston, and Mayes (2013) also found 
an enhanced negative occipito-temporal ERP (occurring slightly earlier at N300) for 
incongruent gaze shifts. In addition, Tipples et al. (2013) found an enhanced N300 
when arrows provided the directional shifts of attention, suggesting a domain general 
mechanism for detecting and processing unexpected events, perhaps not limited to 
gaze shifts. Therefore, a little is already known about ERP correlates when 
participants observe a face looking towards or away from an object. 




EDAN. The EDAN’s role during reorienting attention from gaze shifts has 
resulted in mixed findings. The EDAN was found to be modulated in response to 
spatial cues of attention from arrows, but not from eye gaze (Hietanen, Leppänen, 
Nummenmaa, & Astikainen, 2008). Therefore, this was thought to support the theory 
of different systems for attentional orienting in response to gaze, compared to other 
stimuli. Brignani, Guzzon, Marzi, & Miniussi (2009), reported a reverse EDAN-like 
effect from eye gaze shifts and a more typical EDAN-effect from arrows. More 
research is needed to ascertain if the EDAN is modulated by gaze cueing similarly to 
other attentional shifts. However, even the EDAN’s role in attentional orientating is 
controversial, specifically whether it reflects processing the stimulus itself or 
orienting attention based on the directional cue being given (see Velzen & Eimer, 
2003; Woodman, Arita, & Luck, 2009, for further discussion on this point). 
N170. The N170 has been the subject of a large body of work showing its 
involvement in face processing, but it has also has been implicated specifically in 
gaze processing (see Itier & Batty, 2009, for a review). This has resulted in mixed 
findings, with some studies showing greater N170 elicited for gaze aversion over 
direct gaze (e.g. Latinus et al., 2014), some the opposite effect (e.g. Conty, N’Diaye, 
Tijus, & George, 2007), others finding no modulation at all (e.g. Myllyneva & 
Hietanen, 2016). Therefore, this is very much an unresolved area for future research 
to try to address. 
N2pc. The N2pc’s role is not clearly established, only being shown to our 
knowledge in one study to date involving eye gaze, as it is more commonly found in 
visual search paradigms (Grubert & Eimer, 2015). This ERP component comprises 
greater negative activity at the posterior sites which are contralateral to the side on 
which the stimuli are presented, implicated in spatial attentional shifting (Galfano et 
al., 2011). Galfano et al. (2011) used the N2pc as an index of spatial attention 
reorientation to the target needed when incongruent gaze cueing occurred. Galfano et 
al. (2011) predicted, and found, greater N2pcs elicited from incongruent gaze cueing 
than congruent.  
P3 for gaze leading. Only two studies, to my knowledge, have specifically 
examined the neural time course of processing responses to initiating joint attention. 
Caruana, de Lissa, and McArthur (2015) found an enhanced central parietal P3 ERP 
(reported as a “P350”) occurred when participants’ joint attention bids were ignored 




(an averted gaze shift resulted) over when successfully reciprocated. Caruana et al. 
(2015) found no such effect when another group of participants undertook a similar 
task which replaced eye gaze responses with arrows. This, therefore, offers evidence 
of a specific social evaluation of the outcome of a joint attention bid. In a second 
paper, Caruana, de Lissa, and McArthur (2017) found that the P350 was not 
modulated by averted gaze or congruent gaze shifts when participants were expressly 
told that they were engaging with a computer program rather than being told that the 
gaze shifts they observed were being controlled by a real human. More research is 
needed to build upon these preliminary findings. It can be concluded from reviewing 
all the eye gaze associated ERPs, that more work is needed to ascertain the 
electrophysiological correlates of gaze cueing and, especially, of initiating shared 
attention. This thesis will offer some new evidence for the latter.  
Current Theories and Models of Shared Attention  
 Baron-Cohen (1997) theorised two evolved mechanisms to facilitate 
cognition that another person is looking at you and whether they are sharing 
attention with you. For these processes he hypothesised an Eye Direction Detector 
and a Shared Attention Mechanism respectively. Much of the empirical evidence 
from both neuroscience and behavioural studies since these theories were offered 
have, indeed, supported the existence of such neurocognitive mechanisms (see 
Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007, for a review). Baron-Cohen (1997) proposed his 
hypothesised mechanisms as part of a ‘mind-reading’ system. The neuro-cognitive 
model of shared attention offered in this thesis (see General Discussion) also places 
theory of mind as one of the key outcomes of sharing attention.  
Seminal single-cell recording work on macaques by Dave Perrett and others 
(Perrett et al., 1985; Perrett et al., 1992) revealed a hierarchical system in the 
monkey anterior superior temporal sulcus which codes, in order, direction of gaze, 
head and body orientations. As Nummenmaa and Calder (2009) pointed out, there is 
no equivalent evidence that a hierarchical system exists in humans but it would seem 
reasonable for such a system to exist given the eyes offer the best clues for social 
attention. Evidence that human neurons are dedicated to separate coding of gaze, 
head and body orientation have been shown repeatedly and Nummenmaa and Calder 
(2009) offer a succinct review of the adaptation paradigms used to explore this 
separate coding system.  




Dave Perrett (Perrett & Emery, 1994; Perrett et al., 1992) theorised a 
Direction-of-attention-detector in a similar vein to Baron-Cohen’s Eye Direction 
Detector and a Mutual Attention Mechanism similar to Baron-Cohen’s Shared 
Attention Mechanism. One of the key findings Perrett’s work added was that the 
system was inhibitory, such that information from the eyes is always prioritised over 
head and body orientations (see Langton et al., 2000, for a more detailed discussion 
of this). However, there is evidence that, rather than being simply inhibitory, the 
system may allow integration of the information from eye and head orientation, 
providing an attenuated effect of head information if the eye information conflicts 
(Langton et al., 2000).  
One behavioural consequence of initiating joint attention has been found to 
be better memory for the pictures participants gaze led to over those they, 
themselves, responded to in response to gaze cueing (Kim & Mundy, 2012). Another 
recent finding was that jointly attending to the same side of a computer screen with a 
social partner increased ratings on a social binding scale, whether or not there was a 
shared goal (Wolf, Launay, & Dunbar, 2016). This indicates that people feel 
connected when jointly attending and this could be built upon by exploring whether 
this sense of closeness is enhanced more by initiating the joint attention interaction, 
rather than responding to it.  
Shteynberg (2015) reviewed behavioural shared attention studies, mainly 
from the field of social psychology. The review includes studies which look at 
effects of sharing attention online, encompassing any studies in which participants 
believe that they are jointly attending, and so goes beyond the much more narrow 
definition of shared attention in this thesis which is between two people who are in a 
face-to-face interaction. However, Shteynberg's (2015) review of behavioural studies 
does demonstrate that the recruitment of increased cognitive resources seems to be 
one result of sharing attention. Shteynberg's (2015) model lists five empirically 
demonstrated effects of sharing attention which are better memory, stronger 
motivation, more extreme judgments, higher affective intensity and greater 
behavioural learning and postulates a shared-attention mechanism which helps 
groups to coordinate and achieve mutual acts.  




Neural Mechanisms of Joint Attention 
The regions involved in detecting gaze presence are the amygdala (Adolphs, 
2008; Adolphs & Spezio, 2006; Gamer, Schmitz, Tittgemeyer, & Schilbach, 2013; 
Kawashima et al., 1999), the hippocampus and lateral fusiform gyrus and the inferior 
occipital gyri (reviewed in Nummenmaa & Calder, 2008). More recently, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been shown to play a role in the driving of 
attention to the eye region as this is impaired in those with lesions to this region 
(Wolf, Philippi, Motzkin, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2014). Following gaze detection, the 
encoding of gaze direction has been implicated in the Intraparietal Sulcus (Hoffman 
& Haxby, 2000), Frontal Eye Fields (O’Shea, Muggleton, Cowey, & Walsh, 2004), 
Superior Parietal Lobule and pSTS (Calder et al., 2007), and MT/V5 complex 
(Watanabe, Kakigi, Miki, & Puce, 2006). 
Once a gaze shift is detected, the responder reorients attention towards the 
initiator’s gaze cued location which involves the Inferior Parietal Lobule (Calder et 
al., 2007; Perrett et al., 1985; Perrett et al., 1992), the Bilateral Middle Frontal Gyri, 
the Bilateral Superior Temporal Gyri, the Bilateral Intraparietal Sulci (Thiel, Zilles, 
& Fink, 2004, 2005), and the Superior Colliculus (Furlan, Smith, & Walker, 2015). 
Whilst the initiator is already attending to the referent object, it has been 
demonstrated that the face of the responder has an attentional capture effect for the 
initiator and so reorienting, at least, covertly towards the responder is part of the 
process for the initiator (Edwards et al., 2015). This “gaze leading effect” is 
theorised to be a mechanism which facilitates the state of joint attention to move 
onto the higher-level cognitive state of share attention as it enables the initiator to 
monitor the response of the responder (Edwards et al., 2105). In addition, those who 
cooperatively follow our gaze leading produce less of a gaze cueing effect in us 
when we subsequently re-encounter them (Dalmaso, Edwards, & Bayliss, 2016). 
This may indicate that shared attention is affected by previous interactions and is not 
exclusively an automatic process, but subject to contextual influences (Dalmaso et 
al., 2016).  
The neural mechanisms of joint attention have been the subject of several 
studies over the past six years with both distinct and common regions shown to be 
recruited when initiating or responding to joint attention (Caruana, Brock, & 
Woolgar, 2015; Redcay, Kleiner, & Saxe, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2010). These 




regions are summarised in Table 1. Most recently, Oberwelland et al. (2016) 
investigated the neural mechanisms of initiating and responding to joint attention in 
adolescents and children and confirmed the involvement of similar regions of 
activity and distinct regions recruited by self-initiated or other-initiated joint 
attention as shown in Table 1, specifically recruiting “social brain” areas and those 
used for processing shifts of attention. Furthermore, that study has begun to identify 
the developmental trajectory of joint attention neural mechanisms, hitherto not 
explored, making two key findings. Firstly, there was a trend towards decreasing 
precuneus activation from childhood to adolescence which the authors suggest may 
be consistent with children becoming less self-referential during adolescence as their 
social interactional skills develop towards maturity. Secondly, Oberwelland et al.’s 
(2016) data indicate a trend towards more precuneus activation during gaze leading 
than responding to joint attention in adolescence which may indicate an increasing 
awareness of gaze leading being self-generated and self-referential. These 
preliminary findings show promise to elucidate the development trajectory of “social 
brain” developmental changes during shared attention and opens the path towards 
more work in this new area of research. 
Table 1 
fMRI Evidence for Distinct and Common Brain Regions Activated During Initiating 
and Responding to Joint Attention Reported by Redcay et al. (2012). 
 Initiating Joint Attention Responding to Joint Attention 
Distinct Regions Bilateral middle frontal gyri Posterior STS 
 Bilateral intraparietal sulci Ventral mPFC 
 Dorsal anterior cingulate Posterior Cingulate 
Common Regions                  Dorsal mPFC 
                  Right Posterior STS 
Abbreviations: STS- Superior Temporal Sulcus, mPFC- Medial Prefrontal Cortex. 
 
Taking these findings together over the past six years, the key regions seem to be the 
MPFC (when a social partner is perceived) and the pSTS (when a shift in attention is 
detected). Both regions are recruited together during joint attention but their distinct 
roles and how they might interact have not yet been precisely defined (see Carlin & 
Calder, 2013; Redcay & Saxe, 2013, for reviews).  




Another revealing recent fMRI study went further and identified functional 
connections between the visual and dorsal attention networks as initiating joint 
attention develops in toddlers in a large sample of 116 one year olds and 98 infants 
of 24 months, 37 of these providing behavioural and imaging data at both age points 
(Eggebrecht et al., 2017). Infants were assessed for their initiating joint attention 
abilities. Then, brain functional connectivity was measured whilst the infants slept so 
that correlations between joint attention initiation abilities and brain functional 
connectivity between regions of interest identified by the work in adults described 
above (e.g. Redcay et al, 2012) could be examined. Broadly, the findings were that 
initiating joint attention abilities was most strongly associated with connectivity 
between the visual and dorsal attention networks and between the visual network and 
posterior cingulate default mode network (Eggebrecht et al., 2017).  
All of these neuroimaging findings broadly support the Parallel and 
Distributed-Processing Model hypothesised by Mundy & Newell (2007) and Mundy, 
Sullivan, and Mastergeorge (2009) in which joint attention initiation is mainly 
served by the anterior attention network and joint attention response by the posterior 
attention network, but with an emphasis on the connections between these networks.  
A further intriguing neural correlate is that shown by Schilbach et al. (2010) 
who demonstrated enhanced ventral striatum activity for initiating joint attention, 
suggesting this is a rewarding experience. This activity also correlated with self-
reported subjective feelings of pleasantness. The greater the activity change in the 
ventral striatum, the greater the sense of pleasantness reported for looking at objects 
with another person. In this case the other person was an onscreen face but 
participants were told that the onscreen face was controlled by a real person. This 
type of research which seeks to examine online social interactions rather than offline, 
has become popular in recent years (see Pfeiffer, Vogeley, & Schilbach, 2013, for a 
review). A further study showed that gaze based behaviours with another person 
activated the ventral striatum, and it did not matter whether the participants believed 
their partner had a shared goal or not (Pfeiffer et al., 2014). Another study found 
increased striatum activity when initiating joint attention was reciprocated with gaze 
following, compared to an averted gaze response (Gordon, Eilbott, Feldman, 
Pelphrey, & Vander Wyk, 2013). Finally, the ventral striatum was activated more 
even when participants simply passively observed actors in a video clip engaging in 




a shared purpose than when the actors were simply acting in parallel (Eskenazi, 
Rueschemeyer, de Lange, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2015). The growing literature 
reviewed show there is an extensive network of brain regions sub-serving joint 
attention. See Mundy (2017) for a comprehensive review of these neural 
mechanisms. These regions will be summarised further in a model of joint and 
shared attention that will be summarised in Chapter 6 (General Discussion).  
Concluding Remarks 
 Initiating joint attention, leading to a shared attention interaction, is a key 
human process vital to typical social cognitive development. The atypicality in 
engaging in shared attention found in those with autism, specifically in its initiation, 
illustrate the difficulties in social interaction which can result if the mechanisms 
involved in shared attention are not optimal. More is known about the gaze 
responder during this interaction than the gaze leader, although work has begun to 
redress this imbalance and this thesis builds on this work. 
Outline of Thesis 
The experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 explore whether we feel a sense of 
agency over the gaze shift responses we cause in others (Experiments 1 to 5). 
Chapter 4’s studies (Experiments 6 and 7) explore whether there are any effects upon 
facial recognition which result from having joint attention bids reciprocated or 
rejected. The data in Chapter 5 (Experiment 8) reveal the electrophysiological 
consequences of gaze responses to joint attention bids. Chapter 6 has a general 
discussion of the results from the empirical chapters and offers a novel, neuro-
cognitive model of joint and shared attention, to encapsulate the processes at work 
for both the gaze leader and gaze follower and the associated neural mechanisms.




SECTION 2: Experimental Chapters 
  




Chapter 2: Sense of Agency Over Responses to Gaze Leading 
  




As prosocial beings, monitoring other’s actions, and our control over those actions, is 
essential to successful human cooperation and social reciprocity (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). 
One everyday interaction which is integral to social reciprocity is joint attention when one 
person follows another’s eye gaze to a referent object (Emery, 2000). The experiments in this 
chapter investigate whether initiating joint attention (“gaze leading”) elicits feelings of 
control over responses. There is a link between perception of time and perception of control 
over events because, if we are in control of an outcome, a compression of perception of time 
occurs between our action and its outcome (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008, for a review). 
This phenomenon is termed temporal binding (also known as intentional binding) and is 
believed to evidence a “sense of agency” (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Critically, 
this compression of time does not occur when we passively observe outcomes not caused by 
our actions (Haggard & Clark, 2003). To date, temporal binding research has been largely 
dedicated to investigating sense of agency for non-social motor actions, usually using hands, 
such as when making button presses to elicit an auditory tone (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a 
review). The experiments in this chapter, uniquely, as far as I am aware, investigated whether 
this distortion of time perception also occurs when controlling others’ eye gaze during the 
social interaction of joint attention. Figure 2 summarises the process being investigated and 
the expected outcome if there is an implicit sense of agency over gaze shifts we elicit.  
 
Figure 2. Graphical abstract summarising the expected temporal binding effect for causing 
gaze shifts in others in response to gaze leading. 




I will begin by introducing the key construct of sense of agency, describing temporal 
binding paradigms and considering the cognitive and accompanying neural mechanisms 
which have been conceptualised to explain how a sense of agency may arise. Then, the key 
role eye gaze plays in controlling social attention and coordination will be described (see 
Emery, 2000; Frischen et al., 2007, for reviews). The process of controlling other’s eye gaze 
occurs during “joint attention.” A line of joint attention research will be described including 
findings about having one’s own gaze followed. Next, research into sense of agency and joint 
attention for those with an autism spectrum condition (ASC) will be reviewed because there 
may be deficits in that population. The research question I explore in this chapter is whether 
temporal binding, offered as a proxy for an implicit sense of agency, results when we cause 
another to follow our gaze to an object. I also explore whether there is any correlation 
between the magnitude of any temporal binding effects and level of autism-like traits and also 
examine the relationship between implicit effects and explicit self-reported sense of agency. 
To pre-empt the results, the explicit agency data demonstrates the greatest agentic 
attributions are made following active gaze leading tasks, and lower sense of agency is 
always reported for passive tasks involving no gaze leading. However, for implicit agency, 
the results are more complex, showing three main effects of interest. Firstly, temporal binding 
does result from gaze leading towards an object. Secondly, binding effects occur when our 
attention is already on an object, with no gaze leading having taken place, but these effects 
are attenuated compared to the binding effects following gaze leading. Finally, even low-
level spatial shifts towards our object of gaze can elicit binding effects where there are no 
social clues to negate this self-agency attribution. This third main effect of interest was 
unexpected and makes the explanations for this data a little more complex than anticipated, 
but, I hope, more revealing and interesting at the same time.  
Explicit and Implicit Agency 
Sense of agency is our conscious experience of causing or generating actions, and 
through them, controlling events in our environment (Gallagher, 2000). Recently, David, 
Obhi, and Moore (2015) highlighted a rapidly expanding interest in sense of agency among 
the research community since 2002, with papers being published in this area exponentially. A 
key component of sense of agency is congruency between an action and its outcome. The 
hypothesis tested in this chapter’s experiments is that if someone follows our gaze we will 
feel a sense of agency as we have caused them to respond. How to test and measure this in 
practice poses a challenge. Explicit measurement can be problematic because, as Gallagher 




(2012) captured well, our agency is not normally something that we are explicitly aware of. 
Explicit sense of agency is somewhat limited to measurement through self-reported feelings 
of control over an action (David, Newen, et al., 2008; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007) which, in 
themselves, are limited by the agent’s own ability for introspection (Barlas & Obhi, 2013). In 
addition, explicit measures have been criticised for their susceptibility to response bias and 
impression management (Obhi, 2012). Because of these difficulties, an alternative is to 
measure implicit (outside of awareness) sense of agency. Temporal binding experiments have 
sought to do this. Here, implicit agency via temporal binding effects is measured, alongside 
self-reported explicit agency.  
Temporal Binding 
Temporal binding is the subjective compression of a time interval between an action 
and its outcome (Haggard et al., 2002). Therefore, it is when a period of time is perceived to 
be shorter than it really is. Research into the subjective experience of time began as long ago 
as the 1880’s with William Wundt’s studies on attention. Wundt developed a “complication-
clock apparatus” used for participants to report the onset of an auditory click relative to a 
clock hand location (Carlson, Hogendoorn, & Verstraten, 2006).  Differences in the 
perception of the onset relative to the clock hand position were believed by Wundt to be 
explained by whether attention was on the clock or the auditory click (Moore and Obhi, 
2012). The temporal binding paradigm itself first appeared with Haggard et al.’s (2002) 
introduction of a measure of sense of agency based upon the relationship between voluntary 
action and subjective time. Temporal binding is often called intentional binding (e.g. 
Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). The term intentional binding implies that outcomes 
must be intended for binding to occur. There has been some debate about whether binding is 
due to causality (Buehner, 2012), or intentionality, or both (Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 
2011). This is why, for clarity, the term used in this thesis is “temporal,” rather than 
“intentional” binding, avoiding theoretical assumptions of intentionality.  
Haggard et al. (2002) used a ‘Libet clock’ method where participants reported where 
the hands of a clock were when they performed actions and when there was an auditory tone, 
the outcome (see Figure 3). Haggard et al. (2002) found that participants perceived the time 
interval between their own button press (an intentional action) and the resulting tone to be 
shorter than it really was, whilst their perception of the interval between an action not caused 




by them (an unintentional action) and the outcome was estimated to be longer than it really 
was (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3. The Libet-clock method used by Haggard et al. (2002), figure taken from Moore 
and Obhi (2012). Participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing which produced a 
tone after a delay of 250 ms. Participants judged where the clock hand was when they pressed 
















Figure 4. Illustration of the compression or extension of perceived time intervals according to 
whether an action was made by the participants or not, as first reported by Haggard et al. 
(2002), figure adapted from Limerick, Coyle, and Moore (2014). 
 
Since Haggard et al.’s (2002) original paradigm, some concerns have been raised 
about the Libet clock method. For example, it has been argued that the binding effects 
reported may be an artefact of the Libet clock procedure itself, arising from fundamental 
subjective biases in judging timings (e.g. Danquah, Farrell, & O’Boyle, 2008), although 
Pockett and Miller (2007) tested seven possible factors which could challenge the reliability 
of the procedure and rejected them all. Whilst I do accept the Libet clock method is one 
reliable way of measuring binding, the method suits paradigms where auditory tones are the 
action outcomes. It is not as suitable a method when participants must pay careful visual 
attention to the onscreen stimuli as that would necessitate splitting attention between the 
visual stimuli and the Libet clock. One alternative method for measuring temporal binding 
involves participants pressing a space bar on a computer to replicate the time interval that 




participants have just experienced (e.g. Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Poonian & 
Cunnington, 2013). This direct interval reproduction procedure is the method adopted here.  
 Temporal binding research has repeatedly provided evidence that a compression of 
perceived time occurs when participants actively cause events by their own actions, but not 
when passively estimating a time interval between an event they were not the agent of and its 
outcome (Moore & Obhi, 2012; for a review). Therefore, the theory put forward is that 
temporal binding is a measure of implicit sense of agency (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Temporal 
binding has been shown to result when participants press a button to cause an auditory tone 
(e.g. Humphreys & Buehner, 2009), a coloured disk to collide with another (Cravo, 
Claessens, & Baldo, 2009), or an onscreen colour change (Ruess, Thomaschke, & Kiesel, 
2018). These are in the context of non-social situations, where it is established that action-
outcome binding effects can occur. Implicit sense of agency has been investigated, then, for 
different button press outcomes (David et al., 2008; for a review), but not yet, to my 
knowledge, for outcomes from eye movements, nor for outcomes from a social interaction.  
The experiments in this chapter are, therefore, theoretically novel for three reasons. 
Firstly, I am not aware that anyone has investigated temporal binding within the context of 
joint attention before. Secondly, the motor action of a saccade towards an object has not been 
tested to see if it can produce temporal binding in the same way other motor actions, usually 
button presses, have been shown to before. Eye saccades are unique in that they do not 
usually cause a physical consequence in the environment unless there is someone else to 
respond to the gaze leading within a social interaction, unlike other motor actions with our 
bodies (e.g. a push or a pull) which usually have a physical consequence upon the (non-
social) world around us. Therefore, it is possible that saccades will not elicit the same 
temporal binding effects. Thirdly, although other studies have examined vicarious agency, 
that is, agency over another’s actions, this has often been within the context of performing the 
same action together with a partner (e.g. Obhi & Hall, 2011) or in paradigms aimed to “trick” 
the actor into perceiving another’s action as their own action (Wegner, Sparrow, & 
Winerman, 2004). These studies have been informative about when binding can occur when 
other agents are present but I believe these experiments are the first to examine implicit sense 
of agency when one person causes an onscreen face to respond to a bid for a social 
interaction.  




Theoretical Models of Sense of Agency and Implicit-Explicit Agency Dissociation 
There are two main, theoretically opposing, neurocognitive models proposed for sense 
of agency. These are the predictive position or the retrospective inference position (reviewed 
by Moore & Obhi, 2012). According to the predictive model, the sense of agency is produced 
when there is a match between the predicted and the actual sensory outcome from an action 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). This idea has been encapsulated in a comparator model 
for explaining the perception of self-action (see e.g. Blakemore et al., 2002; Wolpert & 
Flanagan, 2001). This comparator model became a persuasive theory in which feed-forward 
mechanisms are used to predict the action goal and a feedback loop allows these predictions 
to be compared against the outcomes (see Frith, 2012, who accepts the model has had 
considerable empirical support, but advocates a more sophisticated model is needed). The 
retrospective model, however, conceptualises a comparison between the action’s idea and 
action’s effect and a sense of agency arises if they are similar (Chambon & Haggard, 2013). 
The predictive model assumes that sense of agency operates at a low, sensorimotor level, 
whilst the retrospective inference model conceptualises higher level, cognitive mechanisms 
may be employed (Barlas & Obhi, 2013).  
The predictive model fits well with those who argue that intentionality of the outcome 
is needed for temporal binding to occur (e.g. Desantis et al., 2012), whilst the retrospective 
inference model fits best with those who argue that causality is driving the effect (Buehner, 
2012). However, a series of studies have together provided evidence that the two models can 
be integrated, providing supporting data for both causality (retrospective inference) and 
intentionality (prediction) playing a part in temporal binding (Cravo et al., 2011; see Moore 
& Obhi, 2012, for a review). Moore, Wegner, and Haggard (2009) argued that different, and 
varied, agency cues are integrated to result in a sense of agency (e.g. consequences of actions 
and sensorimotor predictions). This also fits well with the extension of the comparator model 
offered by Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) and Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Voss (2013) 
to help reconcile this debate because it allows for both predictive and postdictive mechanisms 
to operate (see Figure 5). 





Figure 5. Account of optimal cue integration underlying the experience of agency, taken 
from Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Voss (2013). 
 
This extension of the comparator model, to incorporate both predictive and 
postdictive processes and both feelings and judgements of agency, can also help account for 
why explicit and implicit agency may not always correlate. Ebert & Wegner (2010) provided 
evidence that changes in temporal binding, and, therefore, implicit agency, were related to 
changes in explicit self-reports of agency. However, Dewey and Knoblich (2014) reported 
both explicit and implicit (temporal binding) measures of agency where individual 
differences for both measures did not correlate. Therefore, Dewey and Knoblich (2014) 
argued that measures of implicit and explicit sense of agency are not necessarily tapping into 
the exact same processes. Synofzik et al. (2008) offered a dual conceptual framework where 
implicit agency operates at a sensorimotor level and can be understood as a “feeling of 
agency” in which an outcome is classified as self-caused, whilst explicit agency is made after 




higher level processes make a “judgement of agency.” These two processes can, therefore, be 
conceptualised as dissociable. Moore, Middleton, Haggard, and Fletcher (2012) tested this by 
exploring whether explicit and implicit agency were modulated differently by sequential 
patterns of action and outcome. Their results supported a model in which explicit and implicit 
agency can be thought of as dissociable, but, they argued, the two are not completely 
independent systems.  
This dual process model was elucidated further into an elegant, optimum cue 
integration account in which sensorimotor priors form part of the predictive component and 
environmental information forms part of the postdictive component, together combining to 
result in how agency is experienced (Figure 5: Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). Further 
support for a dissociation between explicit and implicit agency comes from a recent study by 
Saito, Takahata, Murai, and Takahashi (2015) who found no correlation between explicit 
measures and temporal binding. In sum, the balance of evidence points towards a dissociation 
between explicit and implicit agency, but how the two may, nevertheless, relate to one 
another is not precisely understood. The experiments in this Chapter aim to explore this 
debate about implicit and explicit agency further by asking participants to rate their feelings 
of explicit agency, in addition to undertaking the temporal binding tasks.  
Neural Mechanisms of Sense of Agency 
Attempts have been made to identify the neural mechanisms of sense of agency, 
although the putative regions are not yet clearly defined. The angular gyrus has been 
implicated in detecting that there is no agency when temporal congruence is lacking between 
an action and its outcome (Farrer et al., 2008). This has been partially confirmed by 
Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, and Haggard (2012) who demonstrated angular gyrus 
activation increased as sense of control decreased when there was no match between prime 
and target, although no such activation increase occurred for compatible trials (see Figure 6). 





Figure 6. Increased activation of angular gyrus when reported sense of control decreased for 
incompatible (a mismatch between prime and target), but not compatible (prime and target 
matched) trials, taken from Chambon et al. (2012). This also shows (bottom right) 
incompatible trials decreased functional connectivity between the angular gyrus (AG) and left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) appeared to play a role in monitoring the 
fluency of action selection processes, whilst the angular gyrus detected agency violations 
(Chambon et al., 2012). This supports the theory that, at a neural level, there is a retrospective 
process of comparing the predicted outcome with the actual outcome (Chambon et al., 2012). 
A later study, Beyer, Sidarus, Fleming, and Haggard (2018), replicated these findings that the 
angular gyrus was modulated by agency, although Kühn, Brass, and Haggard (2013) found 
no association between angular gyrus activation and implicit sense of agency. Further support 
for the DLPFC playing a role in sense of agency when selecting between alternative actions 




has been very recently evidenced by Khalighinejad, Di Costa, and Haggard (2016). Kühn et 
al. (2013) found the left supplementary motor area activation positively correlated with the 
degree of temporal binding. A recent review by Merchant & Yarrow (2016) describes how 
motor actions can alter time perception in several contexts, including temporal binding 
effects, and identified the supplementary motor area as key to performing actions requiring 
timing. In sum, to date the regions implicated are the angular gyrus, the DLPFC and the left 
supplementary motor area but more research is needed for a complete picture to emerge. 
Haggard (2017) offers a further review of the neural mechanisms involved in sense of 
agency. Having reviewed the behavioural consequences and neural mechanisms of sense of 
agency, I now turn to the specific motor action of eye movements (saccades) used in gaze 
leading during joint attention and how sense of agency may be experienced when influencing 
another’s direction of gaze. 
Eye Gaze and Social Attention 
  Eye stimuli are considered to have special status within social attention because the 
morphology of the human eye allows easy detection of gaze signals (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 
2001) and neural mechanisms have been developed to process gaze information (Langton et 
al., 2000). This is also consistent with the cooperative eye hypothesis which is that human 
eyes have evolved to be highly visible because of the need for enhanced social interactions 
(Tomasello et al., 2007). Eye gaze is used in everyday interaction for social evaluation and to 
detect intention to communicate (Hoehl et al., 2008). This gaze information is processed 
automatically and rapidly to help us understand the intentions of others, forming a key 
contributor to social cognition (see Emery, 2000; Frischen et al., 2007; Langton et al., 2000, 
for reviews).  
Joint Attention 
“Joint attention,” during which there is a gaze leader and a gaze follower, is when eye 
gaze communication is shared between two people about an object (Emery, 2000). Joint 
attention plays a key role during development, particularly in the progression from the 
primary to the secondary “inter-subjective” phases of normal development (Mundy & 
Newell, 2007). “Inter-subjectivity” is the phenomenon of sharing experiences with one 
another (Bard, 2009; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). The mental processes during an infant’s 
first year of life are termed the “primary intersubjective” phase during which a mother and 
child share attention in a dyadic fashion, that is, between each other (Bruner & Sherwood, 
1976; Terrace, 2013). After one year, this phase progresses to the “secondary intersubjective” 




phase during which their attention becomes shared in a triadic fashion, that is, attention 
includes objects in the environment; this is the development of joint attention (Terrace, 
2013). Mother-child joint attention is positively correlated with efficiency in word learning 
(Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) and the frequency of engaging in joint attention predicts 
language acquisition ((Morales et al., 2000; Mundy & Newell, 2007). In order to possess 
inter-subjectivity, the child must have a sense of self which must include a sense of agency 
over its environment. An implicit sense of self in infants from at least two months onwards is 
believed to develop before explicit manifestations of self-agency emerge in the second year 
of life (Rochat & Striano, 2000). This suggests a strong developmental link between joint 
attention and agency and so this chapter seeks to explore the relationship between them.  
From an evolutionary perspective, agency and joint attention are of interest because 
sense of self may be unique to humans, although this is hotly debated (Terrace, 2013, see also 
a review byAnderson & Gallup, 2015). It is also argued that joint attention may be 
exclusively human (Call & Tomasello, 2005; Carpenter & Call, 2013; but see Leavens & 
Racine, 2009, for an alternative view). Therefore, the processes of agency and joint attention 
may potentially have co-evolved, whether or not other primates may share some capacity for 
sense of self or joint attention. Indeed, this accords with a theoretical stance from 
developmental psychology termed “natural pedagogy.” This hypothesises an evolutionary 
link between cognitive mechanisms for cultural learning (which I argue includes possessing a 
sense of agency) and the adaptive ability to communicate, in which joint attention plays a key 
part (see e.g. Csibra, 2010; Gergely, 2013). 
Eye gaze research has tended to focus on the effects upon responders who follow 
gaze. Gaze cueing paradigms have repeatedly shown that when presented with a target, 
reaction times by the responder are faster to that target if preceded by a gaze cueing signal 
(Frischen et al., 2007). Gaze following has been shown to be an automatic, robust phenomena 
(Frischen et al., 2007, for a review), develops early in infancy (Farroni et al., 2004) and may 
be innate, although what ‘innate’ means can be debated (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015). Some 
revealing studies have investigated brain activation associated with joint attention initiation 
(e.g. Schilbach et al., 2010), but there is much less research into the behavioural effects upon 
the initiator, compared to the responder. One study which did focus on the initiator, rather 
than the responder, found that participants spontaneously made faster saccades back to faces 
which had engaged in joint attention under non-speeded conditions (Bayliss et al., 2013). 
This process of initiating joint attention was termed “gaze leading.” These findings raised 
questions about what effects would occur under speeded conditions. This was investigated by 




Edwards et al. (2015) who measured participant response times to targets presented on faces 
which did or did not follow eye gaze during a computer-simulated, eye-tracked joint attention 
interaction. Edwards et al.’s (2015) main finding was that faces which follow our eye gaze 
capture our attention because response times were faster to those faces than other faces. This 
led to the theoretical suggestion that this effect of gaze leading evidences an evolved 
mechanism to facilitate shared attention and the on-going social interaction. The aims of the 
experiments in this chapter are to explore this attentional capture effect further by 
investigating whether a sense of agency over the responder is experienced by the initiator.   
One study has already suggested that having a successful response to a joint attention 
bid creates an explicit sense of agency in the initiator. Pfeiffer et al. (2012) collected self-
reports of feeling of relatedness between the participant’s gaze towards an object and the 
response of either gaze aversion or gaze following. The results showed that greater sense of 
agency (relatedness) was reported when gaze was followed than when it was not followed 
(see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Graphs taken from Pfeiffer et al. (2012) showing self-reported relatedness of gaze 
reaction where gaze was always followed (Joint attention; JA) and when gaze was either 
followed (JA) or not followed (non-joint attention; NJA). Panel A shows self-reported 
relatedness of gaze reaction for a study where the response was equally likely to be JA or 
NJA. This shows little effect of latency on relatedness. Panel B shows another study where 
gaze was always followed to establish JA (showing greatest relatedness at 400 ms and a 
linear decrease thereafter) and also shows again the JA condition from Panel A which shows 
little effect of latency. 
The neural mechanisms of joint attention have been the subject of several studies with  
both distinct and common regions shown to be recruited when initiating or responding to 
joint attention (Redcay et al., 2012). The main regions are the medial Prefrontal Cortex 




(mPFC; associated with social interaction) and the posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus 
(pSTS; associated with shifts of attention). Both regions are recruited during joint attention 
(Redcay & Saxe, 2013). In addition, Schilbach et al. (2010) and Gordon et al. (2013) have 
shown that the striatum may be involved in having joint attention bids responded to, 
suggesting this is a rewarding experience. Similarly, experiencing a sense of agency for a 
positive social outcome has been shown to be associated with increased ventral striatum 
activity (Decety & Porges, 2011).  
Distortions of Perceived Time Associated with Eye Movements 
Two phenomena which affect time perception have already been found to be related 
specifically to eye movements (see Merchant & Yarrow, 2016, for a review). One is saccadic 
suppression, whereby space and time are not perceived during a saccade. This has been 
demonstrated by Morrone, Ross, and Burr (2005) who found subjective time intervals were 
shortened by a factor of two during a saccade. Another process, believed perhaps to work in 
opposition to saccadic suppression, is chronostasis. This is the phenomenon whereby stimuli 
are perceived to have been presented for longer than actually presented following a saccade 
(Yarrow, Haggard, Heal, Brown, & Rothwell, 2001). It is persuasive that saccadic 
suppression would have an opposite process such as chronostasis to compensate for the loss 
of perceived time during saccades (Merchant & Yarrow, 2016). This was tested by Knöll, 
Morrone, and Bremmer (2013), across four experiments, who showed that chronostasis does 
not exclusively occur at saccadic targets and may be a more general mechanism during visual 
perception. Nevertheless, both processes of saccadic suppression and chronostasis are 
distortions of time found in eye vision research and it is interesting to explore whether the 
further time distortion of temporal binding will occur in the paradigm introduced in this 
chapter. 
ASC and Sense of Agency 
 ASCs are heterogeneous disorders, defined by the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) as persisting deﬁcits in social communication and social interaction across 
multiple contexts, alongside restricted, repetitive patterns, interests, or activities. Two studies 
to my knowledge have investigated sense of agency for those with an ASC with conflicting 
results. David et al. (2008) found no sense of agency deficits, but just investigated self-
reported explicit sense of agency. Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, and Zalla (2014), exploring 
implicit sense of agency, did find reduced temporal binding effects for those with an ASC 
compared to the typically developing population. Therefore, the limited empirical evidence 




appears contradictory but may relate to the dissociation between explicit and implicit agency. 
A self-report questionnaire of level of autism-like traits (the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
Questionnaire; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) was used in 
the experiments in this chapter alongside the temporal binding experiments to enable 
exploration of any association between autistic-like traits and temporal binding effects in the 
typically developing population.  
Further studies which examined time reproduction abilities, rather than agency, for 
those with an ASC found intact reproduction abilities compared to controls, suggesting time 
perception is not impaired, and may, in fact, be more accurate (Stewart, Griffiths, & Grube, 
2015; Wallace & Happé, 2008). It is not clear whether this would be found to be the case in 
studies like those presented in this chapter where joint attention is also a feature of the 
paradigm because there are deficits associated with those with ASCs for joint attention, 
which I now turn to.  
ASC and Joint Attention 
Importantly, interventions to improve joint attention in those diagnosed with an ASC 
have been found to significantly improve language development, play skills and social 
development (Goods, Ishijima, Chang, & Kasari, 2013; Reichow & Volkmar, 2010, for a 
review). Therefore, any insight into links between autism-like traits and joint attention 
initiation could prove helpful to inform interventions like these. Edwards et al. (2015), across 
three experiments, found a negative correlation between the gaze leading effect (attentional 
orienting towards faces which had just followed gaze) and level of autism-like traits. 
Therefore, the higher the autism-like traits, the less faces who followed gaze captured 
attention. Therefore, in these experiments, I explore whether a similar correlation might be 
found between magnitude of temporal binding and autism-like traits when joint attention 
initiation is made. 
 To summarise the predicted results, I hypothesised that having participants’ self-
initiated eye movements result in an outcome would produce temporal binding, just as other 
motor actions have been shown to. The temporal binding effect was measured in milliseconds 
(ms) and was calculated by the difference between the actual time interval and participants’ 
replicated reproduction of the interval. In addition, the percentage reproduction was 
calculated to compare participants’ time reproductions with a perfect reproduction of one 
hundred per cent. I also expected that there would be greater temporal binding effects when 
participants’ eye gaze was followed to an object (Active Gaze Leading conditions) than when 




no saccades to the object were made (Passive conditions). If this hypothesis is supported, this 
may evidence an implicit sense of agency for the initiator in causing the gaze following 
outcome in the responder.  
I predicted there would be a negative correlation between autism-like traits and 
temporal binding effects in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Therefore, the higher the 
level of participant’s autism-like traits, the lower the magnitude of the temporal binding 
effects when participant’s gaze is followed to an object. I maintained an open hypothesis 
about whether the magnitude of temporal binding effects across conditions would correlate 
with level of autism-like traits because the evidence for reduced sense of agency for those 
with an ASC is limited. Finally, explicit ratings of agency are predicted to be greatest in the 
Active Gaze Leading tasks over the Passive tasks with an open hypothesis about whether 
explicit and implicit agency would correlate.  
Experiment 1 
 This study was designed to test whether gaze leading (using a horizontal saccade) 
towards an object to engage in joint attention would result in a sense of agency over gaze 
shift responses. This was tested using a temporal binding paradigm in which participants 
replicated the time interval between an object appearing (immediately after which they 
saccaded to it) and an on-screen face looking towards the object. It was hypothesised that 
having gaze leading followed would result in temporal binding, evidencing a sense of agency 
over the on-screen face’s gaze shifts. Conversely, during passive tasks in which participants 
made no saccades towards the object, no temporal binding was predicted to occur. There 
were two passive tasks; one with a face, identical to the Active Gaze Leading task, and one 
control task using a phase scrambled version of the face, with a spatial shift towards the 
object in place of the gaze shift. In addition, correlations between the magnitude of any 
binding effects and level of autism-like traits and between implicit and explicit agency were 
examined. Throughout all three experiments reported here, Active Gaze Leading tasks 
involve gaze leading towards an object, whilst Passive tasks involve no active eye 
movements. Passive Face tasks require participants to look at the face throughout, whilst 
Passive Object tasks require participants to look at the object throughout. 
Experiment 1 Method 
Participants. After ethical approval was obtained from the University of East Anglia 
Psychology Ethics Committee, 32 Psychology undergraduate student participants (mean age 
= 20.59 years, SD = 6.40; 2 males), gave written, informed consent and were granted course 




credits in return for participation. The sample size was guided by previous eye tracked 
experiments (Edwards et al., 2015) which tested 32 participants. Also, a power analysis with 
a medium effect size and a power of 0.80 (Cohen, 1988) calculated using G*Power3, (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) produced a required sample of 28. All participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were positioned comfortably in a 
chin rest and had rest breaks between three blocks of trials. 
Design. The within-subjects design had three blocked conditions of 56 trials each. 
The conditions were Active Gaze Leading, Passive Face and Passive Phase Scrambled. The 
Active Gaze Leading condition is illustrated at Figure 8. The dependent variable was the 
participant’s percentage reproduction of the inter-event interval. The inter-event interval was 
the time between an object’s appearance and a subsequent gaze shift (Active Gaze Leading 
and Passive conditions) or a spatial shift (Passive Phase Scrambled condition) towards the 
object. There were also two correlational designs to examine any associations between, 
firstly, level of autism-like traits and, secondly, explicit ratings of control and degree of 
temporal binding. 
 
Figure 8. Trial sequence for the Active Gaze Leading task. Circles and the arrow were not 
displayed but represent where participants were instructed to fixate and the saccade from the 
face to the object, respectively. Participants looked at the face (a), displayed for 1000ms. 
Participants made a saccade (b) to the object as soon as it appeared. After a random inter-
event interval of 400ms to 2300ms, gaze onset (c) occurred. After 1000ms, estimate 
instruction appeared (d) until response. Participants pressed and released the space bar to 
replicate the inter-event interval. The inter-event interval is the time between the object 
appearing and the gaze onset.  
Stimuli. The female face stimulus was a grayscale photograph with a neutral 
expression (280 × 374 pixels) taken from Bayliss, Bartlett, Naughtin, and Kritikos (2011). 
The photographs of the face included three variations: eyes open looking straight ahead, eyes 
closed and looking right (25o). The object stimuli set consisted of 8 objects commonly found 
in the kitchen (220 × 78 pixels), taken from Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, and Tipper (2006). The 
face was presented on the left hand side of the display with the centre of the nose 13.5 cm 
from the left hand side of the display and 7.5cm from the top of the display. The objects were 




presented to the right of the face stimuli with the centre of the object 11.5cm from the centre 
of the nose on the face stimulus. There was also a phase scrambled version of the face 
stimulus, used in the Passive Phase Scrambled task, comprising a rectangle (280 x 374 pixels) 
with two smaller rectangles (37 x 26 pixels) placed where the eyes would be on the face. The 
smaller rectangles were phase scrambled images of the face stimulus eye regions. All stimuli 
appeared on a black background and were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software. Examples 
of stimuli are illustrated in Figure 8.  
Apparatus and materials. Right eye position was tracked with an infrared eye 
tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada; spatial resolution of 0.10, 500 Hz). A 
head and chin rest was used to maintain head stability. Viewing distance was 70cm from eyes 
to an 18” computer monitor (resolution 1024 × 768 pixels). A standard keyboard was used 
for participants’ manual responses. The Autism Spectrum Quotient Questionnaire was used 
as a measure of the level of autism-like traits (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), presented 
using E Prime. Participants rated how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each item (e.g. I 
prefer to do things the same way over and over again) on a four point Likert scale ranging 
from definitely agree to definitely disagree. To measure self-reported explicit agency, 
participants rated, after each task, how much control they felt they had over the onscreen 
face’s eye movements or the rectangles shifting on a scale from 1 to 8 (with 1 representing no 
control at all and 8 representing a lot of control).  
 Procedure. The eye tracker was calibrated to each participant to enhance tracking 
accuracy using a standard nine point calibration at the start of each block. The participants 
completed a practice block of six trials followed by three blocks of 56 trials, one for each 
task. The three tasks, which were counterbalanced, are termed Active Gaze Leading, Passive 
Face and Passive Phase Scrambled. Example trial sequences are illustrated at Figure 8.  
 In the Active Gaze Leading task, each trial began with the presentation of a female 
face with direct gaze on the left side of the screen. Participants were instructed to look at the 
face (presented for 1000 ms) until one of eight objects appeared to the right of the face which 
became the participant’s cue to rapidly shift their gaze to reorient to it. The object was 
displayed for a random inter-event interval of 400-2300 ms, after which the face’s gaze 
shifted 25o to the right to look at the object. This inter-event interval was the time interval the 
participants were asked to replicate, with the start of the time interval being when the object 
appeared and the end of the interval being when the gaze shift occurred. The random 
sampling of the time interval meant the time interval for any one trial could be anywhere 
between 400 and 2300 ms to the millisecond, as is usual in the temporal binding literature. 




 Next, after 1000 ms, the participant was prompted by the on-screen instruction 
“Estimate” presented on a black background with a white font (Courier, 18pt) above and 
below the face to press and hold down the spacebar with their preferred hand to replicate the 
time interval between the object’s appearance and the face’s gaze shift towards it. 
Participants were given no feedback about their responses. 
 An inter trial interval (a blank screen) was displayed for 1000 ms. The stimulus set of 
objects for all trials was presented randomly. Participants were told they must fixate on the 
object as soon as it appeared to trigger the face to follow their gaze. They were given no 
further instructions about fixation during each trial beyond fixating the object. Participants 
did not know anything about the hypotheses.  
 The Passive Face task display was identical to that of the Active Gaze Leading task, 
except that the onscreen face had closed eyes (instead of direct gaze) until the gaze shift to 
the right occurred. The Passive Phase Scrambled task had the same display as the other two 
tasks except that, in place of the face, was a rectangle comprised of the phase scrambled face, 
with two smaller, phase scrambled rectangular regions, which were used for a spatial shift 
towards the object, instead of a gaze shift. The phase scrambled rectangles, positioned in the 
place the eyes would have been, shifted 2 mm to the right after the inter-event interval. The 
size of the 2 mm spatial shift was chosen as this matched the same spatial shift as occurred 
for the pupils of the eyes when gaze shifted in the other two tasks.  
 In the Passive Face task participants were instructed to fixate on the face throughout 
each trial, not to look at the object and that they needed to replicate the time interval but they 
were not causing the gaze shift to occur. The time interval participants were asked to 
reproduce was the same as the Active Gaze Leading task. In the Passive Phase Scrambled 
task the same instructions were given as the Passive Face task, except participants fixated the 
rectangle throughout and the inter-event interval was the time between the object’s 
appearance and the shift of the smaller rectangles to the right. After each task participants 
rated their self-reported degree of control felt over the face’s eye movements or the rectangles 
shifting. After all three tasks, participants completed the Autism Quotient Questionnaire on 
the computer.  
Experiment 1 Results 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction. Mean reproduction error was 
calculated for each participant in each condition which is the reproduced time interval minus 
the actual time interval (see Table 2). Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs 




above or below their individual means were removed (0.41% of trials). The reproduced time 
intervals were divided by the actual time intervals to calculate mean percentage reproduction 
(see Figure 9). Therefore, 100% reproduction represents perfect accuracy, anything greater 
than 100% is over-reproduction, and less than 100% is temporal compression (under-
reproduction). Greenhaus-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom are reported when applicable. 
Confidence intervals and standard errors around the means are based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples. Confidence intervals around effect sizes have been calculated using ESCI 
(Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals; Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2016). 
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Table 2 
Mean and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) for Reproduction Errors (ms) and Explicit Agency Ratings (from 1 to 8) in all conditions and 
the Agency Rating Difference.  
 RE Agency Ratings Difference 




















SO A and PF A and PO A and SR A and SO 
E1 RE -211.53 
(436.28) 
- - 2.34  
(399.20) 











- - 2.25 
(1.61) 































E3 RE -248.59 
(296.61) 




















Abbreviations: RE = Reproduction Error in milliseconds (ms) 
Notes: the Agency Rating Difference is calculated by subtracting the mean RE or explicit rating for the Passive task from the RE or explicit 
rating for the Active Gaze Leading task. The conditions are: A is Active Gaze Leading (a gaze leading saccade was made from face to object), 
PF is Passive Face (fixation was on the face throughout), PO is Passive Object (fixation was on the object throughout), SR is Phase Scrambled 
Rectangle (fixation was on the scrambled rectangle throughout) and SO is Phase Scrambled Object (fixation was on the object throughout).
 










Figure 9. Mean percentage reproductions for Experiment 1. In the Gaze Leading task, 
participants looked first at the face, and then at an object as soon as it appeared. In the 
Passive Face or Passive Phase Scrambled tasks, participants looked at the face or scrambled 
face throughout. The images show how the face/scrambled stimulus was displayed when gaze 
onset occurred. Circles and the arrow were not displayed but represent where participants 
were instructed to fixate (and the saccade from the face to the object for the Active task). 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-subjects designs calculated 
using the procedure recommended by (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
First, in order to establish whether each condition produced temporal compression 
(reliable under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze onset), or relatively 
accurate reproductions, single sample t-tests were performed for each of the three conditions 
using percentage reproduction. This showed that temporal compression was only statistically 
significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, participants reproduced M=84% of 
the veridical time interval, 95% CI [73, 96] (SD=32%), t(31) =2.76, p=.01, dz=0.69, 95% CI 
[0.18, 1.19]. In the two passive conditions, reproduction errors (REs) were low and did not 
differ statistically from 100% reproduction (Passive Face Fixation condition: M=100% 
reproduction, 95% CI [91, 112], SD=30%, t(31)=0.09, p=.926, dz=0.02, 95% CI [-0.51,0.47]; 
Passive Phase-scrambled, M=94% reproduction, 95% CI [82, 100], SD=30%, t(31)=1.09, 








p=.286, dz=0.27, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.76]. There was a main effect of task, F(1.53,47.42)=10.91, 
MSE=207, p<.001, p2=0.260, and follow-up contrasts showed that the proportional temporal 
compression effect in the Active Gaze Leading condition was greater than in both the Passive 
Face Fixation, t(31)=3.73, p=.001, dz=0.52, 95% CI [0.21,0.82] and Passive Phase Scrambled 
Fixation conditions t(31)=3.17, p=.003, dz=0.32, 95% CI [0.10,0.52]. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that having participants’ deliberately-initiated saccade followed would result in 
greater temporal compression than passive conditions (where no saccades were made) was 
supported. 
 Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset analyses. 
Mean self-reported explicit ratings of agency were greater for the Active Gaze Leading 
(M=4.44, SD=2.09) 95% CI [3.68, 5.19], than both the Passive Face Fixation (M=2.25, 
SD=1.61) 95% CI [1.67, 2.83] and Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation (2.03, SD=1.43) 95% 
CI [1.52, 2.55] conditions; ts>6, ps<.001, dzs>1. This shows that participants felt a degree of 
explicit agency in the Gaze Leading condition, supporting the inference that the temporal 
binding effect presented here reflects a sense of agency.  
I considered potential concerns that something about performing a saccade per se 
might explain the data. Saccades can, indeed, affect time perception; a substantial amount of 
work has demonstrated an expansive effect (chronostasis; see review by Merchant & Yarrow, 
2016), which if present in these data would of course increase participants’ estimates (i.e. this 
effect, if present, would work in opposition to the predicted and demonstrated effects). 
However, two studies have noted an opposing compressive effect (Morrone et al., 2005; 
Yabe, Dave, & Goodale, 2017). These opposing effects are small and might be of similar 
magnitude, potentially cancelling each other out were they to be present in this (rather 
different) task. Nevertheless, it is still possible that any temporal compression effects of 
making saccades alone may account for an element of the temporal binding effects shown 
here so it is prudent to explore the data for any relationships between saccade metrics and 
time reproductions. It was found that in the critical Active Gaze Leading condition, neither 
mean saccadic reaction time (sRT, M=220ms, SD=41ms) nor saccade duration (M=81ms, 
SD=44ms) correlated with temporal binding, r=-.05, n=32, p=.80, r=.004, n=32, p=.98, 
respectively. 








Further exploration was carried out to check for those participants whose saccades 
may have landed on the object after the onscreen face’s gaze shift as this may have affected 
their perception of their sense of agency over that outcome. This was possible in this design if 
participants were particularly slow to execute a saccade on a trial with one of the shortest 
possible temporal intervals (here, the shortest possible interval was 400 ms). Such 
occurrences were present in nine participants, and on a maximum of three trials for a given 
participant (and a total of 0.7% of active trials). The explicit and implicit data were 
reanalysed, excluding all nine of these participants, and it was found that the data pattern was 
very similar without them. Their mean explicit ratings are similar to those who never 
experienced a gaze shift before their saccade landed (M=4.5, SD=2.22 and M = 4.41, 
SD=2.15, respectively). Temporal compression was only statistically significant in the Active 
Gaze Leading condition. Here, participants reproduced M=84%, 95% CI [74,95] (SD=30%), 
of the veridical time interval t(22)=2.49, p=.02, dz=0.73, 95% CI [0.13,1.3]. In the two 
passive conditions, reproduction errors were low and did not differ statistically from 100% 
reproduction, Passive Face Fixation condition: M=103%, 95% CI [93,113] SD=23%, 
t(22)=0.597, p=.556, dz=0.18, 95% CI [-0.75,0.40]; Passive Phase-scrambled, M=98%, 95% 
CI [87,109], SD=25%, t(22)=0.31, p=.763, dz= 0.09, 95% CI [-0.49,0.67].  
To check whether passive tasks were compromised by saccades occurring contrary to 
the fixation instruction, erroneous saccades were also examined; on only 0.28% of trials were 
saccades made in error to the object during the Passive Face task and on 0.11% of trials in the 
Passive Scrambled condition. These few trials are unlikely to have had a critical impact on 
the data. Thus, overall, saccade metrics cannot parsimoniously explain the observed time 
underestimation in the Active task at the trial or participant levels.  
As this is the first attempt to my knowledge using a temporal binding paradigm with 
saccades as the action, it is useful to examine whether the data share another commonality 
often observed in manual tasks in order to inform comparability across effectors. Previous 
temporal binding research using interval replication or estimation methodologies show 
stronger effects with longer intervals (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Wen, Yamashita, & 
Asama, 2015). In order to determine whether the data share this latter characteristic of the 
temporal binding phenomenon, performance of each participant on the longer 50% of 
intervals they estimated was compared with the shorter 50% of intervals they estimated. In 








order to establish whether this pattern is present in the data, the reproduction error (RE) is 
used as the measure, calculated in milliseconds as the participants’ reproduction of the 
temporal interval between two events minus the veridical temporal interval (rather than the 
percentage reproduction used in the main analysis). The split was applied by taking all the 
trials with intervals below the median for the shortest half, and all those above for the longest 
half. The median time interval was 1350 ms and the mean was 1341 ms (SD= 550). The mean 
temporal interval for the shortest half was 865 ms (SD= 280) with a mean RE of 394 ms 
(SD= 705), meaning there was no under-reproduction for the shortest half. The mean 
temporal interval for the longest half was 1815 ms (SD= 548) with a mean RE of -819 ms 
(SD= 548), meaning there was under-reproduction in the longest half. The shortest and 
longest halves were significantly different, t(31)=10.27, p<.001, dz=1.75. This corroborates 
the notion that the observed data reflects a temporal binding effect, rather than some form of 
previously unreported saccade-induced temporal discounting effect that would most likely be 
either proportional to saccade metrics, or in fact be stronger for short intervals, not weaker 
(given the timescale of saccades, and the timescale of previously observed interactions 
between saccades and time perception).  
Correlation analysis of explicit and implicit agency findings. Any correlations 
between explicit and implicit agency were examined for each of the three conditions and 
found no significant correlations. There was a statistical trend towards a negative correlation 
in the Active Gaze Leading condition; this showed a relationship (but not significant), so that 
the higher the self-reported explicit agency, the higher the implicit agency measured by 
binding effects, r(32) = -0.34, p = .054 (two-tailed).  
There was a medium, negative correlation between the differences between Active 
Gaze Leading and Passive Face. Greater implicit or explicit agency in the Active Gaze 
Leading task over the Passive task is termed here the “Agency Effect.” Therefore, the greater 
the Agency Effect for the implicit task measured by temporal binding, the greater the explicit 
Agency Effect, r(32) = -0.38, p = .03 (two-tailed). Similarly, there was a medium, negative 
correlation between the Agency Effect for the Active Gaze Leading task and Passive 
Scrambled. Again, the greater the implicit Agency Effect, the greater the explicit Agency 
Effect, r(32) = -0.41, p = .02 (two-tailed).  








 Correlation Analysis of AQ. The mean AQ score was 16.59 (SD = 5.58) and the 
range was 3 to 26. This compares well with a meta-analysis mean of 16.94 from 73 studies in 
non-clinical populations (Ruzich et al., 2015) and a mean of 16 obtained by the authors of the 
AQ from a social science population, as here (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The hypothesis was 
that a higher level of autism-like traits would be associated with less of a difference in 
binding in the Active compared to Passive conditions. Therefore, a Pearson’s correlation 
analyses was performed on AQ score and Agency Effects for Passive Face task, r(32) = -
0.13, p =.469 (two-tailed) and Passive Scrambled task, r(32) = -0.14, p = .445 (two-tailed). 
The hypothesis was not supported. There was also no correlation between AQ score and 
binding effects collapsed across all conditions, r(32) = 0.05, p = .787 (two-tailed). 
Experiment 1 Discussion  
The results demonstrate that having a voluntary saccade towards an object 
reciprocated results in the classic temporal binding effect which suggests an implicit sense of 
agency over the onscreen face’s response during a joint attention interaction. This contrasts 
with no temporal binding in the Passive Face and Passive Phase Scrambled tasks. Therefore, 
it seems to be the action of making a saccade which drives the effect in this experiment and 
produces the implicit sense of agency. This supports the growing body of temporal binding 
research which has demonstrated the same effects but for other motor actions, usually button 
presses, and within a non-social context (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). The 
significantly greater binding in the Passive Phase Scrambled task, compared to the Passive 
Face task, is surprising, although it may be due to the closed eyes in the Passive Face task at 
the outset offering the social cue that a gaze shift is unlikely to be triggered by the participant, 
whilst in the Passive Scrambled task, no such social cue was available.  
After Experiment 3, I will discuss further the potential effects of low level spatial 
shifts upon implicit agency. However, for now, the null binding effects in both Passive tasks 
compared to the Active Gaze Leading task do support the hypothesis that it is the action of 
gaze leading which drives the binding effects. The explicit ratings of agency show the 
manipulation of explicit sense of agency was successful with participants rating more sense 
of control over onscreen events in the Active Gaze Leading task than both the Passive tasks. 
There was a correlation between the Agency Effects (more binding for Active Gaze Leading 
over Passive tasks) between implicit and explicit measures. However, what this could mean 








for the relationship between explicit and implicit agency will be discussed in the Chapter 
Discussion because the results here do not replicate in the next two experiments or when 
combining the data for all three experiments.  
There were no correlations between AQ and magnitude of binding and magnitude of 
explicit agency. The lack of correlation in a non-clinical sample between AQ and explicit 
binding support previous findings in an ASC sample of no difference in explicit agency to 
typically developing individuals, suggesting this may possibly be intact in those with an ASC 
(David et al., 2008). However, the findings of no correlation between AQ and magnitude of 
temporal binding contrast with those of Sperduti et al. (2014) who found less binding in an 
ASC sample than the typically developing sample. It may be that this study failed to find any 
correlation because the effect is only found in those with a clinical diagnosis. Future research 
is needed to test further whether implicit agency over gaze responses is intact for those with 
an ASC diagnosis. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 Method 
A new group of participants of the same number (N=32) and type as Experiment 1 
was recruited in the same manner and, again, took part in return for course credits. Their 
mean age was 19.69 years (SD = 2.42, four males). The findings in the Phase Scrambled 
conditions in Experiments 1 had been interesting. However, the most crucial effect to seek to 
replicate was the novel finding, that an intentional saccade towards an object, if followed, 
compresses our perception of time between the object appearing and the subsequent gaze 
shift. In Experiment 1 the Active Gaze Leading condition had the onscreen joint attention 
responder maintain direct gaze towards the participant at the outset. Therefore, it was prudent 
to check whether a lack of eye contact between the participant and onscreen partner before 
the saccade was made could eliminate the temporal binding effects demonstrated before. The 
Active Gaze Leading condition in the second experiment was kept the same as before with 
the exception of the onscreen stimulus having closed eyes at the outset, instead of direct gaze. 
This enabled a check on whether it was the direct gaze, rather than the saccade, driving the 
binding effects, given it is known that direct gaze is a powerful social cue (Hamilton, 2016; 
for a review). Similarly, because there were closed eyes at the outset for the Passive Face task 
in the previous experiment, direct gaze from the onscreen face was used at the start, for 








Experiment 2’s Passive Face task. No saccade towards the object was made and participants 
kept fixation on the face throughout.  
One other important factor that needed to be tested relates to the fact participants 
began their interaction looking at the face before they began gaze leading in the Active Gaze 
Leading task. In everyday social exchanges we often do deliberate or intentional saccades to 
objects to direct another’s attention to it. However, we also sometimes find our gaze is 
followed by others even when we did not intend this to occur. I term this “incidental agency” 
such as when someone notices you are looking at something and so follows your gaze to see 
whether your attentional focus is also of relevance to them. To test whether incidental 
implicit agency also results in such an interaction a grey fixation dot (Courier, 18pt) was 
added where the object was due to appear in a Passive Object task. In this task, therefore, a 
situation in which gaze following was caused was simulated but not in the same intentional 
way as the Active Gaze Leading task. No saccade was made towards the object and 
participants maintained fixation throughout on the fixation dot placeholder and then the 
object, once it appeared, in the same place. Therefore, in this Passive Object task, the 
onscreen gaze response occurred when participants were already looking at the object, not 
having first performed a gaze leading saccade to it.  
The procedure and task for participants was the same in all other respects for 
Experiment 2 as the previous experiment. The Active Gaze Leading task was identical to 
Experiment 1 except for the addition of a fixation dot as a place holder for the object to keep 
consistency with the displays in the Passive tasks. For clarity, in the Active Gaze Leading 
task the instructions were exactly the same as Experiment 1 so participants looked at the face 
and then at the object once it appeared.  
Experiment 2 Results 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction. Mean reproduction error was 
calculated for each participant in each condition which is the reproduced time interval minus 
the actual time interval (see Table 2). Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs 
above or below their individual means were removed (0.28% of trials). The reproduced time 
interval was divided by the actual time interval to calculate mean percentage reproduction 
(see Figure 10). 
 










Figure 10. Mean percentage reproductions for Experiment 2. In the Gaze Leading task, 
participants looked first at the face, and then at an object as soon as it appeared. In the 
Passive Face task, participants looked at the face throughout. In the Passive Object task, 
participants looked at the placeholder/object throughout. The images show how the face was 
displayed when gaze onset occurred. Circles and the arrow were not displayed but represent 
where participants were instructed to fixate (and the saccade from the face to the object for 
the Active task). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-subjects 
designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 The same processing and analysis was performed on the data as in Experiment 1. 
First, in order to establish whether each condition produced temporal compression (reliable 
under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze onset), or relatively accurate 
reproductions, single sample t-tests for each of the three conditions on the percentage 
reproductions were performed. This showed that temporal compression was statistically 
significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, participants reproduced the temporal 
gap by M=80%, 95% CI [73,86] (SD=19%), t(31)=6.18, p<.001, dz=1.55, 95% CI [0.98, 
2.10]. In the Passive Face condition, reproduction did not differ statistically from 100% 
reproduction (Passive Face Fixation condition: M=96%, 95% CI [88, 104], SD=23%, 
t(31)=1.00, p=.327, dz=0.25, 95% CI [-0.24,0.74], but did in the Passive Object Fixation 








condition, M=90%, 95% CI [82, 98], SD=22%, t(31)=2.70, p=.01, dz=0.67, 95% CI [0.17, 
1.18]. There was a main effect of task, F(2,62) =21.45, MSE=0.221, p<.001, p2=0.409, and 
follow-up contrasts showed that the proportional temporal compression effect in the Active 
Gaze Leading condition was greater than in both the Passive Face Fixation, t(31)=6.02,  
p<.001, dz=0.79, 95% CI [0.46, 1.11] and Passive Object 
conditions t(31)=4.17, p<001, dz=0.51, 95% CI [0.23, 0.77]. 
Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset analyses. As in 
Experiment 1, greater explicit agency was reported following the Active Gaze Leading (3.97, 
SD=1.79) 95% CI [3.32, 4.61] than both the Passive Object Fixation (2.72, SD=1.57) 95% CI 
[2.09, 3.35] and Passive Face Fixation (2.59, SD=1.50) 95% CI [2.05, 3.13] conditions 
(ts>3.6, ps<.001, dzs>0.7). In the critical Active Gaze Leading condition, mean saccadic 
reaction time was 219ms (SD=57ms), and mean saccade duration for the gaze leading 
saccade was 79ms (SD=69). There were only 0.6% of trials where the onscreen face gaze 
shift occurred before the participant’s saccade was completed. The same check as Experiment 
1 was performed, by reanalysing the data with the nine participants excluded who 
experienced a gaze shift onscreen before their saccade was completed. This was for only an 
average of 1.22 trials per participant. These nine participant’s mean explicit ratings were not 
different to the rest of the sample (M = 3.66, SD=1.87 and M = 4.01, SD=1.75, respectively). 
The data showed a remarkably similar pattern. The Active Gaze Leading condition revealed 
temporal compression – participants reproduced 76%, 95% CI [68,84], SD=19% of the 
veridical time interval, t(22)=6.12, p<.001, dz=1.81, 95% CI [1.11,2.48]. The Passive Face 
Fixation condition did not produce temporal compression (M=92% reproduction, 95% CI 
[82,101] SD=23%, t(22)=1.77, p=.091, dz=0.52 95% CI [-0.07,1.11]. However, the Passive 
Object Fixation task did reveal reliable under-reproductions, of about one third less than that 
in the active condition; M=84% reproduction, 95% CI [76,93] SD=19%, t(22)=3.87, p=.001, 
dz=1.14, 95% CI [0.51,1.76]. 
In the critical Active Gaze Leading condition, mean sRT was 219ms (SD=57ms), and 
did not correlate with the temporal compression effect, r=-.06, n=31, p=.77. (There was no 
eye tracking data due to technical reasons for one participant so n= 31 for these analyses of 








sRT and saccade durations). Mean saccade duration for the gaze leading saccade was 79ms 
(SD=69) and did not correlate with temporal compression either, r=.26, n=31, p=.16. 
Saccades to the object in error were made on only 0.33% of trials during the Passive 
Face task. In the Passive Object task of Experiment 2, saccades in error away from the object 
to the face were made on only 0.06% of trials. Therefore, passive tasks were not 
compromised by erroneous saccades, just like Experiment 1, as these were so small in 
number. The same split half analysis of binding by temporal interval was carried out as 
Experiment 1. The median time interval was 1376 ms and the mean was 1375 ms (SD= 541). 
The mean temporal interval for the shortest half was 905 ms (SD= 271) with a mean RE of  
-10 ms (SD= 352), meaning there was very little under-reproduction for the shortest half. The 
mean temporal interval for the longest half was 1844 ms (SD= 267) with a mean RE of -557 
ms (SD= 465), meaning there was under-reproduction in the longest half. The shortest and 
longest halves were significantly different, t(31)=14.53, p<.001, dz=2.57, showing larger 
effects with the longer intervals, again supporting the notion that these are, indeed, temporal 
binding effects.  
Correlation analysis of explicit and implicit agency findings. Any correlations 
between explicit and implicit agency were examined for each of the three conditions and 
between the Agency Effects for the Active Gaze Leading task compared to the Passive Object 
task. All correlations were non-significant, rs< 0.20, ps>.28.  
Correlation analysis of AQ. The mean AQ score was 15.06 (SD = 6.35) and the 
range was 5 to 33. Just like Experiment 1, no significant correlations were found between AQ 
and RE for all tasks, rs< 0.17, ps>.35.  
Experiment 2 Discussion 
 The findings of temporal binding resulting from having an Active Gaze Leading 
towards an object followed, replicated but now there is another, novel finding of binding in 
the Passive Object task, albeit attenuated compared to the Active Gaze Leading task. The 
findings for Passive Face (no binding) replicated that of Experiment 1. I now summarise the 
results from Experiments 1 and 2 together. If an Active Gaze Leading was made, binding was 
greatest. When no saccade was made, some binding resulted, but only if participants were 
already looking at the object. There was no binding in passive tasks if participants were 
looking at the face throughout. The same effects or lack of effects resulted whether or not 








participants experienced direct gaze or closed eyes with the participant before the gaze 
response. This will be discussed further in the Chapter Discussion as it relates to theoretical 
models of predictive or retrospective mechanisms underpinning the implicit agency process. 
There were no reliable correlations between implicit and explicit agency and in 
Agency Effects between the two types of agency measures. This is evidence, like the last 
experiment, that implicit and explicit agency may be dissociable (Synofzik et al., 2008, 
2013). The explicit agency ratings for both Passive tasks were low in both experiments, 
compared with higher ratings for the Active Gaze Leading task. Just like the previous 
experiment, no correlations between implicit or explicit agency and AQ were found. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 Method 
In this experiment a further, new group of participants of the same number (N=32) 
and type were recruited in the same way and given credits for participation, as before. Their 
mean age was 21.34 years (SD = 5.72, three males). This experiment was an exact replication 
of Experiment 1 for the Active Gaze Leading task, being the main novel finding to seek to 
replicate. In the final experiment the aim was to check any outstanding questions not yet 
tested in the previous experiments for Passive Object tasks. 
For the Passive Object task in this experiment, whether the attenuated incidental 
implicit agency effect would replicate that found in Experiment 2 was explored, but with the 
onscreen partner having closed eyes at the outset, instead of the direct gaze used in 
Experiment 2. The Passive Phase Scrambled Object task in this third experiment was the 
same as the Passive Phase Scrambled task in Experiment 1, with the important difference that 
participants fixated the fixation dot and then the object throughout, instead of the rectangle 
throughout, to test whether an attenuated sense of agency would occur when there is a low-
level shift in peripheral vision towards the object of gaze, but no gaze leading saccade is 
made. The prediction was that participants would not attribute agency in this case as they 
would not expect to cause rectangles to shift, unlike eye gaze shifts which they would expect 
to control. To pre-empt the results, this is the most unexpected finding across the three 
experiments as there was binding in this task, but explicit agency ratings remained low. I will 
put forward possible explanations for this potentially revealing finding. The procedure was 








the same as Experiments 1 and 2 with participants reproducing the same time intervals as 
before, being the time between the object appearing and the gaze or rectangle shift onset.  
Experiment 3 Results 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction. Mean reproduction error was 
calculated for each participant in each condition which is the reproduced time interval minus 
the actual time interval (see Table 2). Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs 
above or below their individual means were removed (0.24% of trials). The reproduced time 
interval was divided by the actual time interval to calculate mean percentage reproduction 
(see Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean percentage reproductions for Experiment 3. In the Gaze Leading task, 
participants looked first at the face, and then at an object as soon as it appeared. In the 
Passive Object and Passive Phase Scrambled Object tasks, participants looked at the 
placeholder/object throughout. The images show how the face/scrambled stimulus was 
displayed when gaze onset occurred. Circles and the arrow were not displayed but represent 
where participants were instructed to fixate (and the saccade from the face to the object for 
the Active task). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-subjects 
designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 








The same processing and analysis was performed on the data as in Experiments 1 and 
2. First, in order to establish whether each condition produced temporal compression (reliable 
under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze onset), or relatively accurate 
reproductions, single sample t-tests were performed for each of the three conditions on the 
percentage reproductions. This showed that temporal compression was statistically significant 
in all three conditions. In the Active Gaze leading condition, participants reproduced the 
temporal gap by M=81%, 95% CI [74, 89] (SD=22%), t(31)=-4.84, p<.001, dz=1.21, 95% CI 
[0.63, 1.78]. In the Passive Object condition, participants reproduced the temporal gap by 
M=90%, 95% CI [82, 98] (SD=22%), t(31)=2.64, p=.013, dz=0.66, 95% CI [0.14, 1.17]. In 
the Passive Phase Scrambled Object Fixation condition, reproduction was M=85%, 95% CI 
[75, 94], SD=25%, t(31)=3.45 p=.002, dz=0.86, 95% CI [0.32, 1.39]. There was a main effect 
of task, F(2,62) =5,15, MSE =0.055, p=.009, p2=.142, and follow-up contrasts showed that 
the proportional temporal compression effect in the Active Gaze Leading condition was 
greater than the Passive Object Fixation, t(31)=3.02, p=.005, dz=0.38, 95% CI [0.11,0.64], 
but no different from the Passive Phase Scrambled Object condition, t(31)=1.09, p=.283, 
dz=0.13, 95% CI [0.11,0.37]. 
Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset analyses. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, greater explicit agency was reported following the Active Gaze Leading 
(4.06, SD=2.00) 95% CI [3.34, 4.78], than both the Passive Phase Scrambled Object Fixation 
(2.00, SD=1.72) 95% CI [1.38, 2.62] and Passive Object Fixation (2.16, SD=1.57) 95% CI  
[1.59, 2.72] conditions (ts>5.03, ps<.001, dzs>1.80). In the critical Active Gaze Leading 
condition, mean saccadic reaction time was 180ms (SD=43ms), and mean saccade duration 
for the gaze leading saccade was 71ms (SD=69ms). There were only 0.3% of trials where the 
onscreen face gaze shift occurred before the participant’s saccade was completed. The same 
check as Experiments 1 and 2 was carried out, by reanalysing the data with the five 
participants excluded who experienced a gaze shift onscreen before their saccade was 
completed. This was for only an average of 1.20 trials per participant. These five participant’s 
mean explicit ratings were not different to the rest of the sample (M = 4.07, SD=1.98 and M 
=4.06, SD=2.00, respectively). The data showed a remarkably similar pattern. The Active 
Gaze Leading condition revealed temporal compression – participants reproduced 81%, 95% 
CI [73, 89], SD=21% of the veridical time interval, t(26)=-4.66, p<.001, dz=1.27, 95% CI 








[0.63, 1.90]. The Passive Object Fixation condition produced temporal compression (M=89% 
reproduction, 95% CI [80, 97] SD=22%, t(26)=-2.70, p=.012, dz=0.73 95% CI [0.16, 1.30]. 
The Passive Scrambled Object Fixation task also revealed reliable under-reproductions; 
M=83% reproduction, 95% CI [73, 92] SD=24%, t(26)=-3.78, p=.001, dz=1.03, 95% CI [0.42, 
1.63]. 
Just like Experiments 1 and 2, saccade metrics revealed that in the critical Active 
Gaze Leading condition, neither mean saccadic reaction time (M=223 ms, SD= 113 ms) nor 
saccade duration (M=78 ms, SD= 55 ms) correlated with temporal binding, r=-,21, n=32, 
p=.26, r=-.26, n=32, p=.16, respectively. In the Passive Phase Scrambled Object task, there 
were no saccades made away from the object to the scrambled rectangle. In the Passive 
Object task, saccades in error away from the object to the face were made on only 0.06% of 
trials. Therefore, passive tasks were not compromised by erroneous saccades, just like 
Experiments 1 and 2. The same split half analysis of binding by temporal interval was carried 
out as Experiments 1 and 2. The median time interval was 1290 ms and the mean was 1325 
ms (SD= 546). The mean temporal interval for the shortest half was 853 ms (SD= 177) with a 
mean RE of 2 ms (SD= 390), meaning there was no under-reproduction for the shortest half. 
The mean temporal interval for the longest half was 1800 ms (SD= 303) with a mean RE of  
-503 ms (SD= 507), meaning there was under-reproduction in the longest half. The shortest 
and longest halves were significantly different, t(31)=8.38, p<.001, dz=0.40, showing larger 
effects with the longer intervals, again supporting the notion that these are, indeed, temporal 
binding effects.  
Correlation analysis of explicit and implicit agency findings. Any correlations 
between explicit and implicit agency for each of the three conditions was examined. There 
was a medium, positive correlation between implicit Active Gaze Leading task and explicit 
Active Gaze Leading task, r(32) = 0.41, p = .02 (two-tailed). Therefore, the greater the 
implicit agency, the less explicit agency was reported. This is in the opposite direction to that 
found trending in Experiment 1. There were no significant correlations between implicit and 
explicit findings for the Passive Object task or the Passive Phase Scrambled object task, rs< 
0.23, ps>.23. Analyses were carried out to explore any correlations like those found in 
Experiment 1 between the differences in the Agency Effect between implicit and explicit 
findings, but no significant correlations were found, rs< 0.13, ps>.09. Combining data across 








all three experiments still revealed no significant c3orrelations between binding and explicit 
ratings. 
Correlation analysis of AQ. The mean AQ score was 14.13 (SD = 8.48) ) and the 
range was 1 to 33. Just like Experiments 1 and 2, there were no correlations between AQ and 
the Agency Effect, nor between AQ and degree of binding in any task, rs< 0.20, ps>.285. 
Combining the data across the three experiments in case they lacked power to detect a 
correlation still failed to reveal any significant correlations between AQ and binding or AQ 
and Agency Effects. 
Experiment 3 Discussion 
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 of temporal binding effects in the Active Gaze 
Leading condition were replicated. This supports the hypothesis that making eye movements 
which cause an outcome produces perceived compression of time, like other motor actions. 
Therefore, an implicit sense of agency results from having gaze leading responded to. The 
attenuated binding effect for incidental agency found in Experiment 2 also replicated. 
Participants apparently felt some implicit agency when they were already looking at an object 
in the Passive Object task, whilst they did not self-report corresponding high levels of explicit 
agency perhaps because higher level processes led to a low agency judgement. This supports 
the balance of evidence that implicit and explicit agency are dissociable (e.g. Moore et al., 
2012, Saito et al., 2015). Implicit agency for incidental agency is not surprising in the context 
of social interaction because our gaze is not only followed after a deliberate saccade to an 
object, but also incidentally when others notice our object of attention. Indeed, we are aware 
our gaze may sometimes be followed when we do not want it to be followed.  
However, unexpectedly, this binding effect was even stronger, in the Passive Phase 
Scrambled Object task, when no saccade was made but a spatial shift occurred towards the 
incidental object of gaze. This observation could merely reflect a carry-over effect from the 
active task blocks (given the repeated measures design) so those participants who completed 
the Scrambled Passive Object block first were examined. However, those participants under-
reproduced the interval by a similar amount to the sample as a whole, 86% reproduction, 
compared to 85% reproduction for the whole sample. I speculate that implicit agency resulted 
for one of three reasons, or a combination of them. Firstly, when there is a face we have a 
social context within which to make agency attributions. However, the situation is ambiguous 








in the Passive Phase Scrambled Object task. This lack of context makes it a safer option to 
over-attribute agency when there is a spatial shift towards our direction of gaze. It is adaptive 
to assume we caused an outcome for which we may be responsible and have to take further 
action. This explanation also fits with recent findings reported by Desantis, Waszak, and 
Gorea (2016) who found that participants over-attribute self-agency when they are in an 
ambiguous situation.  
Secondly, the two rectangles shifting sideways resemble eyes moving on a face and so 
may be processed as such with face-like stimuli having been shown to produce gaze cueing 
effects, when perceived as faces ( the “pareidolia” phenomenon, Takahashi & Watanabe, 
2013). Interestingly, there were no order effects between the three blocks in Experiment 3, 
meaning participants were just as likely to experience implicit agency whether they 
experienced the Phase Scrambled Object task before or after the face tasks. Thirdly, the gaze 
cueing literature has often, but not always, found shifts of spatial attention result from arrows 
in a similar way to eyes (see Frischen et al., 2007, for a review). It may be that low level 
spatial shifts towards our object of gaze from non-faces, here the shifting rectangles akin to 
arrows, produce an implicit sense of agency within a non-social context, just as have been 
shown here to emerge in the social context of the faces.  
 A lack of reliable correlations between binding and explicit agency ratings across the 
three experiments points towards a dissociation between implicit and explicit agency and this 
will be discussed further in the Chapter Discussion. Finally, there were no correlations with 
AQ and binding, just like Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting no individual differences in 
implicit agency according to level of autism-like traits in a typically developing sample. 
Chapter Discussion 
Here, using a temporal binding paradigm in a novel context, a sense of agency 
resulting from initiating joint attention was investigated. In three experiments whether eye 
saccades, like other motor actions in previous research within a non-social context, can result 
in temporal binding, was tested and it was found that they can within a simulated social 
interaction context. Furthermore, incidental implicit agency effects were examined when no 
saccades are made but attention is already on an object when a gaze (or spatial shift) shift 
occurs, and an attenuated sense of implicit agency was found in those circumstances. I also 
explored whether implicit and explicit agency are associated or independent systems, finding 








evidence that they can be viewed as dissociable. Finally, no correlations between autism-like 
traits and binding and Agency Effects were found.  
Temporal binding findings. This data demonstrates, for the first time, that having an 
eye movement responded to does induce a perception of a compression of time between its 
initiation and an outcome; the classic temporal binding effect (Moore & Obhi, 2012; for a 
review). I argue, as many have before me, that this is a putative marker of an implicit sense of 
agency (e.g. Kühn et al., 2013). Sense of agency is particularly important within the context 
of joint attention interactions. This is because controlling other’s gaze takes place within 
everyday social interactions and enables us to communicate our “theory of mind” to others 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978), helping us achieve our goals (Baron-Cohen, 1997). Therefore, 
being able to monitor how we impact the behaviour of others is essential during these 
interactions. The lack of binding in Passive Face tasks, in contrast to binding in the Passive 
Object tasks, demonstrates that it matters where we are looking when we experience agency 
over another’s eye movements. If we are looking at an object already, we may attribute some 
agency to an observed congruent eye shift and we have demonstrated the same effect occurs 
when observing a spatial shift akin to an eye gaze shift, congruent with our location of gaze.  
The lack of binding in passive conditions shows that the mere presence of a social 
stimulus does not interfere greatly with accurate timing of intervals per se. However, the 
weaker but reliable binding effect in the Passive Object Fixation task of Experiments 2 and 3 
is worth further discussion. This observation could merely reflect a carry-over effect from the 
active task blocks (given the repeated measures design). However, upon examination of those 
participants who completed the Passive Object task first, the binding effect was still present, 
or even more so, as it was for the whole sample. In Experiment 2, there was a mean of 87% 
reproduction for those who experienced Passive Object first, compared to the whole sample’s 
mean of 90%. In Experiment 3 the mean reproduction for those who experienced Passive 
Object first was 84%, compared with the whole sample mean of 90%, so carry-over effects 
are an unlikely explanation for the effects found in that experiment too. Therefore, a more 
interesting (but speculative) suggestion would be that object-oriented attention in the 
presence of a face gazing at the same object might affect time estimation, even in the absence 
of a recently preceding action. It could be the case that if we are looking at an object already, 
we may attribute some agency to an observed congruent eye shift; but the effect is stronger if 








we have recently saccaded to that object (as in the Active Gaze Leading condition). This 
chimes with work highlighting the critical importance of objects in joint attention (Bayliss & 
Tipper, 2006; Bayliss et al., 2013; Lobmaier, Fischer, & Schwaninger, 2006). 
Taking this evidence together, there may be a hierarchical system which attributes the 
greatest sense of implicit agency after intentional gaze leading and then an attenuated sense 
of implicit agency if a gaze shift is detected when we are already directing our gaze towards 
an object incidentally. It makes adaptive sense to monitor gaze in this way and to detect and 
attribute our causal role in these shifts of attention. Indeed, these data show that even a low 
level spatial shift towards our object of gaze will elicit implicit, although not explicit, sense 
of agency. As social, communicative and collaborative beings, we need to know what impact 
our own actions may be having on other’s actions, whether or not we intended to influence 
them. An implicit, interpersonal agency effect during joint attention is one mechanism which 
can help us achieve that.  
I now consider what these findings offer for the theories about a predictive or 
retrospective position, or a combination of both, for how sense of agency occurs. The data in 
this chapter do not support an exclusively predictive position. Because binding occurred even 
when the onscreen eyes were closed at the outset, this implies some retrospective inference 
has been made as we do not expect someone who is not looking at us to respond to our gaze 
signals. This supports a growing body of research which has shown retrospective processes 
are involved (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009). This is 
also consistent with the finding that angular gyrus activation shows, at a neural level, that 
there is a comparison of predicted outcome with actual outcome (Chambon et al., 2013; 
Farrer et al., 2008).  
Moore and Obhi’s (2012) review of evidence on the intentionality or causality debate, 
concluded that both are necessary for binding to occur but either one alone is not enough. 
Causality seems to have played the main role in the findings for the Passive Object tasks 
because intentionality was not manipulated in that task. Participants were told they were not 
causing the gaze shift in the Passive Object task but binding still resulted, albeit weaker than 
in the Active Gaze Leading tasks where participants were told they were causing the gaze 
shift. This contrasted with the explicit low agency ratings for the Passive Object task. This 
supports the position of Buehner (2012) who argued causality is the main driver of binding. 








Further research using this paradigm but manipulating intentionality could shed further light 
on the relative contributions of causality and intentionality. For example, participants could 
be instructed to choose their preference between two objects by looking at the one they liked 
best, with the intention of making the on-screen face follow their gaze to that choice. If 
temporal binding continued to occur when gaze was not followed in that paradigm, then it 
would be hard to argue that intentionality had driven the effect. 
Explicit and implicit agency. Taking all three experiments together, no reliable 
correlations were found between implicit and explicit agency. This points towards a 
dissociation between the two types of agency as previously proposed (Moore et al., 2012; 
Saito et al., 2015; Synofzik et al., 2008). The data does, nevertheless, support the idea that 
there is some relationship between the two types of agency, rather than them operating 
completely independently. This is because, whilst individuals’ degree of binding and degree 
of self-reported feelings of control did not correlate, nevertheless, the largest sense of explicit 
agency was reported in the Active Gaze Leading task compared to the lower ratings in the 
Passive tasks in all three experiments, just as the binding effects were largest in the Active 
tasks compared to the Passive tasks. The findings lend support to the existence of a 
dichotomy between what is experienced on a low, sensorimotor level during implicit agency 
and what is judged to be under our control on an explicit level, also supporting an extended 
version of the comparator model (see Moore et al., 2012; Synofzik et al., 2008, 2013). This is 
because, on an implicit level, binding occurred in the Passive Phase Scrambled Object task 
when participants were already looking at the object but explicitly in that task they made self-
reported judgments that they felt little control over causing the rectangles to shift.  
Autism-like traits and binding and agency effects. There were no correlations 
between magnitude of temporal binding overall and level of autism-like traits. This accords 
with David et al. (2008) who found intact explicit sense of agency in an action monitoring 
task for those with a diagnosis of autism. The data also lend support to the idea that time 
perception may be intact for those with an autism diagnosis (Wallace & Happé, 2008). 
However, in a temporal binding paradigm similar to the one employed here, Sperduti et al. 
(2014) did find reduced temporal binding in their sample with an autism diagnosis, compared 
with control.  








Similarly, there was no association with autism-like traits and the magnitude of the 
Agency Effects. I had predicted that there would be a correlation here because of previous 
findings in my lab of weaker attentional orienting towards faces who followed gaze for those 
with higher levels of autism-like traits (Edwards et al, 2015). However, Edwards et al. (2015) 
demonstrated an attentional effect of gaze leading and, in the light of the findings here, sense 
of agency effects during joint attention appear distinguishable from attentional effects and not 
to be modulated by autism-like traits.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
  I cannot rule out that the temporal binding effect demonstrated in these three 
experiments may not be a measure of implicit sense of agency, although much research has 
offered evidence that it is (See Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). It is also noted that these 
experiments were limited to demonstrating temporal binding within a computer simulated 
joint attention context, rather than a naturalistic interaction. 
Another methodological limitation is that the direct interval replication method was 
used to measure temporal binding. Some studies have used other binding measures such as 
instructing participants to make evaluations of intervals on an analogue scale in milliseconds 
(e.g. Kühn et al., 2013). These studies could be repeated using analogue scale reports in place 
of direct interval replication to explore whether that method is more or less sensitive to the 
binding effect. In addition, as Hughes, Desantis, and Waszak (2013) point out, by employing 
the direct interval replication method we cannot isolate the relative contributions of a shift in 
the perception of the motor action or of the outcome effect to the effect of temporal binding. 
The same point can be made about any interval estimation procedure. To explore these 
relative contributions, reporting the position of the clock hands when the action or the 
outcome occurs would be needed as employed for the Libet clock method (Haggard et al., 
2002), but this would be difficult in this paradigm where visual attention needs to be on the 
stimuli and not on the clock. There is also an argument put forward by Stetson, Cui, 
Montague, and Eagleman (2006) that there is a recalibration of order judgments rather than a 
perceived shifting backwards in time of the outcome and my paradigm cannot explore this 
interesting possibility. 
Another possible future direction would be to manipulate the inter-event interval 
further as random intervals between 400 and 2300 ms were employed. It would be instructive 








to explore if longer intervals remove the effect altogether because the interaction may feel 
less naturalistic and so implicit agency may not result. It is possible that using very short 
intervals may also eliminate the effect if that feels less naturalistic. There is likely to be a 
“Goldilocks” time interval which feels just right. To explore the apparent dissociation further 
between implicit and explicit agency, this paradigm could be used but with the important 
difference that participants are told in all tasks that they are not causing the gaze or spatial 
shifts, even in the Active Gaze Leading tasks. I speculate that similar implicit Agency Effects 
would be found in the Active Gaze Leading task but that the explicit ratings for that task 
would decrease significantly. 
There are a host of boundary conditions that remain untested in order to establish the 
conditions necessary and sufficient to produce indices of implicit agency in social contexts. 
One important future condition to test is to establish whether the observed gaze response 
needs to be congruent with the participant’s saccadic action, or can be any response (e.g. to 
avert gaze, or to change emotional expression, for example). I speculate that possibly an 
incongruent gaze shift might elicit binding if we feel we have caused another to look away 
from our direction of interest. Whether this would be binding of the same magnitude as a 
congruent gaze shift (or no binding at all) would be interesting for future studies to explore. 
The current results identify just one instance in which temporal binding can occur following a 
causal eye movement. Although determining the specificity of this effect is, of course, 
important for understanding the nature of the mechanisms involved, if future work were to 
demonstrate that the effect does generalise widely, this would not necessarily reduce the 
direct importance of this mechanism for understanding how social cognition is supported by 
such basic sensorimotor mechanisms. 
One potential complication for the interpretation of these findings is that in both 
active and passive conditions, participants must detect the onset of the object in their 
periphery (while they are looking at the face). However, in the active tasks, the onset of the 
responding gaze shift is to be detected in their periphery because the participant is now 
looking at the object having performed a saccade, while in the passive conditions, the 
participant detects the gaze shift at their point of fixation, having not moved their eyes. This 
difference could have affected the speed of detection of the gaze shift across conditions. 
However, were participants to be slower to detect the gaze shift in their peripheral vision in 








the active task, this would have extended their time estimations, which means that the binding 
effects may have, if anything, been artificially relatively reduced. Despite this difference 
potentially working against the predictions, medium (Experiment 1) and large (Experiments 2 
and 3) binding effect sizes emerged.  
Future work could employ a gaze-contingent design to explore agency in social gaze 
interactions. The present work did not take this approach. If the action of the participant had 
been yoked more directly to the stimulus changes by using gaze-contingent stimuli, perhaps 
participants would report a greater explicit sense of agency than found here, and the temporal 
binding effects might have also been more stable. I did not employ a gaze contingent design 
here because I wished to avoid the introduction of a confound. Specifically, in the Active 
Gaze Leading task the to-be-estimated time interval would have included three periods of 
temporal lag that would not be present in the Passive conditions, making them not 
comparable without off-line adjustment. These lag periods are the saccade latency, the 
saccade duration and the eye-tracker uptake time to detect good fixation upon the object in 
order to cause the gaze shift. By not using gaze contingent stimuli, my chosen design 
afforded direct comparison of the actual time intervals across conditions. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that future studies should employ gaze contingent designs that circumvent the issues 
noted above to overcome this limitation of the present research. This would allow for even 
more robust tests of hypotheses regarding the temporal dynamics of social gaze. 
Finally, only one female face was used for the gaze stimulus.  The task is to hold the 
time of object appearance and gaze onset in working memory in order to reproduce a time 
interval.  This task requires good concentration and so keeping the face stimulus constant 
throughout was thought to be best to avoid distraction from that task. However, this means 
the binding effects demonstrated are in predominately female samples using a female 
onscreen face. A potential fruitful line of research could follow up these findings by 
exploring effects for onscreen male faces compared to female faces.  I speculate that there 
may well be revealing differences in a similar way to the gaze cueing sex differences 
demonstrated by Bayliss et al. (2005), where females were shown to be more responsive to 
gaze cueing.  









 These three experiments show, to the best of my knowledge uniquely, that temporal 
binding can occur when a gaze response is perceived to result from deliberate eye saccade 
bids for joint attention. Moreover, this implicit agency effect is within the context of a 
simulated joint attention interaction. I offer this as evidence for an implicit sense of agency 
for initiating joint attention interactions. Similarly, implicit agency can result when detecting 
a gaze shift towards our object of gaze, even if not intentionally caused. Finally, an incidental 
sense of agency may be felt even for low level spatial shifts towards our object of gaze, in an 
ambiguous, non-social situation. Given that this is a unique study into temporal binding 
within joint attention, the findings need replication, but show promise to elucidate the 
cognitive processes at work which produce a sense of agency during gaze interactions. There 
were no associations with level of autism-like traits and the magnitude of the temporal 
binding effect, suggesting time perception and agency may possibly be intact in the ASC 
population. The findings also support the theory that implicit and explicit agency are 
dissociable mechanisms. Future work is needed to explore this fascinating human experience 
of how we monitor our control over the world around us using our eyes and the effects of 
these motor actions on time perception. 
 
  














































In the three experiments in Chapter 2, I hypothesised that that there would be greater 
temporal binding when participants’ eyes were followed to an object (Active Gaze Leading 
conditions) than when no saccades to the object were made (Passive conditions). The data 
was consistent with this hypothesis, providing evidence that an implicit sense of agency is 
generated in the gaze leader when their saccade is followed, establishing joint attention. 
However, these findings left two key, unanswered questions. Firstly, was it simply the action 
of making a saccade which would always induce temporal binding rather than the context of 
the nature of the interaction with an onscreen face? Secondly, I had found attenuated 
temporal binding effects of about half the magnitude of the gaze leading effects when 
participants were already fixating object when the gaze shift response occurred. This seemed 
to evidence a form of incidental agency when some agency is felt over a congruent gaze shift 
towards our object of attention, even without a gaze leading saccade. This begged the 
question of whether a saccade was even necessary to induce temporal binding. Therefore, two 
further experiments were designed to test these questions. To pre-empt the results from both 
experiments, the data suggests that a gaze leading saccade may be necessary, but may not be 
sufficient by itself, to elicit the binding effects found in gaze leading conditions in 
Experiments 1-3.  
There are only two studies I am aware of which have investigated agency and/or 
temporal binding for oculomotor actions. Firstly, Yabe and Goodale (2015) found temporal 
binding occurred between the intention to perform a saccade and the saccade itself, 
demonstrated by a shifting backwards in time of the perceived visual cue to saccade. This 
demonstrates that, in principle, a saccade may elicit binding effects between an intention to 
saccade and the performance of the saccade. Secondly, Grgič, Crespi, and De’Sperati (2016) 
found an explicit sense of gaze agency can arise from causing (via saccades) auditory beeps to 
co-occur with bouncing balls moving on a screen. This study evidenced the ability to become 
explicitly self-aware of controlling a gaze-based, non-social interface. What the first 
experiment in this chapter aimed to do was explore oculomotor agency during an interaction 
with a non-social stimulus with the same type of saccadic metrics as the social interaction 
simulated in the three experiments in Chapter 1. 









In Experiment 4, participants completed an interval reproduction task under two 
conditions manipulated within-subjects. In the “Saccade” task, participants attempted to 
reproduce the time interval between a fixation cross’ appearance, to which the participants were 
to immediately saccade, and an initial fixation cross’ enlargement. As typical for temporal 
binding paradigms, performance in the active “Saccade” condition was compared with a 
‘passive’ condition in which no action (here, a saccade) is made by the participant. In the “No 
Saccade” condition participants fixated the first cross throughout but still reproduced the time 
interval between the second cross appearing and the first cross enlarging. The spatial distance 
between the crosses was matched to the distance between the face and object in Experiments 
1-3, to ensure meaningful comparison. In both experiments, I have reported how I determined 
sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations and all measures. 
Experiment 4 Method 
Participants. Thirty-two participants (mean age=19.69 years; 2 were men) completed 
the study in return for course credit. The target sample size was determined by matching that 
of the samples in the three previous experiments where medium or large effect sizes for the 
gaze leading binding effects were found. Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Ethical approval was granted by the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, 
University of East Anglia. All participants were drawn from the Psychology undergraduate 
programme, were naïve to the aims of the study and gave written informed consent. One 
participant whose data revealed the essential instruction to attempt to reproduce the time 
intervals had not been followed was excluded. Henceforth, n=31. 
Stimuli. The stimuli were a white first fixation cross (Courier, 24pt) initially (but 
enlarging to Courier, 48pt) presented 5 cm left-of-centre onscreen centrally and a second white 
fixation cross (Courier, 24pt) presented centrally onscreen and 11.5 cm to the right of the first 
cross. Stimuli appeared on a black background and were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software 
(see Figure 12).  









Figure 12. Trial sequence for the Saccade task. Participant looked at the first cross (a), 
displayed for 1000ms. Participant made a saccade (b) to the second cross as soon as it 
appeared. After a random inter-event interval of 400ms to 2300ms, the first cross enlarged 
(c). After 1000ms, estimate instruction appeared until response. Participants pressed and 
released the space bar to replicate the inter-event interval. The inter-event interval is the time 
between the second cross appearing and the first cross enlarging.  
Apparatus and materials. Right eye position was tracked with an infrared eye tracker 
(Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada; resolution 0.10, 500 Hz). A chin rest was used 
to maintain head stability. Viewing distance was 70cm from eyes to a 45 cm monitor 
(resolution 1024×768 pixels). A standard keyboard was used for manual responses. A 1-8 scale 
was used for participants’ self-reported feelings of agency in each condition, with 8 
representing the highest feeling of agency.  
 Design. The within-subjects design had two blocked conditions of 56 trials each. Block 
order was counterbalanced across participants. The conditions were Saccade and No Saccade. 
The dependent measures were the reproduction error (RE), calculated in milliseconds as the 
participants’ reproduction of the temporal interval between two events minus the veridical 
temporal interval, and the percentage reproduction, calculated as the veridical temporal interval 
divided by the reproduced time interval. The inter-event interval was the time between a second 
fixation cross’ appearance and a subsequent enlargement of the first fixation cross. The 
temporal interval between the second cross’ appearance (rather than saccade onset) and the 
first cross enlarging was used to allow direct comparison between conditions (as no saccades 
were made in the No Saccade condition).  
Procedure. Each experimental block commenced with a standard nine point eye 
tracking calibration, then 8 practice trials, then 56 experimental trials (see Figure 12). In the 
Saccade task, each trial began with the presentation of the first fixation cross on the left side of 
the screen. Participants were instructed to look at the cross (presented for 1000 ms) until a 
second fixation cross appeared on the right. This sudden onset was the participant’s cue to 








immediately saccade to the second fixation cross. After a randomly selected inter-event interval 
of 400-2300ms following the onset of the second cross, the first cross enlarged to twice its 
original size. After 1000ms, the word “Estimate” appeared (white font, Courier, 18pt) above 
and below the crosses. This prompted the participant to manually press and hold down the 
spacebar for a duration that to their best ability replicated the time interval between the second 
cross’ appearance and the first cross’ enlargement. Participants were given no feedback about 
their responses. Finally, after releasing the spacebar, the display cleared to black for 1000ms. 
The design relied on the low variance of saccadic RT and spatial acuity in this very 
simple eye movement task to ensure that the minimum temporal gap of 400ms was greater than 
the vast majority of saccades. Moreover, timing the temporal gap from a single fixed onset that 
occurred in both conditions (the second cross onset) afforded a straightforward and direct 
comparison between conditions. Finally, in the construction of the task, the fact that merely 
making a saccade can compress perceived temporal durations (saccadic suppression) was 
considered. However, this effect has been shown to operate on a much smaller scale than the 
effects anticipated here (Morrone et al., 2005), and is likely offset by chronostasis (Merchant 
& Yarrow, 2016).  
 The baseline control condition, in which I predict accurate temporal reproduction 
intervals was the No Saccade task. This was identical to the Saccade condition, except that the 
participant maintained fixation throughout on the first fixation cross. After each task (at the 
end of a 56 trial block) participants self-reported their degree of felt control over the first cross 
enlarging. The instruction was “Please rate how much control you felt over the first cross 
enlarging from 1 to 8, 1 meaning no control at all to 8 meaning a lot of control.”  
Experiment 4 Results 
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction. Mean reproduction error was 
calculated for each participant in each condition which is the reproduced time interval minus 














Table 3.  
Reproduction errors for each condition for Experiments 3 and 4. Confidence intervals are 
based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
Condition M SD Explicit Rating 
E4 No Saccade   60  [-70, 190] 355 2.10 (SD=1.64) 
E4 Saccade -120 [-270, 28] 406 2.13 (SD=1.45) 
E5 Passive Face Fixation   87  [-41, 216] 357 2.50 (SD=2.00) 
E5 Passive Object Fixation  -27  [-124, 71] 271 3.03 (SD=1.51) 
Abbreviations: M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs above or below their individual 
means were removed (0.58% of trials). The reproduced time interval was divided by the actual 
time interval to calculate mean percentage reproduction (see Figure 13). Confidence intervals 
around effect sizes are reported, using ESCI (Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals) 
to calculate these (Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017). First, in order to establish whether each 
condition produced temporal binding (reliable underestimations of the time between second 
cross onset and first cross enlarging), or relatively accurate reproductions, two single sample t-
tests were performed for each condition. This showed that temporal binding was not 
statistically significant in either the Saccade or No Saccade conditions. In the Saccade 
condition participants reproduced 92%, SD= 22%, 95% CI [74, 89] of the temporal interval, 
t(30)=1.45, p=.159, dz=-0.37, 95% CI [0.14, 0.87]. In the No Saccade condition, participants 
reproduced 105%, SD= 27%, 95% CI [95, 115] of the temporal interval, and this did not differ 
statistically from zero, t(30)=1.02., p=.315, dz=0.26, 95% CI [0.76, 0.25]. Next, to test for 
differences between conditions, a paired sample t-test revealed percentage reproductions were 
greater for the No Saccade task than the Saccade Task, t(30)=4.48, p<.001., dz=0.45 95% CI 
[0.22, 0.67]. 
 









Figure 13. Mean percentage reproductions by condition for Experiment 4. In the Saccade 
task, participants looked first at a fixation cross, and then at a second fixation cross, as soon 
as it appeared. In the No Saccade task, participants looked at the first cross throughout. The 
images show how the crosses were displayed when the second event occurred. Circles and 
the arrow were not displayed but represent where participants were instructed to fixate (and 
the saccade from the first cross to the second cross for the Saccade task). Error bars represent 
the standard error of the mean for within-subjects designs calculated using the procedure 
recommended by Loftus and Masson (1994). 
 
 
Secondary measures and manipulation checks. Mean self-reported explicit ratings 
of agency were low and similar for the Saccade task (2.13, SD=1.45) 95% CI [1.60, 2.66] and 
the No Saccade task (2.10, SD=1.64) 95% CI [1.50, 2.70], t(30)=0.71, p= .865. Mean saccadic 
reaction time in the Saccade task was 200 ms (SD=43) and mean saccade duration was 84 ms 
(SD=91). In the No Saccade task, saccades in error to the second fixation cross were made on 
only 0.95% of trials.  








Experiment 4 Discussion 
 There were no binding effects for the No Saccade task, showing that we do not under-
reproduce time intervals between events which involve no action on our part. This is as 
expected and consistent with the temporal binding literature (see Moore & Obhi, for a review, 
2012) and Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 2. Moreover, it has been shown in the Saccade condition 
that the mere action of making a saccade which is followed by an outcome, devoid of social 
context, does not cause us to reliably bind our saccade and the outcome together in time. 
Therefore, the gaze leading effects found in Experiments 1-3 seem to require some form of 
social context in order to elicit an implicit sense of agency for a gaze response following a 
saccade to an object. Saccades alone are not sufficient to drive the gaze leading effects 
previously demonstrated. I note there was some numerical, although non-significant, under-
reproduction of the veridical time interval in the Saccade condition and the potential 
implications of that will be discussed further in the Chapter Discussion.  
Experiment 5 
 In Experiment 5, I wanted to see if the findings of attenuated binding when participants 
were already fixating the object when gaze shift occurred (incidental agency) would replicate. 
This had been found in Experiments 2 and 3 in the Passive Object condition. However, another 
question was whether the binding effects can be boosted to those found in the gaze leading task 
simply by informing participants that their fixation on the object was causing the gaze shift. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, for the Passive Object task, participants were told they were not causing 
the gaze shift and attenuated binding resulted of about half the magnitude of the gaze leading 
task when a saccade was made. Now that Experiment 4 has established that saccades alone do 
not drive reliable binding effects outside of a social context, could stronger binding effects 
result with no saccade at all within a social context but by manipulating belief of causation 
explicitly? To examine this the Passive Object task from Experiments 2 and 3 was repeated, 
but participants were now told they were causing the gaze shift. If this resulted in strong 
binding, then, within a simulated interpersonal context, a gaze leading saccade may not be 
necessary to elicit reliable binding, if participants feel they are, nevertheless, causing the gaze 
shift towards their incidental object of interest.  








Experiment 5 Method  
A new sample of participants (n=32; mean age=20.47 years, three were men) was 
recruited from the same population as Experiments 1-4 and took part in return for course 
credits. The stimuli were the same as the Passive Object tasks in Experiments 2 and 3. The 
blocked design was manipulated within subjects and counter-balanced. The Passive Face 
condition was the same as main Experiment 1 with participants fixating the face throughout. 
The Passive Object Fixation task was the same as Experiments 2 and 3 with participants 
fixating the placeholder dot or the object throughout (see Figure 14) , but it was emphasised to 
them they were causing the gaze shift in the Passive Object Fixation task, but not in the Passive 
Face Fixation task. To be clear, in the Passive Object Fixation task, the onscreen gaze response 
occurred when participants were already looking at the object, not having first performed a 




Figure 14. Trial sequence for the Passive Object task. Red circles were not displayed but 
represent where participants were instructed to fixate. Participant looked at a fixation dot 
placeholder (a), whilst the face was displayed for 1000ms. Participant fixated on the object 
(b) when it appeared in the same place as the place holder. After a random inter-event 
interval of 400ms to 2300ms, gaze onset (c) occurred. After 1000ms, estimate instruction 
appeared (d) until response. Participant pressed and released the space bar to replicate the 















Experiment 5 Results  
Reproduction error and percentage reproduction. Mean reproduction error was 
calculated for each participant in each condition which is the reproduced time interval minus 
the actual time interval (see Table 3). The reproduced time interval was divided by the actual 
time interval to calculate mean percentage reproduction (see Figure 15). Trials in which 
participants’ estimates were 3SDs above or below their individual means were removed (0.36% 
of trials).  
 
 
Figure 15. Mean percentage reproductions by condition for Experiment 5. In the Passive 
Face Fixation tasks, participants looked at the face throughout. In the Passive Object Fixation 
task, participants looked at the placeholder/object throughout. The images show how the face 
was displayed when gaze onset occurred. Circles were not displayed but represent where 
participants were instructed to fixate. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for 
within-subjects designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus and Masson 
(1994). 
 
The same processing and analysis was performed on the data as Experiment 4. The 
Passive Object Fixation condition, unlike in Experiments 2 and 3, revealed no significant 
temporal binding: 98% interval reproduction (SD=22), 95 % CI [90, 106], t(31)=0.45, p=.642, 








dz=0.12, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.61]. As in Experiments 1-3, the Passive Face Fixation condition did 
not produce binding, with an interval reproduction of 104% (SD=25, 95% CI [95, 113], 
t(31)=0.92, p=.366, dz=-0.23, 95% CI [-0.72, 0.27]. The conditions differed, with greater 
under-reproductions in the Passive Object task than the Passive Face Fixation task t(31)=2.15, 
p=.039, dz=0.25, 95% CI [0.01, 0.48], representing a small effect. 
Secondary measures and manipulation checks. Greater explicit agency was reported 
following the Passive Object Fixation task (3.03, SD=1.51) 95% CI [2.49, 3.58], than the 
Passive Face Fixation task (2.5, SD=2.00) 95% CI [1.78, 3.22], although there was no statistical 
significance between these ratings, t(31)= 1.87, p=.071. This suggests the manipulation of 
causation was not as successful as when a gaze leading saccade precedes the gaze shift response 
as in Experiments 1-3. In the Passive Face Fixation task, saccades in error to the object were 
made on only 0.50% of trials. In the passive Object task, erroneous saccades to the face were 
made in only 0.06% of trials. 
Experiment 5 Discussion 
 The null binding effect for the Passive Face Fixation tasks from Experiments 1-3 
replicated. However, the attenuated binding effects found in Experiments 2 and 3 for the 
Passive Object Fixation task, did not replicate with no reliable binding, even though those 
attenuated effects were attempted to be boosted by explicit manipulation of belief of a causal 
link between fixation on the object and the subsequent gaze shift. This suggests that saccades 
might be necessary to find consistent binding effects and that manipulating causality alone may 
not drive the effects. However, there was a smaller under-reproduction in the Passive Object 
condition, compared to the Passive Face condition, where a small over-reproduction was made, 
albeit representing a small effect. This suggests there is some difference, nevertheless, in the 
two tasks which leads participants to reproduce smaller time intervals when their gaze is fixated 
on a referent object. Perhaps never experiencing a gaze shift towards their direction of gaze 
following a gaze leading saccade, like they did experience in Experiments 1-3, accounts for 
why no significant under-reproductions were found in this experiment. Nevertheless, there is 
some suggestion of greater implicit agency in the Passive Object task over the Passive Face 
task. Order effects were checked and revealed those half of the sample who completed Passive 
Face Fixation first had a mean RE of -26.53 ms, compared with the whole sample mean of 38 








ms. Those who experienced Passive Object Fixation first had a mean RE of 68 ms, compared 
with the whole sample mean of -68 ms. This shows no clear order effects.  
Chapter Discussion 
 These two further experiments aimed to answer some unresolved questions arising from 
Experiments 1-3. Firstly, Experiment 4 is evidence that performing a saccade alone cannot 
account for the temporal binding effects in the Active tasks in Experiments 1-3. Previous 
temporal binding studies, employing a traditional button press for the action have not 
investigated whether the motor action button press alone causes temporal compression in the 
way that has been investigated here for the saccade action. Furthermore, the field has not 
considered that participants are making saccades all the time during a binding experiment and 
that those saccades may elicit some temporal compression not controlled or accounted for in 
the design. This opens up a new question for the temporal binding field generally. Although no 
reliable binding in the Saccade task was found, the numerical under-reproduction of ~120ms, 
together with the previous findings of saccadic temporal compression reported by Morrone et 
al. (2005), suggest there may be circumstances in which reliable binding might occur for 
saccades alone if other paradigms or manipulations are employed. For example, if participants  
were told they were causing the cross to enlarge in Experiment 4, binding might have resulted.  
Binding within the context of a simulated social interaction has been demonstrated in 
Experiments 1-3. However, that does not mean I believe only social contexts would elicit 
binding from saccades. We have seen from Experiment 3 (Chapter 2) that binding occurred in 
a non-social context when the situation was unfamiliar and ambiguous (in the Phase Scrambled 
Object Fixation task). My notion is that any outcome which participants believed they caused 
or may have caused by their eye movement could elicit binding. This is a potentially rich 
avenue for future studies to explore.   
 The second question arising from the experiments in Chapter 2 was whether an 
incidental sense of agency can result from a gaze shift towards one’s object of gaze, without 
being preceded by a deliberate gaze leading saccade from the face to the object.  This was 
found to be the case in Experiments 2 and 3, albeit with attenuated effects compared to the 
active gaze leading effects. In Experiment 5, this effect did not replicate, despite participants 
being informed they were causing the gaze shift. This casts doubt upon the original suggestion 
in Chapter 2 that there could be a hierarchical system which elicits greater binding following a 








deliberate joint attention bid and lesser binding for incidental congruent gaze shifts. It may be 
that only reliable binding was found in Experiments 3 and 4 for Passive Object Fixation tasks 
because of carry-over effects from completing the Active Gaze Leading task. However, having 
examined those participants who completed the Passive Object task first in Experiment 2, it 
was found their reproductions were of a similar magnitude (87%) as those for all participants 
in that task (90%). Similarly, those who completed the Passive Object task first in Experiment 
3 made 86% reproductions, compared to reproductions of 85% for the whole sample. Carry-
over effects are, therefore, an unlikely explanation for those results. Future studies are needed, 
therefore, to seek to resolve the mixed findings for incidental joint gaze, particularly given that 
there was a difference between conditions in Experiment 5, with numerical under-
reproductions for the incidental joint gaze task, but over-reproductions when there was no joint 
gaze upon an object.  
Conclusion 
Taken together with the findings from Experiments 1 to 3, Experiments 4 and 5 show 
that, whilst gaze leading saccades may be necessary to drive binding effects within a social 
context, they are not sufficient by themselves without a social context.












 Face recognition is a highly important part of our social interaction (Haxby, Hoffman, 
& Gobbini, 2000). At a very basic level, we need to know, in an instant, whether a face is 
familiar to us or a stranger we have never met before. Our eye gaze interactions form part of 
how we process faces (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002) and so may affect how we encode 
a new face. The studies in this chapter aim to explore any effects the responses we receive to 
gaze leading may have on face recognition. I will outline what is known about face 
processing and recognition generally and then some differences and similarities between 
typically developing and autism populations. Finally, I will summarise some recent work 
which has begun to investigate the effects upon memory of gaze-based interactions and how 
the studies in this chapter were designed to build upon those findings. 
Face Recognition 
Processing faces for identification, whether for group classification such as gender or 
for individual identity recognition, is an essential part of our function as typical social beings 
(Ellis, 1975). It is critical for us to distinguish whether a face is familiar or a stranger. Indeed, 
we appear to have an innate potential for becoming experts at face processing, evidenced by a 
very early preference, even in new born infants, for attending to faces for longer (Goren, 
Sarty, & Wu, 1975) and further away (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991) than 
other stimuli. In addition, there is evidence we can discriminate between the face of our 
mother and a stranger as early as one month of age (Sai & Bushnell, 1988). This potential for 
developing face processing expertise may develop from a preference for the top-heavy 
configurations that faces have, rather than faces themselves (see Turati, 2004, for a review) 
but, nevertheless, face processing expertise is evident during early infancy in the typically 
developing population. This ability is supported by specialised neural regions for face 
processing in the ventral visual stream, including the fusiform face area (FFA; Kanwisher & 
Yovel, 2006), and the occipital face area (OFA; Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2011). 
However, importantly, the literature has recently begun to emphasise how this expertise 
which we have for recognising faces only applies to familiar faces and that unfamiliar face 
recognition ability is more limited (Kramer, Young, & Burton, 2018; Young & Burton, 
2017a, 2017b). For a contrary view, see Rossion (2018). 
There is a considerable body of evidence that we process faces holistically (see a 
meta-analysis by Richler & Gauthier, 2014). Individual differences have been identified in 
facial recognition ability along a continuum, from the impaired ability found in the condition 
known as prosopagnosia (McNeil & Warrington, 1993) at one end, through to the exceptional 




ability to recall a face found amongst so-called “super-recognisers” at the other (Russell, 
Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009). One commonly used measure of face recognition ability is 
the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) which seeks to 
identify scores for recognition ability, ranging from low to high ability, with normative scores 
for comparison. 
Face Recognition in Autism 
 Face recognition and processing abilities in those with autism has been subject to 
quite a large body of studies. A behavioural review by Weigelt, Koldewyn, and Kanwisher 
(2012) found that people with autism do not perform as well as typically developing samples 
on facial recognition tasks, although there is no evidence of qualitative differences in the way 
that faces are processed, for example, the face inversion effect (Yin, 1969) has mostly been 
found to be intact for those with autism. Performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Test 
(CFMT) is apparently worse for those with autism than typically developing (Kirchner, Hatri, 
Heekeren, & Dziobek, 2011; O’Hearn, Schroer, Minshew, & Luna, 2010). Hedley, Brewer, 
and Young (2011) found a similar pattern of results for those with autism on the CFMT but 
offered additional, more nuanced evidence that performance is on a continuum for those with 
and without autism as some autistic individuals can out-perform typically developing 
individuals. 
  Other research has examined autistic-like traits (AQ: Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) within the typically developing population and found no 
significant correlation between face recognition scores as measured by the CFMT and AQ 
scores overall (Rhodes, Jeffery, Taylor, & Ewing, 2013). However, Rhodes et al. (2013) did 
find that for males there was an association between face-selective recognition ability and 
AQ sub-scale scores for social skills.  Higher overall AQ scoring males displayed lower 
adaptive coding of identity. Women, however, had greater adaptive coding ability, the greater 
their AQ scores. In summary, it seems then, given the above reviewed evidence, that there are 
both differences and similarities in face processing abilities between those with and without 
an autism diagnosis and the picture is even more nuanced when considering the broader 
phenotype. 
Joint Attention and Gaze Behaviour Effects on Memory 
An essential component of face processing includes coordinating gaze behaviours 
with others during joint and shared attention (see Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007, for a 




review). Some research has demonstrated that learning from observed gaze behaviours of 
faces influences subsequent gaze behaviours with those same faces (see Capozzi, Becchio, 
Willemse, & Bayliss, 2016; Dalmaso, Edwards, & Bayliss, 2016). Therefore, there are some 
preliminary indications that joint attention can interact with memory encoding and 
subsequent behaviours. There is evidence that gaze behaviours during joint attention can 
impact upon memory for the object of joint attention. For example, Kim & Mundy (2012) 
have demonstrated that gaze leading towards pictures enhanced recognition memory for those 
stimuli, compared to when responding to gaze cued pictures, even controlling for picture 
viewing time. Working memory effects have also been shown by Gregory and Jackson 
(2017) who demonstrated that being gaze cued to stimuli can enhance working memory for 
those stimuli, compared to when there was no joint attention on the items to be recalled. 
Gregory and Jackson (2018) went on to show that these effects do not emerge if the cue face 
has a barrier placed between it and the object. Therefore, the working memory enhancement 
in a gaze follower from gaze cueing seems to rely on perception of a shared perspective with 
the gaze leader. 
There is some limited evidence that looked-at faces are rated as more trustworthy than 
faces which are not looked at (Kaisler & Leder, 2016). However, another study found no 
effects on how faces were evaluated according to whether they were looked at by faces with 
positive or negative emotional expressions (Landes, Kashima, & Howe, 2016). There has not 
been any previous research examining how face recognition may be affected by responses to 
joint attention initiation. Therefore, these studies in this chapter aimed to explore whether 
different gaze responses to joint attention initiation result in any differential memory 
encoding for those faces encountered.  This was measured by ability to recognise if a face 
had been seen before or was a new face, not previously encountered.  
The hypothesis was an open one. On the one hand, it is possible that gaze leading 
being reciprocated would enhance face recognition, given previous findings that gaze leading 
being followed increases attention to the faces who follow over those who respond with 
averted gaze (Edwards et al., 2015). However, it is also entirely possible that these attentional 
effects will not translate into enhanced recognition because it may be the uncooperative faces 
which are encoded stronger in memory because not being followed is the unexpected 
outcome. The social norm transgressors who avert gaze may, therefore, be preferentially 
encoded over the co-operators.  




 To explore whether there are any effects on face recognition, and the direction of 
those effects, a gaze leading task was used where participants encountered faces which either 
followed their gaze to an object or averted gaze. This gaze response was gaze contingent 
upon the participant’s fixation on the referent object and was followed by a surprise face 
recognition task, and then individual differences measures were taken (AQ and CFMT). 
Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 Method 
 Participants. After ethical approval was obtained from the University of East Anglia 
Psychology Ethics Committee, 35 Psychology undergraduate student participants (mean age 
= 19.43 years, SD = 2.03 ; 3 males), gave written, informed consent and were granted course 
credits in return for participation. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The sample size was determined by an a priori power calculation conducted using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) which indicated 34 participants would be required to achieve 
80% power at .05 alpha, anticipating a medium effect size. I note here, however, that there is 
no indication from previous literature of what effect size to expect, because I believe this 
exploratory study, to my knowledge, may be the first of its kind. 
Stimuli. The face stimulus set comprised of 80 smiling photographs (560 × 760 
pixels) of 40 females and 40 males. Of these, 35 females and 35 males were taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Set (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1988) and the 
remaining five females and five males were taken from the NimStim face set (Tottenham et 
al., 2009). Smiling faces were used for the experiments in this chapter to enhance participant 
engagement with the faces as the research question here was about remembering the faces 
(not necessary in Experiments 1-5 where one neutral face was used). The photographs of the 
faces included three versions: the original image displayed with direct gaze and two further 
versions which had been photo-shopped so that the eyes looked right (for the joint attention 
gaze response) or looked left (for the averted gaze response). The object stimuli set consisted 
of 8 objects commonly found in the kitchen (220 × 78 pixels), taken from Bayliss et al. 
(2006). The face was presented 4 cm to the left of the centre of the screen. The faces were 
scaled to appear approximately life-sized onscreen. The objects were presented to the right of 
the face with the centre of the object 15 cm from, and in line with, the bridge of the nose. 
Examples of stimuli are illustrated in Figure 16.  
 
 





Figure 16. Trial sequences and examples of stimuli for the gaze leading task. (a) Participants  
fixated the face displayed with direct gaze. (b) After 2000 ms of good fixation on face was 
detected, an object appeared. Participants saccaded to the object as soon as it appeared. (c) 
After 300 ms of good fixation on the object was detected, gaze onset occurred, either toward 
the object (joint attention) or averted (non-joint attention). Participants saccaded back to the 
face as soon as they noticed the gaze shift. Gaze was displayed for 3000 ms. (d) The stimuli 
cleared and the participant prompted to identify the face as male or female, displayed until 
response.  
  Apparatus and materials. Right eye position was tracked with an infrared eye 
tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada; spatial resolution of 0.10, 500 Hz). To 
maintain head stability, a head and chin rest was used. Viewing distance was approximately 
70 cm from eyes to an 18” computer monitor (resolution 1024 × 768 pixels). A standard 
keyboard was used for participants’ manual responses to the gaze leading task and a ‘Black 
Box’ four-button response box was used for participant’s finger press responses to the 
old/new face recognition task. The Autism Spectrum Quotient Questionnaire was used as a 
measure of the level of autism-like traits (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), presented using E 
Prime. Participants rated how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each item (e.g. I prefer 
to do things the same way over and over again) on a four point Likert scale ranging from 
definitely agree to definitely disagree. The Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT: Duchaine 
& Nakayama, 2006) was used as a standardized assessment of participant face recognition 
ability. The CFMT presents six unfamiliar male faces from three different views and then 
tests recognition in a three-alternative forced-choice task. 
Design. The within-subjects condition had two levels: congruent response (joint 
attention face) and averted/incongruent gaze response (non-joint attention face). The 
dependent variables were the number of correctly recalled hits for faces recognised, the level 
of confidence about the recollection (sure or not sure), reaction time (RT) to categorise the 
gender of the faces (gaze leading task) and RT to report whether they recollected seeing the 
face before (old/new face recognition task). There were also two correlational designs to 
examine any associations between recall and RT for the gaze-led faces and, firstly, level of 
autism-like traits and, secondly, scores on the CFMT (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). 




 Procedure.  Participants were positioned comfortably in the chin rest for a short 
practice block of the gaze leading task (6 trials) and then for the gaze leading block of 40 
trials. The eye tracker was calibrated to each participant to enhance tracking accuracy using a 
standard nine point calibration at the start of the gaze leading, eye-tracked block. An example 
trial sequence for the gaze leading task is illustrated at Figure 16. Each face was presented 
with direct gaze until 2000 ms of fixation on the face was detected.  
Next, an object appeared to the right of the face with participants being instructed to 
immediately perform a saccade to the object. Upon detection of 300 ms of fixation on the 
object, the onscreen face responded either with a congruent gaze shift towards the object 
(joint attention condition) or an averted gaze shift away from the object (non-joint attention 
condition). This was a gaze contingent design (unlike Experiments 1-5), meaning the fixation 
on the object triggered the onscreen gaze shift. The time between the object appearing and the 
onscreen gaze shift, therefore, comprised of the saccade latency (approximately 200 ms based 
on mean saccadic reaction times in Experiments 1-4), the saccade duration (approximately 80 
ms based on the mean saccade duration in Experiments 1-4) and the 300 ms required for 
fixation on the object to be detected and any uptake time by the eye tracker to detect fixation. 
Therefore, the total time between object appearance and gaze shift would be around 580 ms. 
Participants were instructed to saccade back to the face as soon as the onscreen face’s gaze 
shifted. Gaze onset was displayed for 3000 ms before the stimuli cleared and participants 
were prompted to press the ‘f’ key with their left hand to report the gender if the face was 
female and the ‘m’ key with their right hand for male, displayed until response. There was an 
inter-trial interval of a blank screen for 1000 ms before the next trial began. Participants were 
told about the gaze contingency, that is, that the onscreen face shifted gaze once the eye 
tracker detected their fixation on the object. Participants saw 20 faces (10 males, 10 females) 
who followed and 20 faces (10 males, 10 females) who never followed their gaze. The faces 
were counterbalanced four ways with 20 faces in each counterbalanced set. The stimulus set 
of objects for all trials was presented randomly. 
Following completion of the gaze leading task, participants completed a surprise 
old/new face recognition task in which they were asked to recollect whether they had seen 
(old) or had not seen (new) the face in the previous task, being shown 40 faces (20 males, 20 
females) they had seen and 40 faces (20 males, 20 females) they had not seen (foils), 
presented randomly. Each face was displayed centrally for 4000 ms following the 
presentation of a central fixation cross (white font, Courier, 18pt) for 1000 ms. Next, 




participants were prompted to use the four button response box and their right hand to report 
whether the face was old or new, using their thumb to report old and their little finger to 
report new. Following their old/new response, they were asked to rate their level of 
confidence in that recollection, using their thumb to report they were sure they had seen the 
face before and their little finger to report they were sure they had not seen the face before. 
They used their index finger for faces they thought they had seen but were not sure, and their 
ring finger for faces they thought they had not seen, but were not sure. Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly, but as accurately, as possible and were given no feedback 
about their responses for either the gaze leading or the face recognition tasks. An inter trial 
interval (a blank screen) was displayed for 1000 ms after each old/new response.  Participants 
were naïve to the hypotheses. After the face recognition task, participants completed the AQ 
followed by the CFMT on the computer.  
Experiment 6 Results 
 Data processing. Trials in which participant RTs were +/- 3 SDs from their 
individual means were removed (1.71% of trials for RT for gender in the gaze leading task 
and 2.86% of trials for old/new RT). Confidence intervals around means and confidence 
intervals around effect sizes are reported, calculated using ESCI (Exploratory Software for 
Confidence Intervals; Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2016). 
 Recognition. Overall accuracy in the face recognition task was 70%. Mean correct 
identification of old faces (hits) out of 20 for joint attention faces was 12.77, 95% CI [11.74, 
13.77] (SD=2.91), and for non-joint attention faces was 13.11, 95% CI [11.84, 14.39] 
(SD=3.70). Overall accuracy for the correctly rejected foils was 75% with 30.01 (SD= 7.24) 
mean correct rejections out of 40.  There was no significant difference between hits for joint 
attention and non-joint attention faces, t(34)= 0.737, p= .466, dz=0.10 95% CI [-0.17, 0.28]. 
There was no significant difference between mean number of high confidence hits for joint 
attention faces, 7.66, 95% CI [6.59, 8.73] (SD=3.11), and for high confidence non-joint 
attention faces, 7.97 (SD=3.92), t(34)=0.486, p=.630, dz=0.09, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.45].  
 Reaction time for gaze leading task. Mean RT to report the gender of joint attention 
faces was 645 ms, 95% CI [580, 710] (SD=189) and 658 ms, 95% CI [591, 725] (SD=196) 
for non-joint attention faces, and there was no significant difference between them, t(34)= 
0.652, p= .519, dz=0.07, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.26].  
Reaction time for face recognition task. Mean RT to report old/new was 650 ms, 
95% CI [568, 732] (SD=239) collapsed across all conditions, 665 ms, 95% CI [580, 750] 




(SD=247) for foils, 657 ms, 95% CI [556, 758] (SD=294) for joint attention faces and 628 
ms, 95% CI [558, 698] (SD=204) for non-joint attention faces (see Figure 17). An ANOVA 
(face condition: foils, JA faces, non-JA faces) showed no effect of face condition for RT to 
recall whether a face had been seen before in the gaze leading task, F(2, 68)= 1.471, 
p=.237, p2 =.041.  
 
 
Figure 17. Mean Reaction Times to report old/new for foils, joint attention (JA) and non-joint 
attention (non JA) faces in face recognition task for Experiment 6. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean for within-subjects designs calculated using the procedure 
recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
AQ correlational analyses. Mean AQ score was 15.60 (SD=8.53), which is about 
normative for social science university students (see Baron-Cohen et al., 2001, who reported 
a social science student mean of 16). The range was 3 to 39. There were no correlations 
between total AQ scores and accuracy overall, number of joint attention or non joint attention 
hits (whether with high or low confidence), or the difference between them, rs<0.167, 
ps>.338. Analyses were carried out on the AQ sub-scales and can be found in Appendix C.  
 
CFMT correlational analyses. Mean CFMT performance was 75% (SD=12) 
accuracy, which is a little below the normative score of 80% (SD=11) (Duchaine & 






































gender, RT for old/new, recollection accuracy or AQ) and performance on the CFMT were 
found, rs<0.21, ps>.22. 
Experiment 6 Discussion 
 This study shows that the congruency of gaze shift following gaze leading (averted 
gaze or joint attention) appears to have no consequences for how well those faces are 
subsequently recognised, nor for how quickly basic information about a face (in the form of 
gender classification here) is reported. This may be because there are simply no effects upon 
how faces are encoded in memory by gaze response, or it may be because this particular 
experimental design limited participants to encountering each face just once, and that may not 
be enough to lead to differential encoding. Alternatively, this null finding may offer evidence 
that it is equally important to remember all faces, whatever their social response to gaze 
leading. This will be discussed further in the Chapter Discussion. 
 There were no correlations found between autism-like traits (AQ) and subsequent face 
recognition performance following gaze leading, and no correlations with any variables of 
interest and face recognition ability, measured by scores on the CFMT. There was a medium 
correlation between total score for autism-like traits and RT to report the gender of the face. 
Those with higher AQ were slower to report gender after averted gaze responses. The next 
experiment, Experiment 7, being higher powered, was designed to enable a more reliable 
examination of these preliminary, promising finding of individual differences, alongside a 
change to how often the faces were encountered. 
Experiment 7 
 
 Having found that recognition of faces was unaffected by responses to gaze leading, it 
was possible that only presenting each of the 40 faces in the gaze leading task once was 
insufficient to enable potential effects to emerge. In addition, the lack of correlations with 
CFMT and task performance may require greater power afforded by an increase in sample 
size in the next experiment and enable further exploration of the significant AQ correlation in 
Experiment 6. Therefore, two changes to the design of Experiment 6 were made. Firstly, 
participants were presented with the same faces from Experiment 6 twice, instead of once, 
doubling the number of trials in the gaze leading task. Secondly, 59 new participants were 
recruited for this study. One participant did not complete the tasks due to difficulties with 




eye-tracking, hence n=58 (mean age 19.93, SD = 2.54; 10 were male). Other than those 
changes, the procedure was identical in Experiment 7 to Experiment 6. 
Experiment 7 Results 
  Data processing. Trials in which participant RTs were +/- 3 SDs from their 
individual means were removed (1.46% of trials for RT for gender in the gaze leading task 
and 2.16% of trials for old/new RT). As for Experiment 6, confidence intervals around means 
and confidence intervals around effect sizes are reported. 
 Recognition. Overall accuracy in the face recognition task was 81%, an increase of  
11% from Experiment 1, which is expected because participants encountered each face twice, 
rather than just once. Mean correct identification of old faces (hits) out of 20 for joint 
attention faces was 15.40, 95% CI [14.69, 16.10] (SD=2.67), and for non-joint attention faces 
was 15.10, 95% CI [14.40, 15.81] (SD=2.67). Overall accuracy for the correctly rejected foils 
was 88% with 35.38 (SD= 3.01) mean correct rejections out of 40. There was no significant 
difference between hits for joint attention and non-joint attention faces, t(57)= 0.794, p= .430, 
dz=0.11 95% CI [-0.38, 0.16]. There was no significant difference between mean number of 
high confidence hits for joint attention, mean 11.24 hits 95% CI [10.28, 12.21] (SD=3.67), 
and for high confidence non-joint attention, mean 11.43 hits 95% CI [10.60, 12.26] 
(SD=3.15), t(57)=0.392, p=0.696, dz=0.06, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.33].  
 Reaction time for gaze leading task. Mean RT to report the gender of joint attention 
faces was 588 ms, 95% CI [542, 633] (SD=174) and 577ms, 95% CI [533, 621] (SD=167) for 
non-joint attention faces, with no significant difference between them, t(57)= 1.611, p= .113, 
dz=-0.10, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.02].  
Reaction time for face recognition task. Mean RT to report old/new was 486ms, 
95% CI [447, 525] (SD=148) collapsed across all conditions, 493ms, 95% CI [450, 535] 
(SD=161) for foils, 494 ms, 95% CI [450, 539] (SD=169) for joint attention faces and 464 
ms, 95% CI [427, 501] (SD=141) for non-joint attention faces. These times are much faster 
than Experiment 6 RTs.  This is expected, given participants saw each face twice, rather than 
once. Mean RTs are shown in Figure 18.  





Figure 18. Mean Reaction Times to report old/new for foils, joint attention (JA) and non-joint 
attention (non JA) faces in face recognition task for Experiment 7. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean for within-subjects designs calculated using the procedure 
recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
An ANOVA (face condition: foils, JA faces, non-JA faces) showed no effect of face 
condition for RT to recall whether a face had been seen before in the gaze leading task, 
F(2,114)= 2.961, p=.056, p2 =.049. It is notable, however, that RT to JA faces was almost 
exactly the same as RT to foils. Significant differences between RT to JA and non-JA faces 
were checked by analysing separately correct or incorrect responses, but the differences were 
not reliable in either case, ts<1.54, ps>.07. For completeness, given the pattern of the RT 
data, the datasets from Experiment 6 and 7 were combined, and an ANOVA performed (face 
condition: foils, JA faces, non-JA faces) which showed an effect of face condition on RT, 
F(1.87, 171.97)= 4.301, p=.017, p2 =.045, Greenhaus-Geisser-corrected, with a small to 
medium effect. A follow up contrast showed that RT to JA faces were slower (M=555 ms 
SD= 236) 95% CI [506,604] than NJA faces (M=525 ms, SD=185) 95% CI [488,564], 
t(92)=2.189, p=.031, dz=-0.14 [-0.27, -0.01], but this was only a small effect. In contrast, 
reaction time to foils (M=558 ms, SD=214) was strikingly similar to those for joint attention 
faces (M=555 ms SD= 236). Figure 19 shows the mean RT collapsed across both 
experiments.  





Figure 19. Mean Reaction Times to report old/new for foils, joint attention (JA) and non-joint 
attention (non JA) faces in face recognition task collapsed across Experiment 6 and 
Experiment 7. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-subjects designs 
calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
  AQ Correlational analyses. Mean AQ score was 14.21 (SD=5.90) and the range was 
5 to 30. There were no correlations between total AQ scores and accuracy overall, number of 
joint attention or non joint attention hits (whether with high or low confidence), or the 
difference between them, rs<0.174, ps>.192. There were no correlations between AQ and RT 
to report old/new in the face recognition task, whether to foils, joint or non-joint attention 
faces or difference between joint and non-joint attention faces, rs(58)<0.193, ps>.148. A 
correlational analysis of the AQ sub-scales can be found at Appendix C. 
CFMT correlational analyses. Mean CFMT performance was 79.91% (SD=11.45) 
accuracy, which is normative (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). No correlations between any 
variables of interest in any condition (RT for gender, RT for old/new, number of hits or AQ) 
and performance on the CFMT were found, rs<0.242, ps>.067. However, there was a positive 
correlation between CFMT scores and accuracy overall in the old/new face recognition task, 
r(58)=0.272, p=.039. The higher the CFMT score, the higher the accuracy score for 
recognition. This which would be expected as the recognition task should reveal individual 
differences which correlate with performance on the CFMT, an established measure for this 
ability.  




Experiment 7 Discussion 
 Experiment 7 confirmed, like Experiment 6, that recognition of faces is not modulated 
by previous gaze leading responses. Participants were just as accurate at remembering 
whether they had seen a face, whether or not the face had responded with joint attention or 
with averted gaze. Reaction times to report gender of the faces and in the old-new task were 
not modulated by gaze response either. However, there was a pattern of slower reaction times 
for the old-new task to recollect joint attention faces over averted gaze faces. This did not 
reach statistical significance, however. These findings will be discussed further in the Chapter 
Discussion. The AQ correlation found in Experiment 6 did not replicate in Experiment 7. The 
lack of consistency across experiments in these correlational findings makes it hard to draw 
any reliable inferences from them. 
Chapter Discussion 
 Across two experiments, it has been shown that the gaze response to gaze leading has 
no effect upon subsequent recognition of faces. This may be because it is equally important to 
know whether we have encountered a face before, whatever their responses to our own gaze 
behaviours. The ability to recognise new faces better than we can recognise other novel 
stimuli has been a robust finding in social cognition for years (see seminal paper by Ellis, 
1975). This ability speaks to the fundamental importance of face recognition in human 
relationships, although recently an important distinction has been made between our 
apparently automatic face expertise for familiar faces, compared to unfamiliar faces, where 
there are far greater individual differences (Young & Burton, 2017a). Whilst gaze leading has 
been shown to influence subsequent recall of stimuli which are the object of the joint 
attention bid (Kim & Mundy, 2012), this may not be the same for recognition of the faces we 
have gaze led. 
  The findings of no effect upon old-new recognition is consistent with Bell, Buchner, 
and Musch (2010). Bell et al. (2010) employed a trust game with cooperators and defectors 
and found enhanced old-new recognition for the faces of both groups of people. Similarly, the 
fairly high rates of old-new accuracy in both experiments (70% for Experiment 6 when faces 
were encountered once and 81% for Experiment 7 when faces were encountered twice) for 
gaze followers (who are co-operators) and non-followers (who are the defectors/norm 
violators here), could show the equal importance of encoding both types of people in 
memory.  




The pattern of slower reaction times in the old-new task for joint attention faces over 
averted gaze faces is worthy of brief discussion, albeit with the full acknowledgement that 
this was not a statistically significant effect in either Experiment 7 or 8 alone, only reaching 
significance across both experiments combined, and with a very small effect size.  
Furthermore, no corrections have been made for multiple comparisons, meaning the small, 
significant effect needs to be treated with caution. It is also interesting that reaction times to 
foils were just as slow as those to joint attention faces. If such an effect could be more 
reliably demonstrated, then this would demonstrate perhaps better encoding in memory, 
evidenced by faster reaction times, for norm violators (averted gaze) over the co-operators 
(joint attention). This would not be consistent with Bell et al. (2010) where both violators and 
cooperators are remembered equally well in a trust game, but it is a difference context to this 
design so cannot necessarily be expected to produce the same outcome. Future research 
should seek to test this further. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Perhaps presenting the faces just once (Experiment 6) or twice (Experiment 7) for a 
short time was not enough to reveal memory encoding differences. Alternatively, the 
paradigm may have been too subtle in asking participants to report the gender of the faces, 
which ensured they paid attention to the face, but was not very effortful. Maybe if 
participants had been asked to report the eye colour of the faces, this would increase the 
saliency of the eyes and have been a better task to precede the surprise memory test. Another 
change could be to deploy an n-back task (Kirchner, 1958) which would allow participants 
greater opportunity to encode the faces through repeated, sequential exposure, and test any 
effects on working memory. Perhaps the time for recall following straight after the encoding 
task does not lead to recall differences, but there may be longer-term memory effects. 
Therefore, postponing the task until the next day or longer might reveal differences in recall 
of followers and non-followers. Finally, these studies show high accuracy for recognition of 
all unfamiliar faces following gaze leading (70% for Experiment 6 when faces were gaze led 
just once and 81% for Experiment 7 when faces were gaze led twice). It may be that the act 
of a gaze leading interaction itself with those faces caused such high accuracy in the old-new 
task, which this design has not explored. Therefore, an unanswered question is: would lower 
accuracy result from simply being presented with the faces once or twice, with no gaze 
leading? To explore this possibility, a future study could add a control condition in which no 
gaze leading interaction took place.  





 These two experiments investigated whether congruency of gaze response following 
gaze leading to a referent object modulated subsequent recognition of those faces. There were 
no such effects. It may simply be that this paradigm has failed to tap into this phenomenon 
and more encounters than one or two might lead to effects. However, it may be that there is 
never any difference in face encoding according to gaze response because it is equally 
important to recognise a new face, whatever gaze behaviours have been encountered. Future 
work should test whether faces presented for the same amount of time, but not gaze led, are 
remembered as well as gaze-led faces.  
 
  




Chapter 5: Follow my Lead: Event-related Potentials Elicited by Responses to 








Having established behavioural consequences of gaze leading, this thesis aimed to 
examine the neural underpinnings of joint attention initiation. Saccades are one of the fastest 
actions humans can perform.  They are are ballistic and generated and executed at sub-second 
speeds. For example, a ten degree of visual angle saccade ranges in velocity between 420 to 
520 degrees per second (Bahill & Stark, 1979). Therefore, I took advantage of the high and 
continuous temporal resolution afforded by electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the 
event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by gaze responses to gaze leading. The aim was 
specifically to explore whether the N170 ERP component showed any differences when gaze 
leading was reciprocated with a congruent gaze shift, compared with an incongruent/averted 
gaze shift response. In other words, can I establish evidence that the neural system rapidly 
detects the outcome of a successful joint attention bid?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Over the past eight years, there have been a growing number of fMRI papers which 
have identified there are some distinct and some overlapping regions when initiating joint 
attention, compared to responding to joint attention (e.g. Gordon, Eilbott, Feldman, Pelphrey, 
& Vander Wyk, 2013; Oberwelland et al., 2016; Redcay, Kleiner, & Saxe, 2012; Schilbach et 
al., 2010). Mundy (2017) offers a thorough review of these findings and the brain regions 
associated with joint attention. The neuro-imaging work has implicated the posterior Superior 
Temporal Sulcus and the Medial Pre-frontal Cortex as the main regions involved in 
processing joint attention (see Mundy, 2017, for a review). 
 Schilbach et al. (2010) found participants rated gaze interactions as more pleasant 
when they engaged in gaze leading, compared to responding to other’s gaze leading, 
providing self-report evidence of the rewarding nature of gaze leading. The fMRI research 
has also implicated the putative reward system is involved in successful gaze leading with the 
ventral striatum shown to be activated when successfully leading a social partner’s gaze to an 
object (Schilbach et al., 2010). Similarly, Gordon et al. (2013) found increased activation in 
the subthalamic regions of the striatum and the ventral tegmental area for congruent gaze 
shifts in response to joint attention initiation, but not for incongruent responses. We may be 
motivated, therefore, to cause others to align their locus of regard with our own because of its 
rewarding nature in addition to the mutual cooperation and communication it can facilitate.  
Gaze following (responding to joint attention) and eye contact have also been the 
subject of many ERP studies (see, for example, Itier & Batty, 2009; Myllyneva & Hietanen, 
2016; Senju, Johnson, & Csibra, 2012.; Tipples, Johnston, & Mayes, 2013). Only two recent 




papers have examined gaze leading associated event-related potentials (Caruana, de Lissa, & 
McArthur, 2015, 2017). The experiment in this chapter aimed to follow these findings and 
ascertain in an exploratory fashion whether, at an electrophysiological level, there is a 
differentiation between gaze being followed and not being followed within a simple, 
simulated gaze interaction. Another aim was to examine whether autism-like traits were 
associated with any effects. 
This review will begin by reviewing the N170 gaze research, as this is the main 
candidate for investigating ERPs elicited when interacting with faces, and then, to provide 
some further ERP context, evidence will be reviewed for the involvement of the following 
components in gaze processing: P3, N300, and N2pc. Then, there will be a brief review of the 
atypicalities found for gaze leading amongst those with an autism diagnosis.  
N170 
The N170 event-related potential (ERP) component is a negative-going evoked 
potential associated with face processing, emerging over parietal-occipital scalp sites around 
170ms after face stimulus onset (e.g. Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996). The 
N170 is usually associated with face perception and thought to be face-sensitive as it is 
generally greater for faces than other objects (see Eimer, 2011; Rossion, 2014, for reviews). 
The N170 has also, however, been studied specifically in relation to eye gaze which has 
produced a set of conflicting results. Some studies have found greater N170 amplitude for 
averted gaze over direct gaze (e.g. Itier, Alain, Sedore, & McIntosh, 2007; Latinus et al., 
2014; Watanabe, Miki, & Kakigi, 2002), whilst others have found no differences (e.g. Itier & 
Batty, 2009; Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2016; Schweinberger, Kloth, & Jenkins, 2007). Others 
still have reported greater N170 for direct over averted gaze (Conty et al., 2007). Greater 
N170 for direct over averted gaze was also reported by Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, Leppänen, and 
Hietanen (2011), but only when participants viewed a live face, rather than a face on a 
computer. Carrick, Thompson, Epling, and Puce (2007) found no modulation of the N170 
when viewing different types of gaze averted faces. Similarly, Caruana et al. (2015) found no 
modulation of the N170 by congruency of gaze responses to gaze leading. 
This mixed array of findings makes it difficult to predict in which direction gaze 
response to gaze leading may modulate the N170. However, the literature does provide 
evidence that eye gaze is processed during face processing and can modulate the N170 in 
some contexts. Finally, as the present study is an investigation of shared attention initiation, 




requiring the evoking stimulus to be presented in the peripheral visual field, it is important to 
note that the N170 to faces can be delayed when presented in periphery (e,g. Rigoulot et al., 
2011). The N170 is a strong candidate component to be sensitive to not just observed averted 
gaze, but the social context in which it is presented.  
P3 
The P3 ERP component has often been shown to reflect discrimination of less 
frequent targets from more frequent targets, using the oddball paradigm (see Polich, 2007, for 
a review). However, the P3 has been the subject of a diverse body of other research and 
found to be modulated by the cognitive demands of the task at hand (e.g. Kok, 2001) and to 
be associated with memory recall function (see Polich, 2007, for a review).  
Caruana et al. (2015) found a greater and later P3 (a more specific time-locked waveform, the 
“P350” was reported) was elicited when gaze leading elicited an incongruent gaze response 
from a virtual computer-generated face, compared to a congruent gaze response within the 
context of a virtual game. Caruana et al. (2015) also found that when arrows provided the 
directional shifts in response to gaze leading, no P350 congruency effect resulted. Taken 
together, the authors suggested that the P350 reflected an evaluation of the social significance 
of the gaze response. Caruana et al. (2017) went on to compare P350 and N170 elicited when 
onscreen gaze responses to gaze leading were thought by participants to be controlled by a 
human, compared with being controlled by a computer. Participants who were told a human 
controlled the eye movements (using the same dataset as Caruana et al., 2015), demonstrated 
a larger P350 for incongruent gaze shifts compared to congruent. There was no such 
difference for those who were told a computer was generating the gaze shift responses. There 
was a smaller N170 for those who thought a computer, rather than a human, was in control 
but no N170 differences according to gaze congruency. Caruana et al. (2017) suggested the 
findings of P350 modulation in the human attribution condition may reflect the activation of 
mentalising processes not needed during non-human interactions.  
N300 
Firstly, note the important distinction that the following reviewed studies exploring 
the N300 component examine participants being gaze cued, rather than performing the gaze 
cueing (gaze leading), as participants do in the current study. Greater occipito-temporal 
negativity (ERP component reported as “N330”) has been demonstrated in response to 
incongruent gaze shifts away from an object than congruent (Senju et al., 2006). The 




suggested explanation was that the N330 reflected the greater effort required to process the 
violation of the expectancy that gaze would be shifted to an object. In addition, the N330 was 
believed to reflect activity in the posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus. Tipples et al. (2013) 
also found an enhanced negative occipito-temporal ERP for incongruent gaze shifts 
(occurring slightly earlier at N300). Furthermore, Tipples et al. (2013) found an enhanced 
N300 when arrows provided the directional shifts of attention, and so suggested there is a 
domain general mechanism for detecting and processing unexpected events. 
N2pc 
  The role of the N2 posterior contralateral (N2pc) is not clearly established within 
social gaze, only being shown to my knowledge in one study to date involving eye gaze 
specifically (Galfano et al., 2011), as it is more commonly investigated within visual search 
paradigms (e.g. Grubert & Eimer, 2015), and thought to reflect attentional processing (Luck, 
2014). The N2pc component is calculated by subtracting ERPs at the sites ipsilateral to the 
target stimulus, from contralateral ERPs (Grubert & Eimer, 2015). This ERP component 
comprises greater negative activity at the posterior sites contralateral to the side on which the 
stimuli are presented, implicated in spatial attentional shifting (Galfano et al., 2011). Galfano 
et al. (2011) used the N2pc as an index of spatial attention reorientation to the target required 
when incongruent gaze cueing occurred. Galfano et al. (2011) predicted, and found, a greater 
N2pc elicited from incongruent gaze cueing than congruent.  
 To summarise, ERPs P3, N300, N170 and N2pc have all been implicated in gaze 
processing, but there have been some mixed findings and most of the work has investigated 
observing averted or direct gaze, rather than gaze leading. What little evidence there is for 
gaze leading is that the N170 is not modulated by gaze response, but that the P350 can be, but 
not if participants are told a computer, rather than a human, is generating the gaze response 
(Caruana et al., 2015; Caruana et al., 2017). 
Autism-like Traits 
Initiating joint attention has been identified as a specific deficit in those who have a 
diagnosis of autism with greater deficits usually found for initiating joint attention, over 
responding to joint attention (see Mundy, 2017; Mundy & Newell, 2007, for reviews). This 
has generated a growing field of research into interventions to improve this social skill with a 
recent meta-analysis concluding that these interventions can be effective (Murza et al., 2016). 
Because of the sub-optimality of joint attention processes in the clinical population, 
participants’ level of autism-like traits were measured to explore any correlations with the 




ERP effects in the broader phenotype. This was measured using participant’s self-reported 
autism-like traits (AQ) using the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).  
It is possible that ERPs vary according to level of autism-like traits, for example, the 
N170 has been reported as occurring later (e.g. Hileman, Henderson, Mundy, Newell, & 
Jaime, 2011) or being smaller (Churches, Damiano, Baron-Cohen, & Ring, 2012) in those 
with a diagnosis of autism, compared to controls. However, there have been mixed findings 
and a recent systematic review found no consistent differential effects on the N170 for those 
with autism (Feuerriegel, Churches, Hofmann, & Keage, 2015).  
Experiment 8 
Current Study Aims 
This study aimed to find out whether the N170 is modulated according to gaze 
response following a simple gaze leading saccade from a face to an object. This would 
provide evidence of the detection of the response elicited by gaze leading and the time course 
of this. No information was offered to participants about whether a human or the computer 
controlled the responses, simply presenting the faces and explaining their gaze would either 
be followed or not followed by the onscreen faces. In addition, participants performed a 
gender identification task, so their task was orthogonal to the gaze interaction. This means 
that any effects which emerge are unlikely to be driven by higher order processing judgments 
about the gaze interaction. 
Experiment 8 Method 
 Participants. After ethical approval was obtained from a local ethics committee, 36 
Psychology undergraduate student participants (mean age = 19.9 years, SD = 1.33; 7 males), 
gave written, informed consent and were granted course credits in return for participation. All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological 
disorder. Participants were positioned comfortably in a chin rest and had rest breaks between 
four blocks of trials. One participant was excluded from analysis because the EEG signal was 
poor in the regions of interest. Henceforth, n=35. An a priori power analysis anticipating a 
medium effect size (based on mean P3 differences reported by Caruana et al., 2017) with a 
power of 0.80 (Cohen, 1988) calculated using G*Power3, (Faul et al., 2007) produced a 
required sample of 34. However, testing was stopped at the end of a scheduled block of 
testing for convenience with 36 participants tested.  




Stimuli. Images of six smiling faces, three male and three female, (280 x 374 pixels) 
were taken from the NimStim face set (see Figure 20; Tottenham et al., 2009). Smiling faces 
were used to make the task a little more interesting for participants whose sole job was to 
report gender. Each face comprised of three versions, with eyes looking right, looking left or 
straight ahead. There were two further NimStim faces (one female and one male) used for the 
practice block. There were eight images of everyday kitchen objects (220 x 78 pixels) taken 
from Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, and Tipper (2007). All stimuli were presented on a black 
background using E Prime 2.0.
 
Figure 20. Trial sequences and examples of stimuli. a) The participant fixates an onscreen 
face, displayed for 1000 ms. b) An object appears and the participant immediately saccades to 
the object. c) After 800 ms, the onscreen face responds with either a congruent or incongruent 
gaze shift, displayed for 2500 ms. d) The participant is prompted to report the gender of the 
face they just saw (displayed until response). 
 
Apparatus and materials.  A 64-channel active electrode system (Brain Products 
GMbH) with a cap (BrainCap-64 channels) and an amplifier (BrainAmp MR 64 PLUS) was 
used for EEG acquisition. Viewing distance was approximately 70 cm from eyes to a 24” 
computer monitor (resolution 1920 × 1080 pixels). A standard keyboard was used for 
participants’ manual responses. The Autism Spectrum Quotient Questionnaire (see Appendix 
A) was used as a measure of the level of autism-like traits (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), 
presented using E Prime. Participants rated how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each 
item (e.g. I prefer to do things the same way over and over again) on a four point Likert scale 
ranging from definitely agree to definitely disagree. 
 Procedure. Participants were positioned in a comfortable chair in front of a computer 
screen 70 cm from their face. Participants completed a practice “gaze leading” block of six 
trials followed by four gaze leading blocks of 60 trials each where six faces, presented 
randomly, followed gaze leading 50 percent of the time and did not follow gaze leading 
(averted gaze) the other 50 per cent of the time. Therefore, there were a total of 120 trials per 




condition. In two of the gaze leading blocks, the faces were presented 2.5 cm to the left of the 
centre of the screen with the object appearing 13.5 cm to the right of the faces. In the other 
two blocks, faces were presented 2.5 cm to the right of centre, with the object appearing 13.5 
cm to the left of the faces. Block order was counterbalanced. Finally, participants completed 
the Autism Quotient Questionnaire on the computer. Participants were given rest breaks for 
as long as they needed between each block. 
 In all the gaze leading blocks the face was presented looking straight ahead (so with 
direct gaze towards the participants) and this was displayed for 1000 ms whilst the 
participants were instructed to fixate on the face. Next, the object appeared to the right or left 
of the face positioned in line with the line of gaze of the onscreen face and 13.5 cm from the 
bridge of the nose of the face to the centre of the object. Participants were instructed to 
saccade to the object as soon as it appeared and keep fixating on the object until they noticed 
the gaze shift had occurred in their peripheral vision. After 800 ms, gaze onset occurred 
either to follow (joint attention) or not follow (averted gaze) the participant’s gaze towards 
the object. The 800 ms time frame between the object appearing and the gaze onset was 
informed by previous work on how long a time interval feels naturalistic between gaze 
leading and response (Pfeiffer et al., 2012) and a small pilot study in which participants were 
asked to rate which of four time durations felt most naturalistic from a choice of 400, 800, 
1000 and 1400 ms, using the same stimuli set up as the subsequent experiment. Once the gaze 
response had been displayed for 2500 ms, the face and object cleared to reveal a prompt to 
report whether the face was male or female. Participants used the index finger of their right 
hand to press letter key “m” for male and the index finger of their left hand to report “f” for 
female. There was an inter-trial interval of a blank screen jittered with a random interval of 
750-1250 ms following participant response and before the next face appeared to start the 
next trial. Participants performed a gender identification task in order to ensure the task was 
orthogonal to any judgments about whether their gaze was followed or not (see Figure 20).  
 Participants were shown examples of their typical EEG artifacts on a monitor in the 
testing room, including their horizontal saccades.  They were informed that, therefore, 
experimenters would be monitoring their eye movements using the EEG signal throughout 
the experiment. 
Data acquisition. Accuracy and reaction time for the gender identification task was 
recorded for every trial. EEG was recorded using a Brain Vision actiCAP system with 63 
active electrodes. Participants wore an elastic nylon cap (10/10 system extended). A further 




electrode was placed under the left eye to monitor horizontal eye movements (EOG). The 
continuous EEG signal was recorded at a 500 Hz sampling rate using FCz as a reference 
electrode. All electrodes had connection impedance below 50 kΩ before recording 
commenced.  
Continuous EEG data were pre-processed and analysed offline using EEGLAB 
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014). High and low 
pass half-amplitude cutoffs were set at 0.1 and 40 Hz, respectively. Any bad channels were 
interpolated with the spherical interpolation function from EEGLAB. Artifacts were removed 
in two stages. Firstly, trials containing excessive artifacts were rejected by manual inspection 
(2.4 per cent of trials). Secondly, horizontal eye movements and blinks were identified using 
the “runica” ERPLAB function for independent component analysis (ICA). Two procedures 
helped inform the components selected for removal for each participant. Firstly, the scalp 
maps for all components were examined to identify those which were eye artifacts (both 
blinks and saccades). Secondly, the maximal contribution to ERPs was assessed during the 
timeframe within which the saccades could occur (from -200 ms before gaze onset to 4300 
ms after), and those eye artifact components which contributed the most were selected. 
Continuous data were segmented into epochs of 1000 ms (from -200 ms to 800 ms relative to 
gaze onset). EEG data was then re-referenced to an average reference and averaged. The total 
mean number of trials per condition, out of 120, following artifact removal, were 117 for 
congruent gaze shifts (range 109-120 trials) and 117 for averted gaze (range 106-120 trials).  
Two regions of interest (ROIs; see Figure 21) were selected based on previous 
research and visual inspections of ERPs. A left occipital-parietal ROI was comprised of the 
four electrode sites P5/P7/PO3/PO7 and a right occipital-parietal ROI comprised of the four 
electrode sites P6/P8/PO4/PO8. These sites are commonly associated with face processing, 
gaze processing and attentional processes (see, for example, Eimer, 2011; Hietanen, 
Leppänen, Nummenmaa, & Astikainen, 2008; Schmitz, Scheel, Rigon, Gross, & Blechert, 
2012; Tipples et al., 2013). 





Figure 21. Regions of interest for the ERP analysis. A: Blue, Left parietal-occipital ROI B: 
Green, Right parietal-occipital ROI. 
 
ERP trials were time locked to the onset of the gaze stimulus. The amplitudes for ERPs were 
measured as the mean of all data points between 170-230 ms relative to the mean of all data 
points in the 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. This time window was chosen based on a 
combination of previous research and visual inspection of grand averaged and individual 
participant’s average ERPs (averaged across conditions, as recommended by Luck, 2014).  
 
Experiment 8 Results 
Gender categorisation data. Accuracy for identifying gender of faces was very high 
and did not vary across gaze response condition, as mean accuracy for both conditions was 99 
per cent. The mean reaction time (RT) for reporting gender was 558 ms, 95% CI [484, 632] 
(SD=214) for congruent gaze shifts, and 552 ms, 95% CI [479, 624] (SD=210) for averted 
gaze. For faces presented on the left, mean RT was 557 ms, 95% CI [484, 631] (SD=214) 
and, for faces presented on the right, mean RT was 549 ms, 95% CI [474, 624] (SD=218). 




Reaction times to report the gender of the faces were subjected to an ANOVA with gaze 
response (congruent or averted) and face position (faces presented on the left or right) as 
within subject factors. There was no main effect of gaze response, F(1,34)=0.72, 
MSE=1618.65, p=.401, p2 =.021, and no main effect of face position, F(1,34)=0.23, 
MSE=2219.69, p=.463, p2 =.007. 
AQ data. The mean AQ score was 16.63 (SD= 1.33) and the range was 3 to 32. There 
were no significant correlations between the mean AQ and RT in any of the conditions, 
rs<0.08, ps>.63. Similarly, there were no correlations between the magnitude of ERP and AQ 
score, other than one medium, negative correlation between amplitude in the right ROI for 
averted gaze and AQ, r(35)=0.348, p = .040. The greater the AQ score, the lower the mean 
negative amplitude for averted gaze in the right ROI.  
ERP Analysis. Grand-averaged ERPs for the mean amplitudes for the time window 
170-230 ms for the left and right ROIs can be found in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Mean amplitudes for the time window 170-230 ms for each electrode in the 
regions of interest. The graph on the left shows the left ROI electrodes and graph on the right 
shows the right ROI electrodes. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for 
within-subjects designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson 
(1994). 
 
The mean amplitudes in the time window 170-230 ms were subjected to a two way 
ANOVA with gaze response (joint attention or averted) and hemisphere (left or right) as 
within subject factors. There was a main effect of gaze response, F(1,34) = 13.00, MSE= 
4.481, p =.001, p2 = 0.28, and no main effect of hemisphere, F(1,34) = 1.59, MSE= 1.32, p 
= .216, p2 =0.05 and no interaction between gaze response and hemisphere, F(1,34)= 0.14, 
MSE= 0.02, p=.711, p2 =.004. Follow up contrasts showed greater negativity (mean 




difference = -0.36 µV, SD = 0.59) for joint attention over averted, t(34)= -3.61, p = .001, dz= 
0.30, 95% CI [0.12, 0.48] representing a small to medium effect, and no difference (mean 
difference = 0.19 µV, SD = 0.91) between right hemisphere and left hemisphere, t(34)= 1.26, 
p = .216, dz= -0.21, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.09]. At Figure 23 are the grand-averaged ERPs for each 
electrode in both ROIs and at Figure 24 is a scalp map showing the gaze response difference 
effects. 
 
Figure 23. Grand averaged ERPs (n = 35) in response to gaze onset for each electrode in the 
left (P5, P7, PO3, PO7) and right (P6, P8, PO4, PO8) parietal-occipital Regions of Interest 
(ROI), showing greater mean negativity at 170-230 ms after gaze shift for joint attention gaze 
response than for the averted gaze response. 
 
 





Figure 24. A scalp map showing the gaze response difference effects, calculated as the mean 
amplitude (in µV) for the joint attention gaze response (where negativity was greater) 
subtracted from the mean amplitude for the averted gaze response between 170 and 230 ms 
after gaze shift. 
The grand-averaged ERP in response to gaze onset at midline electrode Cz is shown 
in Figure 25, along with electrode P8, as an example of the N170-like waveform. This is 
shown to evidence a vertex positive potential (VPP) at Cz which is known to accompany the 
N170 component. As can be seen from Figure 29, the VPP “mirrors” the N170. The close 
association shown here between the N170 and VPP is typical of N170 studies (see Eimer, 
2011; Joyce & Rossion, 2005). Therefore, this supports the assertion that it is likely to be the 
N170 component elicited by the gaze shift that can be observed in these data (see later 
discussion of this). 





Figure 25. Grand averaged ERPs (n = 35) in response to gaze onset for electrodes P8 and Cz, 
showing the N170 component at P8 and the vertex positive potential (VPP) component at Cz. 
 To examine any effects of the onscreen face location, a further 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was 
performed  on the mean amplitudes between 170 and 230 ms with face location (left and 
right), hemisphere (left and right ROI) and gaze response (joint attention and averted gaze) as 
within subjects factors. There were no main effects of face location, F(1,34) = 0.09 , MSE= 
0.24, p =.762 p2 = 0.003, or hemisphere, F(1,34) = 0.63, MSE= 0.99, p =.433, p2 = 0.018. 
There was a main effect of gaze response, F(1,34) = 15.58, MSE= 10.21, p <.001, p2 = 0.31. 
There was an interaction between face location and hemisphere, F(1,34) = 24.59, MSE= 
55.33, p <.001 p2 = 0.42 (representing a large effect), and no interactions between face 
location and gaze response, F(1,34) = 0.34 , MSE= 0.02, p =.856 p2 = 0.001, nor between 
face location, hemisphere and gaze response, F(1,34) = 0.70, MSE= 0.15, p =.409 p2 = 0.02. 
Follow-up comparisons showed significant differences between face location and 
hemisphere, with greater mean amplitude for faces presented on the left in the right ROI than 
the left ROI, t(34)= 4.05, p <.001, dz=- 0.66, 95% CI [-1.01, -0.30] (mean difference = 1.00 




µV, SD = 1.47), and greater mean amplitude for faces presented on the right in the left ROI 
than the right ROI , t(34)= 3.54 , p = .001, dz= 0.55, 95% CI [0.22, 0.88] (mean difference = 
0.77 µV, SD = 1.29), representing medium to large effects. 
Experiment 8 Discussion 
 These data demonstrate an electrophysiological difference between observing a 
congruent (joint attention) gaze shift and an averted gaze shift, in response to a horizontal 
gaze leading saccade to an object. This means the neuro-cognitive system differentiates 
between when a joint attention bid is reciprocated and when it is not. A specific inference 
from the data is that by around 200 ms after gaze response, the brain detects whether the 
response is congruent or incongruent. This is remarkable given the small stimulus change in 
this experiment (the gaze shift) and the fact that this very small change is presented in the 
periphery.  This is enough to elicit an N170-like waveform and for that waveform to be 
modulated by gaze congruency. This is consistent with some of the previous work showing 
N170 modulation during gaze processing (Itier et al., 2007; Latinus et al., 2014; Watanabe et 
al., 2002). This is also consistent with previous behavioural findings that faces who follow 
our gaze leading capture our attention more than those who do not (Edwards et al., 2015), 
because a distinction between gaze response must be made by the cognitive system in order 
to drive this attentional effect. Furthermore, the results might be consistent with previous 
findings of an implicit sense of agency over a gaze shift response (see Experiments 1-5 in 
Chapters 2 and 3; Stephenson, Edwards, Howard, & Bayliss, 2018). This is because a 
reciprocated gaze shift must be distinguished from averted gaze in order to experience a sense 
of agency over the response. This would need to be investigated much further, though, for 
example, by investigating whether gaze shifts participants passively observe (without gaze 
leading first) elicit the same type of effect. If they do, then this would suggest the effect is 
more one of congruency than agency for gaze leading.  
These findings are the first, to my knowledge, to follow the findings of Caruana et al. 
(2015, 2017) exploring the electrophysiological correlates of gaze leading. There are 
important distinctions to be made between the current paradigm and the previous work, 
which mean a direct comparison cannot be made but can explain why Experiment 8 found an 
N170-like modulation, whilst Caruana (2015, 2017) did not. Caruana et al. (2015, 2017) used 
a computer-simulated onscreen virtual partner whom participants were told was controlled by 
a real person in another room who was playing a find and seek game with them. The 




paradigm used was a virtual game where participants gaze cued their partner (in fact, a 
computer simulation) to locations where prisoners were escaping. Therefore, the paradigm 
was more interactive for Caruana et al. (2015,2017) and had more context than that used in 
Experiment 8 because participants observed whether their attempts to lead the gaze of the 
avatar prison guard were successful or not. Experiment 8 employed photographs of real faces 
(as opposed to an onscreen avatar), with no suggestion that those faces were being controlled 
by a real person, and no game element, just a horizontal gaze leading saccade from a face to 
an object. Therefore, Experiment 8’s paradigm is simpler and likely to employ lower level 
perceptual processes than the higher-order interactional processes likely to be elicited by the 
game employed by Caruana et al. (2015, 2017). A final, important difference is that Caruana 
et al. (2015, 2017) time-locked the ERP to the avatar’s gaze shift response which occurred 
once participants had saccaded back from a cued location to the face (the avatar gaze shift 
occurred whilst the participant fixated the face), whereas, in this study, ERPs were time-
locked to the onscreen face’s gaze shift whilst participants fixated the referent object. 
Therefore, the gaze shift occurred peripherally to fixation in this study, whilst the gaze shift 
occurred at fixation in Caruana et al. (2015, 2017). 
 What Caruana et al. (2015) and Caruana et al. (2017) together offered evidence for 
was a P350 modulation according to gaze response, but only when participants were led to 
believe they were playing the game with a real person (Caruana et al., 2015) and not when 
told a computer generated the gaze shift responses (Caruana et al., 2017). This fits with a 
suggestion made by Carrick et al. (2007), that activity after 300 ms may be affected by social 
context and meaning, whilst activity at N170 may index gaze shifts, unaffected by social 
context or mental state judgments. This could be the case because the finding that mean 
amplitudes between 170 and 230 ms are greater to congruent gaze, could index a detection of 
gaze response which is elicited by observing a change in attentional state towards one’s own 
gaze location, rather than being associated with any attributions of mental state, given this 
paradigm had no context within which to make such attributions. This paradigm also 
employed a task (face gender identification) which was orthogonal to eye gaze response. This 
is also consistent with the theoretical position of Caruana et al. (2017) that some mental 
attribution processes may be at work in the P350 their study elicited, given no P350 
modulations occurred in the context of an interaction with a computer program, rather than 
when told a real person was controlling the gaze responses. 




The data in Experiment 8 support the notion that we need to process gaze shift 
responses to joint attention in order to facilitate on-going social interaction. After all, if our 
gaze shift has not been detected, we need to try again to achieve shared attention. In addition, 
we need to monitor gaze shift responses which we did not intend to cause, when our object of 
gaze has been detected and followed. Indeed, it may even be that we are looking at something 
that may cause us social embarrassment; in those situations, too, it is important to know if our 
gaze has been followed. The findings show an ERP neural correlate which distinguishes 
between these responses to our gaze leading, a critical part of social cognition. 
It is notable that the averaged ERP waveform peak is later than that which is typically 
observed for an N170, peaking around 200 ms, rather than 170 ms (see Eimer, 2011, for a 
review). This may be because participants were fixating on the object when the gaze shift on 
the face occurred in their periphery. Indeed, this accords with another study who found later 
N170 onset when faces stimuli are presented in periphery. For example, when presenting 
fearful faces in periphery, a similar latency was found at 30 degrees eccentricity with peaks 
of around 200 ms for the N170 component, which occurred earlier when faces were presented 
closer to centre, at 15 degrees eccentricity (Rigoulot et al., 2011). Most N170 studies have 
stimuli presented at fovea, so this study has that important distinction.  
The waveform observed here is elicited by a peripheral change and time-locked to 
gaze onset, rather than face onset. Therefore, it may appear a little different in form to the 
typical N170 components associated with face or gaze processing, although it still does 
resemble an N170. It is worth considering whether the waveform is being driven by a typical 
N2pc component, often associated with attentional shifts. Interestingly, both ERPs (N170 and 
N2pc) elicit greatest effects at the same posterior sites (commonly P7/P8 and PO7/PO8) as 
each other (see e.g Eimer, 2011; Luck, 2012; Woodman, Arita, & Luck, 2009) so it is 
possible there is an overlap in the cognitive processes which underlie them. In Experiment 8, 
multiple cognitive processes are probably contributing to the N170-like waveform. The N2pc 
is enhanced negativity peaking approximately between 200 and 300 ms after stimulus onset 
in electrodes contralateral to the location being attended (Woodman et al., 2009). The 
waveform observed here is a little early for the characteristic N2pc, but is a little delayed to 
be truly characteristic of the face-sensitive N170. The analysis shows greater negativity at 
sites contralateral to the face location, like a typical N2pc, but there is no interaction between 
hemisphere, face location and gaze response. There was a midline VPP at electrode Cz which 




is typically associated with N170, occurring in the same time window as the N170 (See 
Figure 29). Taking these considerations together, I believe the waveform this paradigm has 
elicited is likely to reflect cognitive processes following gaze shift response comprising both 
attentional (N2pc-like) and face/gaze (N170-like) cognition, although the waveform is more 
consistent with the N170 component. 
Finally, there was a medium correlation between autism-like traits and magnitude of 
the N170, meaning that the higher the AQ score, the lower the mean 170-230 ms negative 
amplitude magnitude. However, this was only found for averted gaze in the right ROI and the 
sample size lacks sufficient power for a reliable correlational analysis. I, therefore, do not 
make any strong claims based on this finding. However, it is worth mentioning that that there 
may be individual differences associated with ERP components elicited by responses to gaze 
leading. This may accord with previous findings of smaller ERP effects for those with an 
autism diagnosis (e.g. Churches et al., 2012). Future studies would need to explore this 
possibility. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
  In this study, faces were equally likely to follow gaze as not follow gaze, meaning 
their gaze responses were not predictable for any trial. Future work could build on these 
findings by investigating whether the amplitude enhancement for congruent gaze shifts would 
be eliminated when participants can predict the gaze response. It is possible the ERP may be 
differently modulated for faces who participants learn will always follow gaze, compared to 
those who never do. Similarly, an oddball paradigm could be deployed in which faces who 
usually follow gaze occasionally stop following; this may modulate an early ERP similar to 
that which emerged here, or it may modulate the P3 component, commonly associated with 
processing unexpected events (Polich, 2007).  
Future studies could also investigate whether the gaze leading saccade from the face 
to the object before the congruent gaze shift occurs is critical to elicit the neural 
differentiation for congruent and incongruent gaze. This could be done by adding a fixation 
cross before the object appears so participants fixate the object all the time, with no prior 
saccade from face to object. This would mean gaze shift would occur (but still in the 
periphery like Experiment 8) when participants are already fixating the object. If the same 
results occurred, that would suggest what drives the effects is the gaze shift towards the 
object of attention, whether elicited following deliberate gaze leading or following incidental 




joint gaze. However, if the modulation was not found, then that would suggest gaze leading is 
necessary for the neuro-cognitive system to distinguish the congruency of gaze shift.  
Conclusions 
In sum, these data show that when processing gaze shifts in response to gaze leading, 
there is a modulation of an N170-like ERP component, with greater negativity for congruent 
gaze shifts over averted gaze responses. This electrophysiological evidence complements 
previous work which shows dedicated neural networks which can both differentiate between 
initiating and responding to joint attention, and between the congruency of gaze shift 
responses (Schilbach et al., 2010). This work also complements behavioural data showing an 
implicit sense of agency over reciprocated gaze alignment with our own direction of gaze 
(Stephenson et al., 2018) and an attentional capture effect for faces who follow joint attention 
bids (Edwards et al., 2015). 
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The aim of this thesis was to add to what is known about the neural and 
cognitive processes which result from initiating joint attention towards a referent 
object, causing responding gaze shifts in others. Specifically, there were three 
empirical aims: to explore whether a sense of agency is felt over gaze responses the 
gaze leader causes in others, any effects upon the gaze leader’s recollection of 
unfamiliar faces according to gaze response and to explore electrophysiological 
correlates. This chapter will offer an overview of results across all empirical 
chapters, together with limitations and future directions. Then, I will offer a new, 
neuro-cognitive model of joint and shared attention informed both by previous 
research and by the data in this thesis. How this model fits with existing theories will 
be described, followed by a thesis summary.  
Results Overview 
 Agency. In Chapters 2 and 3 (Experiments 1-5), it was demonstrated that the 
temporal binding effect, often used as an index of an implicit sense of agency, occurs 
when gaze shift responses result from gaze leading during joint attention. These 
effects evidence an implicit sense of agency over congruent gaze shifts elicited by us 
during a simulated social interaction. Experiments 1, 2 and 5 each demonstrated no 
sense of agency when gaze shifts are observed, without any gaze leading saccades 
towards the object of the gaze shift. Experiments 1-3 each evidenced a contrasting 
effect of an implicit sense of agency over congruent gaze shifts when participants 
had executed a horizontal saccade to the referent object when they were told they 
caused the gaze shift. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated a weaker, but reliable (of 
about half the magnitude of binding when gaze leading preceded the gaze shift), 
implicit sense of agency over congruent gaze shifts towards an object participants 
were fixating upon, even without a horizontal saccade first from the face to that 
object. This was suggestive of a hierarchical system in which the greatest binding 
effects result from deliberate gaze leading from a face to an object and agency is 
attributed, but less so, when joint attention results incidentally. However, this did not 
replicate in Experiment 5 (Chapter 3), where no binding was found for congruent 
gaze shifts in an experiment where participants never experienced gaze leading from 
the face to an object and were never told their gaze shifts elicited onscreen 
responses, suggesting context and participant belief will modulate sense of agency 
without a deliberate joint attention bid. 
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 Experiments 1, 3 and 4 included a non-social response for comparison with 
gaze shift responses. A change to a fixation cross, following gaze leading of the 
same saccade magnitude as the face stimulus conditions between fixation crosses 
(Experiment 4), showed no binding effects. This suggested any temporal 
compression effects associated purely with executing saccades cannot account for 
the binding effects elicited within the context of an interaction with an onscreen face. 
I infer that there is something special about a congruent gaze shift in response to 
gaze leading which is most likely to induce the greatest sense of agency. Experiment 
1 demonstrated, in a control condition, that a low level spatial shift towards an object 
with a phase scrambled image, with no prior gaze leading to cause it, will not induce 
temporal binding. Experiment 3 explored the same spatial shift from a phase 
scrambled display, but when the shift occurred, participants were fixating the object, 
so it was a congruent spatial shift towards their object of gaze. This did elicit 
temporal binding, surprisingly. However, I attribute this as most likely caused by the 
ambiguity of the situation when it is adaptive for us to over-attribute agency if there 
is any doubt about what is happening as the cost of under-attribution for causing 
events in the world is worse than over-attributing agency. If in doubt, assume we 
caused something, so we can plan what we need to do about it next, if anything. This 
is perhaps one of the most challenging findings to explain in this thesis and so may 
prove the most fruitful for future studies to explore further. 
 Face recognition memory. Experiments 6 and 7 in Chapter 4 showed that 
there is no effect on recognition of faces according to their previously observed gaze 
responses to gaze leading. This is perhaps because it is adaptive to be able to 
recognise faces previously encountered regardless of gaze response, as cooperative 
followers and norm violators are equally important to remember. Across both 
experiments, there were, albeit with a weak effect, faster reaction times to report 
old/new faces who had not followed gaze over the faces who did, suggesting there 
might be circumstances during gaze behaviours in which norm violators are easier to 
remember than cooperative partners. 
 Neural mechanisms. Experiment 8 in Chapter 5 shows that the neuro-
cognitive system by around 200 ms distinguishes between a congruent gaze shift 
response to gaze leading, and an incongruent one. This is evidenced by greater mean 
negative amplitude between 170 and 230 ms following gaze response, likely to be an 
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N170 ERP component modulation and which evidences the detection of a successful 
joint attention bid. 
Autism-like traits. There were no meaningful, reliable correlations between 
levels of autism-like traits and sense of agency (Experiments 1-3), or face 
recollection (Experiments 6-7), nor modulation of the N170 component (Experiment 
8). This might be surprising given the previous findings in the joint attention 
literature which have often pointed to differences in gaze behaviours and also 
differences in the broader phenotype (reviewed in Chapter 1). However, this is also 
in line with studies which show how often there can be similarities to typically 
developing populations, not just differences, in gaze processing and behaviours driven 
by gaze for those with autism or nonclinical populations with high autism-like traits 
(see e.g. Pell et al., 2016). It should be noted, though, the lack of any correlations 
might be due to the fact the experiments in this thesis all examined individual 
differences in the broader phenotype in nonclinical and small samples where the 
modal AQ score was low. 
Further Discussion of Results 
Now that the results have been overviewed, some further thoughts and ideas 
will be offered about what these findings could mean for each of the three empirical 
strands of the thesis, followed by a discussion of how all three strands may relate to 
each other in a integrated discussion of the results. 
Agency Findings. In Chapter 2, the idea was introduced that sense of agency 
may not be what the phenomenon of temporal binding actually taps into (Dewey & 
Knoblich, 2014; Hughes et al., 2013). Hughes et al. (2013) argue that the effects 
might be caused mainly by differences in temporal prediction, citing temporal 
attention evidence that sensory processing can be weakened by temporal prediction. 
Hughes et al. (2013) accept, however, that it is probably a combination of processes 
such as attention, prediction and causality which alter sensory outcome of actions. I 
agree that a variety of cognitive processes may lead to the temporal binding effect 
but this does not negate the most likely explanation that temporal binding does 
reflect a sense of agency, given the typical stark contrast in binding between active 
and passive conditions found in the literature and found in the experiments in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Attentional processes are likely to play a part in the perception of 
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the passage of time. After all, we commonly talk about how time “flies” or “drags” 
usually experiencing a sense of time passing quickly when we are busy and, 
therefore, our attention is absorbed in what we are doing. This is when we are in 
control of our actions, that is, experiencing the greatest sense of agency over them. 
Taking this idea of attentional processes at work in sense of agency, this may 
help explain some of the more unexpected findings in Chapter 3. In Experiment 4, 
although there was no significant binding, there was a significant difference in 
temporal reproduction errors between the saccade and no saccade task with greater 
time interval reproductions when not making a saccade than when making a saccade 
between crosses. Therefore, time was perceived to pass more slowly when no action 
was performed. The fact a saccade had to be performed was likely to engage more 
attention than just fixating a cross with no action required. If attentional engagement 
with a motor task (a saccade here) helps compress time, then making a saccade in the 
context of interacting with an onscreen face is likely to compress time more, as more 
attention is engaged. This could help explain why the gaze leading task with a face in 
Experiments 1-3 resulted in significant temporal compression effects, whilst that 
with a fixation cross in Experiment 4 did not. This could speak to an additive effect 
of social context to sense of agency over and above effects caused by a motor action 
alone. 
In Experiment 5, there were no significant binding effects when fixating the 
face throughout or when fixating the object throughout. In both conditions, there was 
no motor action (saccade) to contribute to a sense of agency. However, there was a 
perception of the time interval being longer when fixating the face alone, compared 
with fixating the object. Attentional processes are different when awaiting a gaze 
shift which must be detected in the periphery (when fixating the object) compared to 
fixating the face where gaze shifts can be detected directly. This may account for the 
differences in the perception of time. 
In addition to temporal attention, Hughes et al. (2013) emphasised the 
involvement of prediction in attenuating sensory outcomes. Social outcomes we 
cause in others can vary a great deal in their predictability. It is usually easier to 
predict outcomes we cause in inanimate objects who have no free will than the 
outcomes from humans who may respond to our actions less predictably or, at least, 
have a greater range of possible responses. Faces always responded to gaze leading 
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in Experiments 1-3 and 5 with a congruent gaze response as the outcome, which 
meant the paradigm was 100% predictable. It is possible different results would be 
found if the predictability of gaze response was manipulated. Future studies could 
explore whether the effects would be attenuated by less likelihood of a congruent 
response. I speculate that agency effects might be robust to such manipulation 
because it is equally important to detect an incongruent gaze shift, which may be 
self-attributed just as much as a congruent one, and because of the findings of 
binding in the ambiguous phase-scrambled condition demonstrated in Experiment 3. 
If in doubt, perhaps the system over-attributes agency, and this is an interesting 
avenue for future studies to reveal. 
In Chapter 2, Synofzik et al’s (2013) model of optimal cue integration for 
sense of agency was introduced. This model included both retrospective and 
predictive processes at work with feelings of agency (implicit agency) and 
judgements of agency (explicit agency) conceptualised as related, yet dissociable. 
The findings from Experiments 1-5 fit well with that model. There were no reliable 
correlations between implicit agency (binding effects) and explicit agency ratings, 
consistent with the two processes being dissociable. At the same time, agency ratings 
were lower for the conditions in which there was no binding, supporting the idea that 
explicit and implicit agentic processes are related, nevertheless. The optimal cue 
integration account does not mention how social context may feed into the feelings 
of agency so is something the findings in Experiments 1-5 could add. There is an 
affective level in the optimal cue integration account which includes emotional 
appraisal and reward anticipation feeding into both feelings and judgments of 
agency. Perhaps a further level could be added of social context, related to the 
affective level. 
Face Recognition Findings. The face recognition results found similar 
levels of recognition ability for both previously encountered followers and non-
followers after gaze leading. It could be, as already discussed, that the equal 
importance of both responses in social interactions can explain the lack of effects 
found. The binary old/new response may be too blunt a tool in itself to fully test this 
and future work could apply, instead, a more continuous measure to be more 
sensitive to any underlying encoding differences. However, there was one weak 
finding that non-followers are better encoded in memory demonstrated by faster 
reaction times (which is a continuous measure) to identify whether a face had been 
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seen before for non-followers over followers. A change in design may reveal a 
stronger effect of this, for example, by participants encountering the faces more often 
and/or introducing a much longer delay before the recall task. Another future avenue 
would be to analyse the eye metrics further. Participants were instructed to look back 
at the face following their peripheral detection of the gaze shift response. Therefore, 
the eye metrics could be analysed to ascertain if saccade latency here or duration of 
fixation on the face once they saccaded back to the face correlated with recognition 
accuracy and whether there were any differences between conditions for this. Such 
differences in fixation duration or saccade latency, were there to be any, between 
followers and non-followers may have influenced subsequent recognition. 
Neural Findings. The N170 modulation shown in Experiment 8 is the first of 
its kind to examine any N170 effects on responses to gaze leading. It is notable that 
Experiment 8 examined the effects of the gaze response when participants were 
fixating the object and detecting the gaze shift in their peripheral vision This can be 
contrasted with previous ERP gaze studies. Previous studies have looked at ERP 
modulation either for direct versus averted gaze towards the participant or observing 
gaze shifts not elicited by the participant (e.g. Latinus et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2006) 
and all have done so when participants fixated the face. None have found modulation 
of the N170 for peripherally presented gaze shifts.  Therefore, the findings in 
Experiment 8 are the first to find N170 modulation for such gaze shifts. It remains 
for future studies to build on this finding to ascertain if the effect is solely due to a 
congruency effect generally or due to a congruency effect only found following gaze 
leading. To test for this, a future work needs to employ a gaze leading paradigm 
coupled with a control condition in which gaze congruency is observed without gaze 
leading first (e.g. when already fixating on the object). 
Integrated Discussion of Results. Taking all eight experiments together, we 
now know that a sense of implicit agency can be felt over causing gaze shifts to align 
with our own, that we can encode new faces well in memory after brief gaze leading 
interactions, whatever the outcome, and that there is electrophysiological evidence of 
the detection of congruent or incongruent gaze responses. It may be that these three 
findings are linked by the overarching theme of sense of agency. Perhaps the high 
accuracy in recalling the unfamiliar faces in Experiments 6 and 7 was helped by the 
fact participants gaze led the faces and the fact they sensed agency over the 
outcomes. Controlling another’s gaze may boost memory for that person as the 
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interaction is more meaningful than when passively seeing a new face. This needs to 
be tested, though, in future research by introducing a control recall task, for example, 
where there is passive observation of new faces to see whether causing the gaze shift 
drives higher recollection accuracy. The weak effect in Experiments 6 and 7 of faster 
reaction times to non-followers could also be due to the violation of expected agentic 
control over those faces. The N170 modulation according to gaze outcome might be 
a signature of agentic control over gaze shifts but it remains to be tested whether this 
is simply a congruency effect that would be elicited in the absence of a causal gaze 
leading action. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Agency. Although the majority of the literature supports the idea that 
temporal binding is a measure of implicit sense of agency (e.g. Haggard, 2017, for a 
review), there are some dissenters (e.g. Hughes et al., 2013), and so it cannot be 
ruled out completely that the temporal binding effects demonstrated here are not a 
proxy for an implicit sense of agency. However, I believe the best explanation for the 
binding effects in the active tasks in Experiments 1-3 is an implicit sense of agency, 
given no such effects are found in passive tasks, coupled with the ever growing 
literature which also supports this position and the points made about attentional 
processes at work made in the further discussion of agency findings above. 
Future research could employ a gaze contingent paradigm to see if this leads 
to an increase in the magnitude of the effects found. The findings of attenuated 
binding for incidental joint attention found in the Passive Object task in Experiments 
2 and 3 were not replicated in Experiment 5, meaning more research is needed to 
resolve this. Relatedly, fruitful areas for future research would be to explore the 
finding of large binding effects in the Scrambled Passive Object task of Experiment 
3, to explore further whether introducing ambiguity and uncertainty into a paradigm 
can still elicit binding when there is any observed shift towards our object of gaze. It 
could be that it is so fundamentally important to our social interactions that any 
congruent shift, whether it be from eyes or other stimuli, will always be processed as 
potentially self-caused. 
Face recognition. Experiments 6 and 7 with the particular paradigm 
employed was just a starting point to exploring any effects on face recognition 
following gaze leading. There are other ways to measure recollection beyond the 
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old-new task which was employed. Using an n-back task to explore working 
memory effects (Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007) could form the basis for a 
future study. Greater exposure to the faces than were employed here might facilitate 
enhanced encoding in memory. Finally, measuring recall from longer-term memory 
could be explored. 
Neural mechanisms. Future work could build on these findings by 
investigating whether the amplitude enhancement for congruent gaze shifts would be 
eliminated when participants can predict the gaze response. It is possible the ERP 
may be differently modulated for faces who participants learn will always follow 
gaze, compared to those who never do. Similarly, an oddball paradigm could be 
deployed in which faces who usually follow gaze occasionally stop following; this 
may modulate an early ERP similar to that which emerged here, or it may modulate 
the P3 component, commonly associated with processing unexpected events (Polich, 
2007). Future studies could also investigate whether the gaze leading saccade from 
the face to the object before the congruent gaze shift occurs is critical to elicit the 
neural differentiation for congruent and incongruent gaze. 
Finally, there is a general limitation of all of the experiments in this thesis 
which is that effects were explored within a computer-simulated joint attention 
paradigm with a virtual other, rather than a real world interaction between dyads. A 
review of the literature has identified that the field has progressed from static to 
interactive paradigms over the years, and the importance of such developments 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2013). The experiments in this thesis employ an interactive 
methodology as the virtual partner responds to participant gaze behaviours. 
However, future studies can build on these findings to explore whether the effects 
demonstrated here extend to real-world interactions. This would, of course, introduce 
new challenges, making it harder to ensure tightly controlled, measurable variables, 
of the type demonstrated here using an interactive, simulated approach. The field 
recognises how grappling with these issues has resulted in compromises to 
ecological validity in social gaze-based research, but the field is, nevertheless, 
increasingly working towards attempts to overcome this (Schilbach, 2015). 
Model of Shared Attention and Associated Neural Mechanisms 
 The findings in this thesis, together with the previously reviewed literature on 
joint and shared attention, enable the formulation of a novel model to capture the 
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processes at work during a joint attention interaction and the neural regions involved. 
The model aims to capture how both people in a joint attention interaction have to 
coordinate their behaviour, how this leads to a state of shared attention which, in 
turn, facilitates a number of subsequent social cognitive processes. This model of 
joint and shared attention is found at Figure 26.  








Figure 26. Neurocognitive Model of Joint and Shared Attention. The two agents need to coordinate gaze in order to engage in shared 
attention. The initiator needs to detect and sense agency over the response received. Coordinating gaze requires both agents to be aware of 
their joint gaze, elevating ‘joint’ to ‘shared’ attention. This then facilitates the social-cognitive processes of empathy, emotional evaluation, 
sense of reward and self and theory of mind. The sub-serving brain regions are identified in this model. 
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Two agents during joint attention need to coordinate their attention and so the 
model shows how this leads to the higher level state of sharing attention, in turn, 
facilitating key components of social cognition: empathy, emotional evaluations, 
sense of self and reward and theory of mind. In addition, the model demonstrates that 
both the initiator and responder during the interaction need to detect the presence of 
gaze, encode each other’s gaze direction and then reorient their attention. In addition, 
the initiator needs to detect and sense agency over the response received, which is 
one part of the model the data in this thesis specifically informs. 
How experiments 1-8 contribute to the model. The model is based on 
previous research into all the processes at work during joint and shared attention and 
the associated brain regions involved. The experiments in this thesis specifically 
contribute the processes of the detection of response and sense of agency 
experienced over the follower’s responses to their joint attention initiation bid (as 
shown by the dashed lines at the top of the model in Figure 26). The gaze leading 
paradigms used throughout these experiments all provide some evidence of these 
two critical processes (detection and agency) at work for the gaze initiator. Gaze 
leading can facilitate the gaze coordination found in shared attention. In turn, 
ultimately this can lead to the consequent cognitive outcomes identified in the 
model. What the model suggests is that gaze leading is a critical part of the social 
interaction which requires agency over gaze outcomes, in turn, eventually facilitating 
other social cognitive outcomes of empathy, emotional evaluation, sense of reward 
and self and theory of mind.  
It is debateable how ‘automatic’ the processes of, firstly, detecting the 
outcome of gaze leading and, secondly, the resultant sense of agency are. The rapid 
200 ms peak of congruency detection evidenced by Experiment 8, suggests the 
detection may be reflexive. The implicit sense of agency evidenced in Experiments 
1-4 suggest, too, a reflexivity and perhaps the sense of agency does always reach 
conscious awareness. This is because the self-reported explicit agency did not always 
tally with the implicit binding measure.  For example, there were low agency ratings 
in Experiments 2 and 3 for passive object conditions, but significant temporal 
binding effects and in Experiment 3 there were low agency ratings for scrambled 
object condition, yet large binding effects. This speaks again to a dissociation 
between explicit and implicit agency which fits with the optimal cue intgration 
account of agency (Synofzik et al., 2013).  
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Application of the model to theory. The extensive network sub-serving 
gaze processing, initiating joint attention, responding to joint attention and shared 
attention consequences are summarised in the model. The theoretical framework 
offered is that initiating shared attention has fundamental benefits for the initiator; 
we are motivated to share attention as part of the human capacity for social cognition 
and intergenerational transmission of culture, including language. Just as gaze 
following allows access to mentalising about other’s intentions, beliefs and expected 
behaviour, so initiating shared attention allows us to share our thoughts and 
experiences with others. This motivation to share our thoughts and experiences with 
others, supported by joint attention, has been identified by Tomasello et al. (2005) 
and argued to be what sets us apart as a species and facilitates shared intentionality 
and, critically, allows our culture to evolve.  
A recent theory, termed sociomotor action control (Kunde, Weller, & Pfister, 
2017) is consistent with the model. In the model the joint attention initiator needs to 
detect the response to their gaze leading action in another person, in order to 
coordinate mutual gaze and lead to on-going cognitive outcomes. It is this detection 
of our action outcomes on other people’s behaviour that is captured by the idea of 
sociomotor action control which is that the responses elicited in another’s behaviour 
feedback to inform further action control (Kunde et al., 2017). I add to this idea that 
social responses from other people are much less predictable than typical action-
outcome in inanimate objects manipulated by us. Arguably, the variance in possible 
outcomes from another person whose behaviour can change on a whim, is far greater 
than the variance in expected outcomes from inanimate objects. Therefore, we need 
to be particularly flexible in our assessment of feedback from social outcomes; the 
system must be capable of processing a huge range of responses. In the context of 
shared attention, possible outcomes include being ignored in our gaze leading bid 
and having to re-establish eye contact and repeat the gaze leading saccade. I also 
note that, as shown in the model, incidental joint gaze may occur because our gaze 
can be followed without any deliberate intent on our part to establish shared 
attention.  
The model captures the neural mechanisms of the gaze detection process, the 
coordination needed between both initiator and responder and the potential resulting 
cognitive processes (empathy, emotional evaluations, sense of self/reward and theory 
of mind) which are integral to the way we interact as human beings. Our motivation 
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to engage with others is facilitated through shared attention which is adaptive to our 
functioning in social groups and the shared intentionality we can engage in which 
makes us so successful as a species (Tomasello & Herrmann, 2010). 
The model of shared attention contributes to wider theories about social 
attention and social cognition. For example, the model can lend support to Frith’s 
“we-mode” theory that, when agents are interacting, they engage in a collective 
mode of cognition and tend to co-represent actions of social partners (Gallotti & 
Frith, 2013). This is supported by studies showing activation of the inferior frontal 
gyrus when engaging in mutual gaze, specifically coordinating gaze with a social 
partner (Cavallo et al., 2015; Koike et al., 2016) which is the same region where 
evidence for human mirror neurons has been offered, using a repetition suppression 
paradigm (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009). Future research could 
investigate whether repetition suppression is found both when executing a repeated 
joint attention initiation to an object and when observing another person repeating a 
joint attention initiation. This would enable exploration of whether there is evidence 
of mirror neurons within the inferior frontal gyrus specifically for joint attention 
bids, which would support the idea both of a human mirror neuron system and the 
overlapping theory of co-representing a social partner’s actions.  
Koike et al. (2016) used hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance 
imaging where two participants shared attention and found synchronisation of neural 
activity of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) during mutual gaze and also IFG 
activation during both initiating and responding to joint attention. Furthermore, eye 
blinks were coordinated during a joint attention task. This is further evidence of a 
shared representational state during shared attention which facilitates theory of mind 
and other key elements of social cognition.  
The neural network in the model. The model reflects past neuroimaging 
findings which broadly support the Parallel and Distributed-Processing Model 
hypothesised by Mundy & Newell (2007) and Mundy et al. (2009) in which joint 
attention initiation is mainly served by the anterior attention network and joint 
attention response by the posterior attention network, but with an emphasis on the 
connections between these networks. A further intriguing neural correlate is that 
shown by Schilbach et al. (2010) who demonstrated enhanced ventral striatum 
activity for initiating joint attention, suggesting this is a rewarding experience. This 
activity also correlated with self-reported subjective feelings of pleasantness. The 
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greater the activity change in the ventral striatum, the greater the sense of 
pleasantness reported for looking at objects with another person. In this case the 
other person was an onscreen face but participants were told that the onscreen face 
was controlled by a real person. This type of research, which seeks to examine online 
social interactions rather than offline, has become popular in recent years (see 
Pfeiffer et al., 2013, for a review). 
A further study from the same lab showed that gaze based behaviours with 
another person activated the ventral striatum, and it did not matter whether the 
participants believed their partner had a shared goal or not (Pfeiffer et al., 2014). 
Another study found increased striatum activity when initiating joint attention was 
reciprocated with gaze following, compared to an averted gaze response (Gordon et 
al., 2013). Finally, the ventral striatum was activated more even when participants 
simply passively observed actors in a video clip engaging in a shared purpose than 
when the actors were simply acting in parallel (Eskenazi et al., 2015). 
Cognitive outcomes in the model. The four key cognitive outcomes from 
shared attention are identified in the model: empathy, emotional evaluation, 
reward/sense of self and theory of mind. I will consider each of these in turn. Firstly, 
the brain regions implicated both by joint attention and the processing of empathy 
are the pSTS and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), whilst another overlapping 
region involved is the ventral MPC (see Bernhardt & Singer, 2012, for a review, and 
Bzdok et al., 2012, for an activation likelihood activation meta-analysis). Secondly 
and relatedly, making emotional evaluations can result from shared attention which 
can be split into evaluations about oneself and evaluations of others’ emotions. 
Those regions involved in our own emotional evaluations are the insula and the right 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), whilst those used when evaluating other’s emotions 
are the STS and the TPJ, and those used for both types of evaluation are the 
amygdala, the lateral PFC and the dorsal mPFC (see Lee & Siegle, 2009, for a 
review). Thirdly, initiating shared attention has been associated with the dorsal 
mPFC (Schilbach et al., 2010) which has been implicated in processing self-
referential information (Bergström, Vogelsang, Benoit, & Simons, 2014; Schmitz & 
Johnson, 2007), and with regions associated with processing reward like the ventral 
striatum, insula and right ACC (Redcay et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 2010). Because 
these two processes of reward and self-referential information implicate the same 
brain regions, I have combined those processes together in the model. Fourthly, 
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sharing attention with another person facilitates the human attribute of theory of 
mind and its accompanying potential for cooperation, teaching, control and 
communication. The neural mechanisms of theory of mind have been identified as 
the pSTS, the TPJ and the mPFC (Saxe, 2006; and see Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, 
Richlan, & Perner, 2014, for a meta analysis). 
To summarise, the model captures the neural mechanisms of the gaze 
detection process, the coordination needed between both initiator and responder and 
the potential resulting cognitive processes (empathy, emotional evaluations, sense of 
self/reward and theory of mind) which are integral to the way we interact as human 
beings. Our motivation to engage with others is facilitated through shared attention 
which is adaptive to our functioning in social groups and the shared intentionality we 
can engage in which makes us so successful as a species (Tomasello & Herrmann, 
2010). 
Thesis Summary 
 The empirical chapters of this thesis (Experiments 1 to 8) together offer new 
evidence of a sense of agency over gaze shifts we elicit in others, of rapid neural 
differentiation between congruent and incongruent gaze shift responses, and 
evidence an equally efficient ability to recollect unfamiliar faces following both 
congruent and averted gaze shifts. Together, these insights contribute to our 
understanding of cognitive processes at work during joint and shared attention, 
specifically, adding to what we know about the initiator of the interaction. These 
data have helped inform a new neuro-cognitive model of these processes, which I 
now summarise. 
The new neurocognitive model of joint and shared attention in this thesis 
seeks to capture three main strands. Firstly, the model captures the many findings 
and advances made over the past twenty years about the brain regions involved in the 
different processes which make up sharing attention using eye gaze signals. 
Secondly, the model shows how these processes relate to one another in an iterative 
fashion, and, thirdly, identifies the key outcomes which can result from sharing 
attention; empathy, emotional evaluation, sense of self/reward and theory of mind. 
An implicit sense of agency for causing eye gaze shifts in others, together with the 
neural detection and differentiation of gaze responses demonstrated in this thesis, are 
captured within the model. Specifically, experiencing agency over gaze shifts and 
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differentiating a congruent from an incongruent response, is necessary to detect the 
response and coordinate gaze during the on-going social interaction which, in turn, 
can lead to empathy, emotional evaluations, sense of self, reward and theory of 
mind. These elements of social cognition are the foundations upon which human 
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AGENCY FOR GAZE LEADING 




Humans feel a sense of agency over the effects their motor system causes. This is the case for 28 
manual actions such as pushing buttons, kicking footballs, and all acts that affect the physical 29 
environment. We ask whether initiating joint attention – causing another person to follow our 30 
eye movement – can elicit an implicit sense of agency over this congruent gaze response. Eye 31 
movements themselves cannot directly affect the physical environment, but joint attention is 32 
an example of how eye movements can indirectly cause social outcomes. Here we show that 33 
leading the gaze of an on-screen face induces an underestimation of the temporal gap 34 
between action and consequence (Experiments 1 and 2). This underestimation effect, named 35 
‘temporal binding,’ is thought to be a measure of an implicit sense of agency. Experiment 3 36 
asked whether merely making an eye movement in a non-agentic, non-social context might 37 
also affect temporal estimation, and no reliable effects were detected, implying that 38 
inconsequential oculomotor acts do not reliably affect temporal estimations under these 39 
conditions. Together, these findings suggest that an implicit sense of agency is generated 40 
when initiating joint attention interactions. This is important for understanding how humans 41 
can efficiently detect and understand the social consequences of their actions. 42 
 Keywords 43 
Gaze leading, Joint attention, Sense of agency, Social cognition, Temporal binding.  44 
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Eyes that Bind Us: Gaze Leading Induces an Implicit Sense of Agency 45 
1. Introduction 46 
The effects our motor system have on the environment need to be accurately detected. 47 
Action monitoring in humans gives rise to a sense of agency whereby we become conscious 48 
of our own actions (Gallagher, 2000). Such actions might be grasping objects or pushing 49 
buttons. However, some of the most important actions we execute do not directly affect the 50 
non-social, physical world, but do affect the social world. That is, some actions lead to 51 
changes in other people’s actions (e.g. Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016). 52 
One such ubiquitous social action is that when we look somewhere, other humans may 53 
spontaneously reorient their own gaze in the same direction, thus establishing joint attention 54 
(Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 2007). Joint attention is an everyday but important example that 55 
shows that, although eye movements cannot directly affect inanimate objects (aside from 56 
modern emerging gaze-controlled technologies, Slobodenyuk, 2016), changes in our gaze 57 
direction can influence other people. Moreover, saccades are the most common action we 58 
perform; we foveate a new area of the visual field 3-5 times each second (Schiller, 1998). 59 
However, there is little evidence that saccades evoke a sense of agency in a similar way to 60 
manual actions. We, therefore, tested whether an implicit sense of oculomotor agency over a 61 
conspecific’s gaze shift response emerges in joint attention. 62 
Because eye movements are a special form of action, they may not necessarily engage 63 
the same mechanisms underpinning agency as those engaged by other effectors. 64 
Nevertheless, there is a clear advantage in having robust agency detection systems for social 65 
outcomes elicited by our own actions, so a common mechanism that generalises between all 66 
effectors and outcome types could also be posited. Efficiently detecting the social effects we 67 
have caused may be critical to understanding others’ actions and support mental state 68 
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ascription (Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2016). Thus, the importance of understanding the role for 69 
agency in social action is critical for the understanding of social cognition. 70 
There is one recent paper that suggests that people can learn to understand the 71 
contingencies between their saccades and a bouncing ball stimulus on a screen (Grgič, 72 
Crespi, & de’Sperati, 2016), which is an initial piece of evidence that the effects of saccades 73 
can be explicitly self-attributed. However, explicitly measuring sense of agency does not 74 
provide a full picture and can be problematic. This is because explicit measures are somewhat 75 
limited as self-reported feelings of control over an action depend on the actor’s own ability 76 
for introspection (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; David et al., 2008; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007). 77 
Moreover, as Gallagher (2012) points out, self-agency is not normally something of which 78 
we are typically aware. Explicit measures are further criticised for their susceptibility to 79 
response bias and impression management (Obhi, 2012).  Because of this, an alternative is to 80 
measure sense of agency implicitly with a measure that does not ask the participant to 81 
introspect about their explicit experience of control.  Inferring sense of agency from implicit 82 
measures of correlated, potentially underlying mechanisms, has been a revealing approach 83 
(Barlas & Obhi, 2013). This can be achieved by exploiting an effect known as temporal 84 
binding (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), whereby perception of the temporal distance 85 
between act and outcome is compressed for self-generated acts, and relatively accurate when 86 
judging the gap between two non-self-related stimuli (Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review).  87 
This is why the temporal binding effect is theorised to measure an implicit sense of agency 88 
(see Haggard, 2017, for review).  89 
Here, we adopt a twofold approach of measuring the sense of agency: temporal 90 
binding (which we offer as an implicit measure of agency) and self-reported ratings of felt 91 
control (an explicit measure of agency). We considered this necessary because explicit 92 
measures and binding effects do not always correlate, suggesting they may not reflect the 93 
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exact same processes (e.g. Dewey & Knoblich, 2014, but see Ebert & Wegner, 2010, where 94 
changes in temporal binding were found to be related to explicit self-reports of agency). This 95 
possible dissociation between explicit and implicit agency are incorporated into an optimal 96 
cue integration account where implicit agency operates at a sensorimotor level, whilst explicit 97 
agency emerges following higher level processing (see Synovik et al., 2013).  98 
Relatedly, sense of agency may arise both from predictive model-based mechanisms 99 
and postdictive mechanisms (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Haggard, 2017; Synofzik, 100 
Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). According to the predictive model, the sense of agency is produced 101 
when there is a match between the predicted and the actual sensory outcome from an action 102 
(Blakemore et al., 2002). The retrospective or postdictive model, however, conceptualises a 103 
comparison between the action’s idea and action’s effect and a sense of agency arises if they 104 
are similar (Chambon & Haggard, 2013). Moore, Wegner, and Haggard (2009) argued that 105 
different, and varied, agency cues are integrated to result in a sense of agency (e.g. 106 
consequences of actions and sensorimotor prediction). Moore, Middleton. Haggard, and 107 
Fletcher (2012) tested this by exploring whether explicit and implicit agency were modulated 108 
differently by sequential patterns of action and outcome. Their results supported a model in 109 
which explicit and implicit agency can be thought of as dissociable, but, they argued, the two 110 
are not completely independent systems. This is consistent with Synovik et al’s (2013) 111 
optimal integration cue account in which explicit and implicit agency can both be included. 112 
Given this reviewed evidence, we aimed to measure the temporal binding effect associated 113 
with an implicit sense of agency and collect self-report explicit ratings of agency as a  114 
manipulation check. 115 
The temporal binding phenomenon has been associated with implicit sense of agency 116 
over physical actions that cause auditory (e.g. Barlas & Obhi, 2014), and visual outcomes 117 
(Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2011). Investigations of interpersonal agency have been more 118 
AGENCY FOR GAZE LEADING 
  165 
 
 
limited, though agency is recognised as a critical aspect of joint action (Sebanz, Bekkering, & 119 
Knoblich 2006). Some studies have demonstrated a sense of agency over others’ actions 120 
during joint tasks (Obhi & Hall, 2011; Pfister, Obhi, Rieger, & Wenke, 2014), and by illusory 121 
agent misidentification (e.g. Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Interpersonal dynamics 122 
can modulate agency (e.g. under social coercion, Caspar et al., 2016). Social outcomes of 123 
physical acts have been studied by Yoshie and Haggard (2013), who showed that the valence 124 
of human vocalisations that served as a consequence of their participants’ actions modulated 125 
temporal binding (but see Moreton, Callan, & Hughes, 2016). These studies offer some 126 
evidence that a social outcome from a button press can elicit binding. In one version of this 127 
paradigm, participants are asked to replicate the time interval they have just experienced (e.g. 128 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2010). We apply this notion of social sense of agency, measured 129 
using a time interval reproduction paradigm, to a crucial component of social cognition – 130 
joint attention - a key way in which humans communicate. 131 
The above-reviewed binding evidence suggests that the socio-affective consequences 132 
of actions are coded in a generally similar way to non-social outcomes. Previous studies have 133 
shown saccade control can be guided by action-outcome effects, albeit in a non- social 134 
context (e.g Huestegge & Kreutzfeldt, 2012; Riechelmann, Pieczykolan, Horstmann, Herwig, 135 
& Huestegge, 2017). Relatedly, one eye-tracking study demonstrated that action-effect 136 
associations are made by the oculomotor system within a social context (Herwig & 137 
Hortsmann, 2011). Participants learned that their saccades triggered changes to onscreen 138 
facial expressions and adjusted their saccade accordingly. When they anticipated their 139 
saccade would trigger a smiling face, saccades landed near the mouth region and when they 140 
anticipated triggering a frown, saccades landed near the eyebrow region. This revealing 141 
finding illustrates how oculomotor actions can be influenced by perceived outcomes within a 142 
social context.  143 
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The actions studied thus far in the temporal binding literature are mostly restricted to 144 
button presses (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). In joint attention, the initiating act is 145 
an eye movement, whereby the gaze leader looks at an object, and a follower orients their 146 
attention to the same object (Frischen et al., 2007). Recent work has shown that people more 147 
efficiently detect instances when their gaze has been followed (Edwards, Stephenson, 148 
Dalmaso, & Bayliss, 2015), and that leading others’ gaze has consequences for subsequent 149 
interactions with those individuals (Bayliss et al., 2013; Dalmaso, Edwards & Bayliss, 2016). 150 
Having one’s eyes followed may necessarily involve the generation of a sense of agency over 151 
another’s congruent gaze response. Indeed, people do explicitly express a feeling of control 152 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2012) and naturalness (Bayliss et al., 2013) in such scenarios. Establishing 153 
with temporal binding that similar processes underpin implicit agency in social gaze orienting 154 
as with physical acts, would be an important advance in our understanding of how social 155 
attention operates. Specifically, such a finding could help to explain why noticing that 156 
someone else has followed your gaze to establish joint attention is such a powerful 157 
experience, despite it being a common occurrence (e.g. Edwards et al., 2015; Bayliss et al., 158 
2013). That is, rather than merely detecting that one’s gaze has been followed, we interpret 159 
the social response as a causal outcome of our initial action. 160 
Alternatively, it may not be this straightforward. There are also reasons to think that 161 
social agency might operate very differently to non-social agency. We have an enormous 162 
amount of experience of our physical manipulations of objects in the environment producing 163 
temporally contiguous outcomes. For example, when we kick a ball, it immediately moves. 164 
Therefore, the temporal window within which we become aware that our actions have 165 
produced an outcome are easily predictable. However, when we produce an action in order to 166 
elicit an outcome in another person, the temporal contiguity of the outcome has much more 167 
variance, making it harder to predict (Kunde, Weller, & Pfister, 2017). For example, a person 168 
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may not immediately respond to our request to pass us an object nor may they immediately 169 
respond to our gaze signals, if their attention was elsewhere. The variance inherent in social 170 
interactions is one reason why implicit agency might work differently in social compared 171 
with non-social contexts. On the one hand, the variance might mean that temporal binding 172 
effects associated with implicit sense of agency might not emerge at all because social agency 173 
detection relies on higher-level mechanisms such as Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 174 
1978) to make sense of social cause-and-effect. On the other hand, the instability of social 175 
interactions might actually elicit very reliable effects because of the critical importance of 176 
social agency detection, which could be underpinned by a system flexible enough to tolerate 177 
the inherent variance. Therefore, whether saccades that cause a social outcome could elicit 178 
temporal binding associated with implicit agency is an interesting open question for work 179 
both on social cognition and action monitoring. 180 
In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that gaze leading elicits temporal 181 
binding, which is offered as a measure of an implicit sense of agency (see Haggard, 2017, for 182 
a review). Participants’ time interval reproductions between an object’s appearance and an 183 
onscreen face looking at that object were compared between two tasks: an active task when a 184 
gaze leading saccade was made to the object, and a passive task in which no such gaze 185 
leading was performed. Therefore, we predicted that we would find greater temporal binding 186 
when participants’ eyes were followed to an object (Active Gaze Leading conditions) than 187 
when no saccades to the object were made (Passive conditions). Our data are consistent with 188 
this hypothesis, providing evidence that an implicit sense of agency, inferred from temporal 189 
binding, is generated in the gaze leader when their gaze is followed, establishing joint 190 
attention. A third experiment examined whether making an eye movement alone  could 191 
explain the temporal compression effects found in Experiments 1 and 2, but no reliable 192 
effects were detected. 193 
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2. Experiment 1 194 
In Experiment 1, participants completed an interval reproduction task under three 195 
conditions manipulated within-subjects. In the active task, for which we predicted reliable 196 
temporal binding, participants replicated the time interval between an object’s appearance, to 197 
which the participants were to immediately saccade, and the on-screen face’s gaze shift 198 
towards the object. As typical for temporal binding paradigms, we compared performance in 199 
the ‘active’ condition with a ‘passive’ condition in which no action is made by the 200 
participant. In the “Passive Face Fixation” condition participants fixated the face throughout.  201 
To provide a further control against which to compare any binding effects in the active task, 202 
we added a “Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation” condition.  Here, we replaced the face with a 203 
non-social stimulus. A strength of our design is that participants in all conditions estimated 204 
the temporal gap between the same two events – the object appearing and the main stimulus 205 
(a face in two of three conditions) changing. In the active condition, participants saccaded 206 
after the object’s appearance, and were instructed that their saccade was the cause of the on-207 
screen face moving its eyes. We also had participants complete the Autism Spectrum 208 
Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-209 
reported measure of autism-like traits. In all experiments, we have reported how we 210 
determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations and all measures. 211 
2.1. Method 212 
2.1.1. Participants 213 
Thirty-two participants (mean age=20.6 years; 2 were men) completed the study in 214 
return for course credit. We determined our target sample size by considering our relevant 215 
observed effect sizes in a previous study using the interval reproduction task (dz=.84-1.44; 216 
Howard, Edwards, & Bayliss, 2016) and from appraising the wider literature. Anticipating a 217 
large effect size dz = .8, with 1- = 0.95 at  = .05, would require n = 23. However, it seemed 218 
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appropriate here to anticipate a potentially smaller effect size than typically observed in 219 
temporal binding experiments using non-social actions, given the inherent variance 220 
associated with social responses to our own actions. We therefore targeted a sample of n=32, 221 
as this is closer to those used by ourselves and others to address similar questions. 222 
Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical approval was granted by 223 
the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, University of East Anglia. All participants were 224 
drawn from the Psychology undergraduate programme, were naïve to the aims of the study 225 
and gave written, informed consent. 226 
2.1.2. Stimuli 227 
The female face stimulus was a grayscale photograph with a calm expression 228 
(280×374 pixels) taken from Bayliss, Bartlett, Naughtin and Kritikos (2011), and had three 229 
versions: eyes direct, eyes closed and looking right. The object stimuli set comprised eight 230 
objects commonly found in the kitchen (varying in size; see Bayliss et al., 2013). The centre 231 
of the face was located 5 cm left-of-centre onscreen. The objects were presented 11.5cm to 232 
the right of the face. For one of the three conditions, a phase-scrambled version of the face 233 
was produced, comprising a rectangle (280x374 pixels) with two smaller rectangles (37x26 234 
pixels) placed where the eyes would be on the face. The smaller rectangles were phase 235 
scrambled versions of the face stimulus’ eye regions. Stimuli appeared on a black background 236 
and were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (see Figure 1).  237 
Fig. 1. 238 
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Trial sequence for the Active Gaze Leading task. Circles and the arrow were not displayed 239 
but represent where participants were instructed to fixate and the saccade from the face to the 240 
object, respectively. Participants looked at the face (a), displayed for 1000ms. Participants 241 
made a saccade (b) to the object as soon as it appeared. After a random inter-event interval of 242 
400ms to 2300ms, gaze onset (c) occurred. After 1000ms, estimate instruction appeared (d) 243 
until response. Participants pressed and released the space bar to replicate the inter-event 244 
interval. The inter-event interval is the time between the object appearing and the gaze onset.  245 
 246 
2.1.3. Apparatus and materials 247 
Right eye position was tracked with an infrared eye tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR 248 
Research, Ontario, Canada; resolution 0.10, 500 Hz). A chin rest was used to maintain head 249 
stability. Viewing distance was 70cm from eyes to a 45 cm monitor (resolution 1024×768 250 
pixels). A standard keyboard was used for manual responses. The Autism Spectrum Quotient 251 
Questionnaire was used as a measure of levels of autism-like traits (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al.,  252 
2001), presented using E Prime. A 1-8 scale was used for participants’ self-reported feelings 253 
of agency in each condition, with 8 representing the highest feeling of agency.  254 
2.1.4. Design 255 
The within-subjects design had three blocked conditions of 56 trials per task. Block 256 
order was counterbalanced across participants. There were six possible orders with six 257 
participants experiencing one order, six participants undergoing another order, and the 258 
remaining four orders had five participants each. The conditions were Active Gaze Leading, 259 
Passive Face Fixation and Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation. The dependent measure was 260 
the proportional reproduction error (RE), calculated by dividing the reproduced time interval 261 
by the actual time interval to calculate mean proportional reproduction. Thus, 100% 262 
reproduction would be reproduction with no error at all. The inter-event interval was the time 263 
between an object’s appearance and a subsequent on-screen gaze shift (Active Gaze Leading 264 
and Passive Face Fixation) or a spatial shift (Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation condition) 265 
towards the object. The temporal gap between the object’s appearance (rather than the 266 
saccade) and the face’s response was used to allow direct comparison between all conditions 267 
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(as no saccades are made in passive conditions). We also had a correlational design to 268 
examine any associations between levels of AQ and degree of temporal binding. 269 
2.1.5. Procedure 270 
Each experimental block commenced with a standard nine point eye tracking 271 
calibration, then 8 practice trials, then 56 experimental trials (see Figure 1). In the Active 272 
Gaze Leading task, for which we predicted reliable temporal binding, each trial began with 273 
the presentation of the face on the left side of the screen, looking straight ahead. Participants 274 
were instructed to look at the face (presented for 1000 ms) until an object appeared on the 275 
right of the face. This sudden onset was the participant’s cue to immediately saccade to it. 276 
Participants were told they must fixate on the object as soon as it appeared in the Active Gaze 277 
Leading task in order to cause the face to follow their gaze. Participants were instructed to 278 
fixate on the object after their gaze leading saccade, until the gaze shift occurred. After a 279 
randomly selected inter-event interval of 400-2300ms following the onset of the object, the 280 
face’s gaze shifted to the right to look at the object. Participants were given no further 281 
instructions about where to look after their gaze leading saccade, apart from that they must 282 
maintain fixation on the object until the gaze shift occurred. After 1000ms, the word 283 
“Estimate” appeared (white font, Courier, 18pt) above and below the face. This prompted the 284 
participant to manually press and hold down the spacebar for a duration that to their best 285 
ability replicated the time interval between the object’s appearance and the face’s gaze shift 286 
towards it. Participants were given no feedback about their responses. Finally, after releasing 287 
the spacebar, the display cleared to black for 1000ms. 288 
To be clear about the particulars of this ‘Active’ Gaze Leading condition, participants 289 
were told that their rapid saccade to the object was the causal event that made the face’s eyes 290 
follow theirs. We were able to confirm that this was the impression that participants had with 291 
the explicit agency ratings task (details in Results section 2.2.2). We relied on the low 292 
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variance of saccadic RT and spatial acuity in this very simple eye movement task to ensure 293 
that the minimum temporal gap of 400ms was greater than the vast majority of saccades. 294 
Moreover, timing the temporal gap from a single fixed onset that occurred in all conditions 295 
(the object onset) afforded us a straightforward and direct comparison across conditions.  296 
The first control condition, in which we predict accurate temporal reproduction, was 297 
the ‘Passive Face Fixation’ task. This was identical to the Active Gaze Leading condition, 298 
except that 1) the participant maintained fixation throughout on the face, and 2) the face had 299 
closed eyes at the start of each trial before looking to the right following the appearance of 300 
the object. The final control condition, Passive Phase-scrambled task, used a rectangle 301 
comprised of the phase scrambled face, with two smaller, phase scrambled rectangular 302 
regions, which provided a spatial shift towards the object, instead of a gaze shift. The phase 303 
scrambled rectangles, positioned in the place the eyes would have been, shifted 2mm to the 304 
right after the inter-event interval. The size of the 2mm spatial shift was chosen as this was 305 
the same spatial shift as the eyes moved in the Active Gaze Leading condition. In both these 306 
passive control conditions, participants were instructed to fixate the face/phase-scrambled 307 
face throughout each trial, and replicate the interval between object onset and averted gaze 308 
onset. It was emphasised to them that they were not causing the gaze shift to occur. After 309 
each task (at the end of a 56 trial block) participants self-reported their degree of felt control 310 
over the face’s eye movements or the rectangles shifting. The instruction was “Please rate 311 
how much control you felt over the onscreen face’s eye movements/rectangles shifting from 312 
1 to 8, 1 meaning no control at all to 8 meaning a lot of control.” Finally, participants 313 
completed the AQ on the computer. 314 
2.2. Results 315 
2.2.1. Proportional Reproduction 316 
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Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs above or below their individual 317 
means were removed (0.41% of trials). Mean proportional reproduction was calculated for 318 
each participant in each condition and submitted to statistical analysis (see Figure 2). We 319 
divided the reproduced time interval by the actual time interval to calculate mean 320 
proportional reproduction.  Therefore, 100% reproduction represents perfect accuracy, 321 
anything greater than 100% is over-reproduction, and less than 100% is temporal 322 
compression (under-reproduction). We report Greenhaus-Geisser corrected degrees of 323 
freedom when applicable. Confidence intervals and standard errors around the means are 324 
based on 1000 bootstrap samples. We report confidence intervals around effect sizes and 325 
have used ESCI (Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals) to calculate these 326 
(Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017). 327 
First, in order to establish whether each condition produced temporal compression 328 
(reliable under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze onset), or relatively 329 
accurate reproductions, we performed single sample t-tests for each of the three conditions 330 
using proportional reproduction. This showed that temporal compression was only 331 
statistically significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, participants reproduced 332 
M=84% of the veridical time interval, 95% CI [73, 96] (SD=32%), t(31)=2.76, p=.01, 333 
dz=0.69, 95% CI [0.18, 1.19]. In the two passive conditions, reproduction errors (REs) were 334 
low and did not differ statistically from 100% reproduction (Passive Face Fixation condition: 335 
M=100% reproduction, 95% CI [91, 112], SD=30%, t(31)=0.09, p=.926, dz=0.02, 95% CI [-336 
0.51,0.47]; Passive Phase-scrambled, M=94% reproduction, 95% CI [82, 100], SD=30%, 337 
t(31)=1.09, p=.286, dz=0.27, 95% CI [-0.22; 0.76]. There was a main effect of task, 338 
F(1.53,47.42)=10.91, MSE=207, p<.001, p2=0.260, and follow-up contrasts showed that the 339 
proportional temporal compression effect in the Active Gaze Leading condition was greater 340 
than in both the Passive Face Fixation, t(31)=3.73, p=.001, dz=0.52, 95% CI [0.21,0.82] and 341 
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Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation conditions t(31)=3.17, p=.003, dz=0.32, 95% CI 342 
[0.10,0.52].  Therefore, our hypothesis that having participants’ deliberately-initiated saccade 343 
followed would result in greater temporal compression than passive conditions (where no 344 
saccades were made) was supported. 345 
 346 
Fig. 2. 347 
Mean percentage reproductions by condition for both experiments. In Gaze Leading tasks, 348 
participants looked first at the face, and then at an object as soon as it appeared. In the 349 
Passive Face or Passive Phase Scrambled tasks, participants looked at the face or scrambled 350 
face throughout. In the Passive Object task (Experiment 2), participants looked at the 351 
placeholder/object throughout. The images show how the face/scrambled stimulus was 352 
displayed when gaze onset occurred. Circles and the arrow were not displayed but represent 353 
where participants were instructed to fixate (and the saccade from the face to the object for 354 
the Active tasks). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-subjects 355 
designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 356 
 357 
2.2.2. Secondary measures, manipulation checks, and participant subset analyses 358 
Mean self-reported explicit ratings of agency were greater for the Active Gaze 359 
Leading (M=4.44, SD=2.09), than both the Passive Face Fixation (M=2.25, SD=1.61) and 360 
Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation (2.03, SD=1.43) conditions; t’s>6, p’s<.001, dz’s>1. This 361 
shows that participants felt a degree of explicit agency in the Gaze Leading condition, 362 
supporting our inference that the temporal binding effect presented here reflects a sense of 363 
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agency. The mean AQ score was 16.59 (SD=5.58), which is normative, and did not correlate 364 
significantly with reproduction error in any condition (r< -.15, p>.4). 365 
We also considered potential concerns that something about performing a saccade per 366 
se might explain our data. Saccades can, indeed, affect time perception; a substantial amount 367 
of work has demonstrated an expansive effect (chronostasis; see review by Merchant & 368 
Yarrow, 2016), which if present in our data would of course increase our participants’ 369 
estimates (i.e. this effect, if present, would work in opposition to our predicted and 370 
demonstrated effects). However, two studies have noted an opposing compressive effect 371 
(Morrone, Ross & Burr, 2005; Yabe & Goodale, 2015). These opposing effects are small and 372 
of similar magnitude so would cancel each other out were they to be present in our (rather 373 
different) task, so are unlikely to account for our data. In the critical Active Gaze Leading 374 
condition, mean saccadic reaction time was 220ms (SD=41ms) and mean saccade duration 375 
was 81ms (SD=44ms). 376 
Further data exploration included checking for saccades executed after the onscreen 377 
face had moved its eyes, which was possible in our design. This could happen, for example, if 378 
the participant was rather slow on a trial with a short time interval. This could potentially 379 
affect the way that the participant perceived the agency of the social context. Such 380 
occurrences were present in nine participants, and on a maximum of three trials for a given 381 
participant (and a total of 0.7% of active trials). We reanalyzed the explicit and implicit data 382 
excluding all nine of these participants and found that the data pattern was very similar 383 
without these participants. Their mean explicit ratings are not different to those who never 384 
experienced this (M=4.5, SD=2.22 and M = 4.41, SD=2.15, respectively). Temporal 385 
compression was only statistically significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, 386 
participants reproduced M=84%, 95% CI [74,95] (SD=30%), of the veridical time interval 387 
t(22)=2.49, p=.02, dz=0.73, 95% CI [0.13,1.3]. In the two passive conditions, reproduction 388 
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errors were low and did not differ statistically from 100% reproduction, Passive Face 389 
Fixation condition: M=103%, 95% CI [93,113] SD=23%, t(22)=0.597, p=.556, dz=0.18, 95% 390 
CI [-0.75,0.40]; Passive Phase-scrambled, M=98%, 95% CI [87,109], SD=25%, t(22)=0.31, 391 
p=.763, dz= 0.09, 95% CI [-0.49,0.67].  392 
To check whether passive tasks were compromised by saccades occurring contrary to 393 
the fixation instruction, we also examined erroneous saccades; on only 0.28% of trials were 394 
saccades made in error to the object during the Passive Face task and in 0.11% of trials in the 395 
Passive Scrambled condition. These few trials are unlikely to have had a critical impact on 396 
the data. Thus, overall, saccade metrics cannot parsimoniously explain the observed time 397 
underestimation in the Active task at the trial or participant levels.  398 
As this is the first attempt to our knowledge using a temporal binding paradigm with 399 
saccades as the action, it is useful to examine whether our data share another commonality 400 
often observed in manual tasks in order to inform comparability across effectors. Previous 401 
temporal binding research using interval replication or estimation methodologies show 402 
stronger effects with longer intervals (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Wen, Yamashita, & 403 
Asama, 2015). In order to determine whether our data share this latter characteristic of the 404 
temporal binding phenomenon, we compared performance of each participant on the longer 405 
50% of intervals they estimated with the shorter 50% of intervals they estimated. In order to 406 
establish whether this pattern is present in our data we instead used the reproduction error as 407 
the measure, calculated in milliseconds as the participants’ reproduction of the temporal 408 
interval between two events minus the veridical temporal interval (rather than the proportion 409 
error used in the main analysis). The temporal compression effect was larger with the longer 410 
intervals, t(31)=10.27, p<.001, dz=1.75. This corroborates the notion that the observed data 411 
reflects a temporal binding effect, rather than some form of previously unreported saccade-412 
induced temporal discounting effect that would most likely be either proportional to saccade 413 
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metrics, or in fact be stronger for short intervals, not weaker (given the timescale of saccades, 414 
and the timescale of previously observed interactions between saccades and time perception). 415 
We can, therefore, confidently assert this effect is temporal compression of a similar nature to 416 
that previously observed following manual actions that cause physical outcomes.  417 
2.3. Discussion 418 
Participants reliably under-reproduced the temporal gap between an object appearing 419 
in the periphery, and an on-screen face responding by looking towards the same object, only 420 
when participants moved their eyes to that object in the belief that they caused the face to 421 
follow their eyes. This is an indication that participants’ eye movements resulted in an 422 
implicit sense of agency, the magnitude of which compares to temporal binding paradigms 423 
using manual actions that cause changes to the physical environment (Moore & Obhi, 2012). 424 
In both of our passive control conditions, our participants did not move their eyes to cause a 425 
social response, and they were rather accurate in their time reproductions. Therefore, we can 426 
be confident that the eye movement in the critical gaze leading condition caused the temporal 427 
compression associated with an implicit sense of agency. 428 
3. Experiment 2 429 
In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate the temporal binding effect in the Active Gaze 430 
Leading condition. It is notable that the Passive Face Fixation condition from Experiment 1 431 
involved a face with closed eyes, whereas the Active Gaze Leading condition began the trials 432 
with direct gaze. This leaves open the possibility that this initial social contact of direct gaze 433 
is critical. To explore this, in Experiment 2, we instead had the active condition begin with 434 
closed eyes, and two passive control conditions begin with open eyes. One of the passive 435 
control conditions replicated that of Experiment 1, with face fixation throughout. The new 436 
passive control condition had participants gaze at the object throughout the trial, which 437 
allowed us to examine the importance of end-state gaze location. This was because we 438 
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sometimes have our gaze followed after deliberate gaze leading, but we also have gaze 439 
followed incidentally when we happen to have been observed looking at an object. This is a 440 
scenario which is specifically found in a joint attention interaction, that is, gaze can be 441 
followed after deliberate gaze leading, but joint attention can result from a person following 442 
our passive attention to an object of interest, without any deliberate intention to engage in 443 
joint attention. It is, therefore, possible that agency may be experienced during joint attention 444 
when our gaze is followed incidentally, without a deliberate, gaze leading saccade. The new 445 
control condition enabled us to explore this possibility.  446 
3.1. Method 447 
A new sample of participants (n=32; mean age=19.7 years, four were men) was 448 
recruited from the same population as Experiment 1 and took part in return for course credits. 449 
The same stimuli were used as Experiment 1. The design involved changes to the three task 450 
conditions. The Active Gaze Leading condition was the same as Experiment 1 except that the 451 
onscreen face began each trial with closed eyes. The Passive Face Fixation task had the face 452 
commence with direct gaze. The new third condition, Passive Object Fixation, entailed the 453 
addition of a grey fixation dot (Courier, 18pt), which the participants were required to fixate 454 
at the start of each trial in this task and was where the object subsequently appeared. 455 
Therefore, in this Passive Object Fixation task, the onscreen gaze response occurred when 456 
participants were already looking at the object, not having first performed a gaze leading 457 
saccade to it. The procedure and task for participants was the same in all other respects for 458 
Experiment 2 as the previous experiment. 459 
3.2. Results 460 
3.2.1. Proportional Reproduction 461 
  Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs above or below their individual 462 
means were removed (0.28% of trials). The same processing and analysis was performed on 463 
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the data as in Experiment 1. First, in order to establish whether each condition produced 464 
temporal compression (reliable under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze 465 
onset), or relatively accurate reproductions, we performed single sample t-tests for each of 466 
the three conditions on the proportional reproductions. This showed that temporal 467 
compression was statistically significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, 468 
participants reproduced the temporal gap by M=80%, 95% CI [73,86] (SD=19%), t(31)=6.18, 469 
p<.001, dz=1.55, 95% CI [0.98, 2.10]. In the Passive Face condition, reproduction did not 470 
differ statistically from 100% reproduction  (Passive Face Fixation condition: M=96%, 95% 471 
CI [88, 104], SD=23%, t(31)=1.00, p=.327, dz=0.25, 95% CI [-0.24,0.74], but did in the 472 
Passive Object Fixation condition, M=90%, 95% CI [82,98], SD=22%, t(31)=2.70, p=.01, 473 
dz=0.67, 95% CI [0.17;1.18]. There was a main effect of task, F(2,62) =21.45, MSE 474 
=.221, p<.001, p2=0.409, and follow-up contrasts showed that the proportional temporal 475 
compression effect in the Active Gaze Leading condition was greater than in both the Passive 476 
Face Fixation, t(31)=6.02, p<.001, dz=0.79, 95% CI [0.46, 1.11] and Passive Object 477 
conditions t(31)=4.17, p<001, dz=0.51, 95% CI [0.23, 0.77]. 478 
3.2.2. Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset analyses 479 
As in Experiment 1, greater explicit agency was reported following the Active Gaze 480 
Leading (3.97, SD=1.79), than both the Passive Object Fixation (2.72, SD=1.57) and Passive 481 
Face Fixation (2.59, SD=1.50) conditions (t’s>3.6, p<.001, dz’s>0.7). The mean AQ score 482 
was 15.06 (SD=6.35), and did not correlate with reproduction error in any condition (r< -.15, 483 
p>.4). In the critical Active Gaze Leading condition, mean saccadic reaction time was 219ms 484 
(SD=57ms), and mean saccade duration for the gaze leading saccade was 79ms (SD=69). 485 
There were only 0.6% of trials where the onscreen face gaze shift occurred before the 486 
participant’s saccade was completed.  We performed the same check as Experiment 1, by re-487 
analysing the data with the 9 participants excluded who experienced a gaze shift onscreen 488 
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before their saccade was completed.  This was for only an average of 1.22 trials. These nine 489 
participant’s mean explicit ratings were not different to the rest of the sample (M = 3.66, 490 
SD=1.87 and M = 4.01, SD=1.75, respectively). The data showed a remarkably similar 491 
pattern. The Active Gaze Leading condition revealed temporal compression – participants 492 
reproduced 76%, 95% CI [68,84], SD=19% of the veridical time interval, t(22)=6.12, p<.001, 493 
dz=1.81, 95% CI [1.11,2.48]. The Passive Face Fixation condition did not produce temporal 494 
compression (M=92% reproduction, 95% CI [82,101] SD=23%, t(22)=1.77, p=.091, dz=0.52 495 
95% CI [-0.07,1.11]. However, the Passive Object Fixation task did reveal reliable under-496 
reproductions, of about one third less than that in the active condition; M=84% reproduction, 497 
95% CI [76,93] SD=19%, t(22)=3.87, p=.001, dz=1.14, 95% CI [0.51,1.76]. 498 
Saccades to the object in error were made on only 0.33% of trials during the Passive 499 
Face task. In the Passive Object task of Experiment 2, saccades in error away from the object 500 
to the face were made on only 0.06% of trials. Therefore, passive tasks were not 501 
compromised by erroneous saccades, just like Experiment 1, as these were so small in 502 
number. We ran the same split half analysis of binding by temporal interval as Experiment 1, 503 
and again showed larger effects with the longer intervals, t(31)=14.53, p<.001, dz=2.57, again 504 
supporting the notion that these are, indeed, temporal binding effects. 505 
3.3. Discussion 506 
We replicated both the binding effects for the Active Gaze Leading task and the null 507 
binding effects for the Passive Face Fixation task. Binding in the Passive Object Fixation task 508 
was significantly attenuated compared with the Active Gaze Leading task, but was 509 
nevertheless statistically reliable and is worthy of discussion so we address this further in the 510 
General Discussion below. For now, we note that there could perhaps be an implicit sense of 511 
agency (albeit reduced) which can be generated when there is a shift towards our object of 512 
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gaze, even if we feel we have only incidentally caused the gaze shift, rather than 513 
intentionally. 514 
4. Experiment 3 515 
 It is possible that saccades alone - devoid of social or agentic context - could produce 516 
binding. However, known saccade temporal disturbances have only previously been 517 
demonstrated at short intervals of around 100ms (e.g. Morrone et al., 2005), whilst ours are 518 
longer with an average of 1350ms. Nevertheless, it is worth checking if the mere oculomotor 519 
act of a saccade can produce similar effects. It is interesting to note that most temporal 520 
binding studies do not investigate whether a non-agentic manual action might produce 521 
distorted temporal judgements in and of themselves. However, because we know that 522 
saccades do produce some temporal distortion (Morrone et al., 2005; Yabe & Goodale, 523 
2015), our approach affords an opportunity to explore this fundamental question. However, 524 
we also note here that, as our primary interest is in social cognition and agency, we look 525 
forward to further work being conducted on this question as it relates to core mechanisms of 526 
saccade control and temporal distortions because our single experiment may only provide 527 
indicative evidence one way or another. In Experiment 3, therefore, we tested two conditions 528 
with no social aspect or agentic expectation and predicted a null effect. 529 
4.1 Method 530 
A new sample of participants executed a saccade of the same amplitude as 531 
Experiments 1 and 2 between two fixation crosses in a Saccade task. They began fixation on 532 
a first cross and saccaded to a second cross, when it appeared.  After the second cross 533 
appeared, the first cross enlarged. Participants then reproduced the interval between the 534 
second cross appearing and the first cross enlarging. In a No Saccade task, they maintained 535 
fixation on the first cross throughout, and reproduced the same time interval as the Saccade 536 
task. Thus, participants were exposed to a sequence of perceptual events, but none of these 537 
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events were social, and they experienced both a saccade task with the same temporal and 538 
spatial characteristics of Experiments 1 and 2 and a no saccade task. Furthermore, they were 539 
given no information about whether their eye movements were causing anything to occur. 540 
This allowed us to test, for the first time to our knowledge, whether saccades alone – devoid 541 
of social context - can elicit temporal binding. A power analysis (GPower: Faul, Erdfelder, 542 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) using the mean gaze leading effects from Experiments 1 and 2, 543 
found that n=29, would deliver 1- power=0.95. Therefore, our final sample of n=31 (after 544 
removing one participant who did not follow instructions) was appropriate.  545 
4.2 Results and Discussion 546 
We found no significant under-reproduction in the Saccade Task, M=94%, 95% CI 547 
[79,109] (SD=40%), t(30)=0.81, p=.427, dz=0.21, 95% CI [-0.29,0.70], nor in the No Saccade 548 
task,  M=105%, 95% CI [95,115] (SD=27%) t(30)=0.983, p=.333, dz=0.25, 95% CI [-0.75, 549 
0.25]. As our prediction was for a null effect to emerge in the Saccade task, we aimed to 550 
assist the interpretability of this null by performing a Bayes one-sample t-test (Rouder, 551 
Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson, 2009), using the expected effect size parameter as the 552 
average effect size from the active conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 of 1.12. This produced 553 
a JZS BF=5.82 in favour of the null suggesting that, from these data, the null hypothesis is 554 
5.82 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis. In addition, participants’ ratings of 555 
explicit agency were low in both conditions; Saccade Task M=2.13 (SD=1.45) and the No 556 
Saccade Task M=2.10 (SD=1.64). In the Passive Fixation Cross task, saccades in error to the 557 
second fixation cross were made on only 0.95% of trials. Taken together, this suggests that 558 
the motor act of the eye movement itself is unlikely to account for the temporal compression 559 
effects we found in the social context of an interaction with an onscreen face. 560 
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5. General Discussion 561 
We investigated the influence of gaze leading on the temporal compression effect 562 
known as temporal binding, which is associated with sense of agency. We showed, for the 563 
first time, that responses to our eye signals, like other motor actions, produce temporal 564 
binding within a simulated social interaction. This is offered as evidence for a form of 565 
oculomotor agency, which is informative for the understanding of social attention, and is 566 
more broadly of interest to the burgeoning field of technology with gaze-based interfaces 567 
(Slobodenyuk, 2016). Across four passive control conditions, we found no binding effects in 568 
three and an attenuated binding effect in the fourth. The explicit agency ratings supported our 569 
manipulation because greater ratings were made for active over passive tasks. We measured 570 
autism-like traits (AQ), but no relationship between binding and these were found. In a 571 
further control experiment, where fixation crosses replaced the face and object, we found no 572 
binding effects. 573 
Given the importance of joint attention in human social interactions, and the fact that 574 
saccades do not - outside of the laboratory, or through certain assistive technologies - cause 575 
physical outcomes, it was sensible to first investigate joint attention. As it turned out, our data 576 
are typical for the temporal binding literature, so we would in fact predict that intentional 577 
saccades that cause a different type of social outcome, or even a non-social outcome, would 578 
also produce temporal binding. Our present data can therefore contribute to, and open up new 579 
questions for social cognition and for the role of agency in eye movements per se. Given the 580 
similarity of our data to that of studies investigating non-social agency, our data are 581 
consistent with a common mechanism which attributes agency for social and non-social 582 
outcomes. The confirmation that saccades can elicit binding is of general importance for a 583 
field in which most of the outcomes resulting in binding are a consequence of a button press 584 
(see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). Relatedly, we note that in our active condition, the 585 
AGENCY FOR GAZE LEADING 
  184 
 
 
key saccade was voluntary, and it is therefore an interesting question as to whether or not 586 
reflexive exploratory saccades may drive similar agentic mechanisms.  587 
Learned outcomes from saccades when exploring faces can feedback to elicit changes 588 
to subsequent interactions (Herwig & Hortsmann, 2011). Taking this together with our data, 589 
we can offer a conceptual framework in which agency is experienced for gaze responses, and 590 
this may be the mechanism needed for feedback to drive subsequent changes in saccadic 591 
behaviour. This would also help explain the changes in visual exploration people exhibit 592 
when inspecting faces with which they had previously engaged in joint attention (see Bayliss 593 
et al., 2013). This is also consistent with a theoretical framework of sociomotor action control 594 
offered by Kunde et al., (2017) whereby the social responses received from our actions 595 
feedback to plan subsequent social actions. Experiencing agency over the social responses to 596 
our actions is a prerequisite to that process. We need to detect agency over any gaze 597 
following we elicit in order to deduce whether we have successfully cued attention to the 598 
referent object, in order to then plan the on-going social engagement. Thus, detecting the 599 
influence that we have had over others’ attentional states may be critical for everyday social 600 
interactions and even support theory of mind processes. Determining that mechanisms 601 
engaged via physical acts generalise to oculomotor agency adds to what we know about gaze 602 
leading in terms of attention (Edwards et al., 2015), and reward value (Schilbach et al., 2010; 603 
Gordon, Eilbott, Feldman, & Vander Wyk, 2013). Agency may be a key piece of the puzzle 604 
that supports joint action with co-ordination and cooperation (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009).  605 
The lack of binding in passive conditions shows that the mere presence of a social 606 
stimulus does not interfere greatly with accurate timing of intervals per se. However, the 607 
weaker but reliable binding effect in the Passive Object Fixation task of Experiment 2 is 608 
curious. This observation could merely reflect a carry-over effect from the active task blocks 609 
(given our repeated measures design). However, we examined those participants who 610 
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completed the Passive Object task first, and found that the binding effect was present 611 
(M=87% reproduction) and of a similar magnitude to the binding effect for all participants 612 
(M=90%), so carry-over effects are an unlikely explanation for the effects we found. 613 
Therefore, a more interesting (but speculative) suggestion would be that object-oriented 614 
attention in the presence of a face gazing at the same object might affect time estimation, 615 
even in the absence of a recently preceding action. It could be the case that if we are looking 616 
at an object already, we may attribute some agency to an observed congruent eye shift; but 617 
the effect is stronger if we have recently saccaded to that object (as in the Active Gaze 618 
Leading condition). This chimes with work highlighting the critical importance of objects in 619 
joint attention (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Bayliss et al., 2013; Lobmaier, Fischer, & 620 
Schwaninger, 2006). It is perhaps this aspect of our data that might lead to future research 621 
into what might be ‘special’ about social agency – we can cause others to behave in a certain 622 
way due to our present state, or even because we have not acted. We need to detect these 623 
interactions as well. Therefore, there may be a hierarchical system which attributes the 624 
greatest sense of implicit agency for intentional gaze leading and then an attenuated sense of 625 
implicit agency if a gaze shift is detected when we are already directing our gaze towards an 626 
object incidentally. This notion implies the importance of causality, in addition to 627 
intentionality, in these effects (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 628 
2012). 629 
There are a host of boundary conditions that remain untested in order to establish the 630 
conditions necessary and sufficient to produce indices of implicit agency in social contexts. 631 
One important future condition to test is to establish whether the observed gaze response 632 
needs to be congruent with the participant’s saccadic action, or can be any response (e.g. to 633 
avert gaze, or to change emotional expression, for example). We speculate that possibly an 634 
incongruent gaze shift might elicit binding if we feel we have caused another to look away 635 
AGENCY FOR GAZE LEADING 
  186 
 
 
from our direction of interest.  Whether this would be binding of the same magnitude as a 636 
congruent gaze shift (or no binding at all) would be interesting for future studies to explore. 637 
The current results identify just one instance in which temporal binding can occur following a 638 
causal eye movement. Although determining the specificity of this effect is of course 639 
important for understanding the nature of the mechanisms involved, if future work were to 640 
demonstrate that the effect does generalise widely, this would not necessarily reduce the 641 
direct importance of this mechanism for understanding how social cognition is supported by 642 
such basic sensorimotor mechanisms. 643 
One potential complication for the interpretation of our findings is that in both active 644 
and passive conditions, participants must detect the onset of the object in their periphery 645 
(while they are looking at the face). However, in the active tasks, the onset of the responding 646 
gaze shift is to be detected in their periphery because the participant is now looking at the 647 
object having performed a saccade, while in the passive conditions, the participant detects the 648 
gaze shift at their point of fixation, having not moved their eyes. This difference could have 649 
affected the speed of detection of the gaze shift across conditions. However, were participants 650 
to be slower to detect the gaze shift in their peripheral vision in the active task, this would 651 
have extended their time estimations, which means that our binding effects may have, if 652 
anything, been artificially relatively reduced. Despite this difference potentially working 653 
against our predictions, medium (Experiment 1) and large (Experiment 2) binding effect sizes 654 
emerged.  655 
Another notable aspect of our design is that we used closed eyes for the Passive Face 656 
task in Experiment 1 because we wanted to ensure participants could easily identify that the 657 
passive task was different to the active task (with open eyes), to ameliorate against potential 658 
carry-over effects. In Experiment 2, the face was depicted with closed eyes until averted gaze 659 
was displayed – no direct gaze towards the participant. The closed eyes at the outset could be 660 
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interpreted as less agentic by participants, but this does not appear to be the case as explicit 661 
agency ratings were similar in both Experiments 1 and 2, as were the magnitude of binding 662 
effects (or even larger observed effect sizes in Experiment 2). We speculate that ambiguity 663 
may result in stronger attribution of agency when there is a spatial shift towards our direction 664 
of gaze. It may be adaptive to assume that we caused an outcome for which we believe – but 665 
are uncertain - that we were responsible for eliciting. The consequences of under-attribution 666 
of responsibility for a social outcome could be particularly costly, whilst a little over-self-667 
attribution is unlikely to lead to adverse consequences. This explanation is consistent with 668 
recent findings reported by Desantis, Waszak, and Gorea (2016), who found that participants 669 
over-attribute self-agency when they are in an ambiguous situation. We suspect that this 670 
result may suggest that binding effects will emerge in instances where the end-point of joint 671 
gaze occurs (given that joint attention can be incidental, as well as deliberate – both of which 672 
are important to notice and interpret). This is another interesting line for future investigations 673 
with respect to social agency specifically.  674 
Although the null effects on temporal estimation in Experiment 3 support the notion 675 
 that the data from Experiment 1 and 2 do reflect a temporal binding effect in a social setting, 676 
it is worthwhile considering that one might have expected reliable temporal underestimation 677 
even in the context of a non-agentic, non-social saccade task of Experiment 3. Specifically, it 678 
is known that eye movements do lead to temporal underestimations (saccadic compression, 679 
 e.g. Morrone et al., 2005), but this did not emerge clearly in Experiment 3 in our data. One 680 
explanation for this could be that the known saccadic-driven temporal effects may not be 681 
 observable in the time intervals of the magnitude we employed here. Our temporal intervals 682 
varied around a mean of 1350ms, while the studies that have discovered saccade-triggered 683 
 temporal distortions have typically employed much shorter intervals (~100ms, e.g. Morrone 684 
et al., 2005).  685 
AGENCY FOR GAZE LEADING 
  188 
 
 
Another potential reason for the failure to observe this temporal compressive effect of 686 
saccades per se is possibly due to the action of an opposing temporally expansive 687 
process,‘chronostasis’, which could operate simultaneously under our experimental 688 
conditions leading to temporal equilibrium (see Merchant & Yarrow, 2016, for a review and 689 
see also Knöll, Morrone, & Bremmer, 2013; Yarrow et al., 2001). Achieving this equilibrium 690 
may be advantageous for spatio-temporal perceptual stability, and a naïve assumption would 691 
be that such equilibrium would emerge more readily after longer temporal intervals, hence we 692 
observed a null effect overall in Experiment 3. This is speculative, however, and it is clear 693 
that future explorations of the direct effects of saccades on timing estimates will assist with 694 
the contextualisation of our present data, and indeed with other work studying social 695 
cognition that involves interactive eye movements and other actions. 696 
 Future work could employ a gaze-contingent design to explore agency in social gaze 697 
interactions. The present work did not take this approach. If we had yoked more directly the 698 
action of the participant to the stimulus changes by using gaze-contingent stimuli, we could 699 
have expected our participants to report a greater explicit sense of agency than we found here, 700 
and the temporal binding effects might have also been more stable. We did not employ a gaze 701 
contingent design here because we wished to avoid the introduction of a confound. 702 
Specifically, in the Active Saccade task the to-be-estimated time interval would have 703 
included three periods of temporal lag that would not be present in the Passive conditions, 704 
making them not comparable without off-line adjustment. These lag periods are the saccade 705 
latency, the saccade duration and the eye-tracker uptake time to detect good fixation upon the 706 
object in order to cause the gaze shift. By not using gaze contingent stimuli, our chosen 707 
design afforded direct comparison of actual time intervals across conditions. Nevertheless, it 708 
is clear that future studies should employ gaze contingent designs that circumvent the issues 709 
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we note above to overcome this limitation of the present research. This would allow for even 710 
more robust tests of hypotheses regarding the temporal dynamics of social gaze. 711 
We found no reliable correlations between binding effects and autism quotient scores. 712 
It may nevertheless be important to test similar paradigms in clinical samples given previous 713 
findings of sub-optimality for joint attention initiation (Mundy & Newell, 2007), and 714 
decreased temporal binding effects in autism (Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2014). 715 
Relatedly, it is notable that some forms of psychosis, such as might be experienced by those 716 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, are associated with disrupted sense of agency (see 717 
Haggard, 2017, for a review). Therefore, this may generalise to problems with understanding 718 
other’s actions, which can be particularly problematic within the social setting of a joint 719 
attention interaction. These data are also of direct relevance for developers of gaze-controlled 720 
interfaces, a field that is currently grappling with issues of agency and control (Grgič et al., 721 
2016; Slobodenyuk, 2016). For example, our findings can help inform research into making 722 
human-robot interactions more naturalistic when designing robots who can produce eye gaze 723 
responses to human gaze signals. Similarly, socially assistive robotics is a growing area 724 
where roboticists apply findings from cognitive science to inform the design of therapeutic 725 
interventions. Such interventions have been developed for a range of applications, including 726 
dementia, mental health, social communication for children with autism and stroke 727 
rehabilitation (see Matarić, 2017, for a review). Our research is also informative for 728 
developers of gaze-controlled interfaces more generally. Building on the boundary conditions 729 
for when eye movements can generate a similar sense of agency as other motor actions do, 730 
can inform how to make such technologies acceptable to users. Recent innovations of 731 
employing face/eye scanning in smartphones exemplify that using our eyes to control objects 732 
will soon be an everyday occurrence, so understanding oculomotor agency in social and non-733 
social contexts is of direct relevance to medical and consumer product development. 734 
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To conclude, this study shows for the first time that temporal binding can occur when 735 
a social gaze response is perceived to result from intentional eye saccade bids for joint 736 
attention. We offer this as an implicit sense of agency effect that follows oculomotor actions 737 
that lead to a state of joint attention. 738 
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Appendix B: AQ Questionnaire 
The Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ)  
Ages 16+ 
 
SPECIMEN, FOR RESEARCH USE ONLY. 
 
For full details, please see: 
 
S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin and E. Clubley, (2001) 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) : Evidence from Asperger Syndrome/High 
Functioning Autism, Males and Females, Scientists and Mathematicians 




Name:...........................................   Sex:........................................... 
 
Date of birth:...................................   Today’s Date................................. 
 
 
How to fill out the questionnaire 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. 
 
 DO NOT MISS ANY STATEMENT OUT. 
Examples 
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3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy 










4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 




















6. I usually notice car number plates or similar 










7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve 










8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 





















10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 

































































16. I tend to have very strong interests which I get 





















18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get 





















20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 
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27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when 










28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, 





















30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a 































33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s 
































36. I find it easy to work out what someone is 










37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 




















39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on 










40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 
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41. I like to collect information about categories of 
things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, types of 










42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like 






















































































50. I find it very easy to play games with children 












The Autism Research Centre 




 MRC-SBC/SJW Feb 1998 
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Appendix C: AQ Sub-scales Correlational Analyses for Experiments 6 and 7 
 
Experiment 6 AQ Sub-scale Analyses 
The sub-scales are attention switching, attention to detail, communication, imagination and 
social skills. There was one significant, medium correlation between the AQ sub-scale of attention to 
detail and the number of high confidence hits for averted gaze faces, r(35)=0.342, p=.044. The higher 
the score on the AQ sub-scale for attention to detail, the greater the number of high confidence hits for 
recollection of non joint attention faces. This correlation is shown in a scatterplot in Figure A1.  
 
 
Figure A1. Scatterplot showing the positive correlation between scores on the AQ sub-scale for 
attention to detail and the number of high confidence hits for non joint attention faces. 
 
There was no correlation between AQ and RT to identify gender collapsed across conditions, 
r(35)= 0.286, p= .096, nor between AQ and RT for joint attention faces, r(35)= 0.179, p= .303. 
However, there was a medium, positive correlation between AQ and RT for non-joint attention faces, 
r(35)= 0.363, p= .032. The greater the AQ score, the slower to identify gender after gaze leading when 
the response was averted gaze. This correlation is shown in Figure A2. Delving deeper into this finding, 
the correlation was driven by the AQ sub-scales of attention switching, r(35)=0.411, p=.014 and social 
skills, r(35)=0.373, p=.028.  
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Figure A2. Scatterplot showing the positive correlation between AQ scores and the RT to report the 
gender of non joint attention faces. 
There were no significant correlations between total AQ scores and RT to report old/new for 
joint or non joint attention faces or foils, or collapsed across conditions or the difference between RT 
to joint and non-joint attention faces, rs<0.201, ps>.075. However, there were eight significant, 
medium correlations between the AQ sub-scales of attention switching and attention to detail and RT 
performance on the old/new task. These correlations are summarised in Table A1.  
Table A1.  
Descriptive statistics RT (in milliseconds) for old/new task and correlation coefficients with AQ sub-
scale scores, with 95% BCa confidence intervals reported in parenthesis. Confidence intervals are 
based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 




1. RT for JA faces 657 [263, 1657] 294 0.358* 0.341* 
2. RT for NJA faces 628 [335, 1174] 204 0.356* 0.448** 
3. RT for foils 665 [371, 1423] 247 0.371*  0.430* 
4. RT collapsed all conditions 650 [328, 1419] 239 0.376*  0.416* 
Abbreviations: M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. AQ = Autism Quotient. JA = joint attention. 
NJA = non joint attention.  
Note: * p <.05, ** p<.01, two-tailed. N=35.  
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Experiment 7 
 AQ Sub-scale Analyses 
There were two significant correlations between number of hits in the face recognition task 
and some of the AQ sub-scales, although the correlation between the attention to detail sub-scale and 
number of high confidence hits for non joint attention faces in Experiment 6 did not replicate. There 
was a small to medium, negative correlation between the number of high confidence hits for joint 
attention faces and score on the imagination AQ sub-scale, r(58)= -0.24, p=.045. A scatterplot 
showing this correlation can be found at Figure A3. The higher the AQ score for imagination, the 
lower the number of high confidence hits for joint attention faces.  
 
Figure A3. Scatterplot showing the negative correlation between scores on the AQ sub-scale for 
imagination and the number of high confidence hits for joint attention faces. 
 
There was a medium, positive correlation between the difference between the high 
confidence hits for joint and non joint attention and score on the social skills AQ sub-scale, r(58)= 
0.308, p=.019. A scatterplot showing this correlation can be found at Figure A4. The greater the 
difference between number of high confidence hits for joint and non joint attention, the higher the 
score on the social skills sub-scale. 
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Figure A4. Scatterplot showing the positive correlation between scores on the AQ sub-scale for 
social skills and the difference between number of high confidence hits for joint and non joint 
attention faces. Positive differences mean more high confidence hits for joint attention over averted 
gaze faces. Negative differences mean more high confidence hits for non joint attention over joint 
attention faces. 
 
There were no correlations between AQ and RT to identify gender collapsed across 
conditions, for joint attention faces, or non-joint attention faces, rs<0.041, ps>.761. The medium 
correlation between AQ and RT for non-joint attention faces found in Experiment 6, therefore, did 
not replicate. None of the AQ sub-scale correlations with RT for old/new found in Experiment 6 
replicated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
